I collect, in this blog post, all terms which I have defined in other blog posts, and give links to the posts in which I have done so. Terms are given in alphabetical order, so that one should refer to the posts themselves to see the definitions in their topical context. Definitions from retracted blog posts are not included.
I have also tried to define all the principal terms that I use differently from the common dictionary usage, even when my usage of them is pretty standard in philosophy; but I may have missed some of those, and some source such as Wuellner may be consulted for them. In those definitions, the linked post will be one where the word is merely used prominently, rather than defined.
I have not tried to define standard philosophical terms that have no different usage outside of philosophy, such as “a priori” or “analytic judgment”. Words that have common dictionary senses are often used in those senses, and I have not tried to reproduce the common dictionary definitions here.
Definitions
accident, n. 1. something that is understood, but cannot be imagined by itself, and must be imagined as part of a whole, which whole is called a substance. So, for instance, color is an accident, since it must be imagined as part of a surface. 2. a form which is understood through an apparent thing but is not understood to belong to that thing’s nature, and may change while the thing remains the same thing. So, for instance, the color white is an accident in a chair, and it may, therefore, change colors while remaining a chair. [cf.]
act, n. 1. action, q.v.; 2. contrasted with potency. an appearance, insofar as it is intelligible, q.v. [cf.]
action, n. a motion which is efficiently caused by an object, which is called the actor or agent with respect to the action. [cf.]
action conflict, phrase. the fact of different human beings having conflicting purposes to achieve with the same material thing, and being unable, given their specific practical constraints, to reach any kind of unity of purpose. [cf.]
anger, n. hatred of perceived injustice in a particular human being, creating a desire that that human being be punished. [cf.]
animal, n. 1. a being which is both animate and sensitive, q.v. [definition from Porphyry, Isagoge; cf.] 2. the infrahuman animals, specifically.
rational animal, an animal that is rational, q.v.; a classical definition of human beings.
animate, adj. an appearance which is understood to be capable, by nature, of containing the efficient cause of its own motions. [cf.]
aristocracy, n. the highest of three social classes, discussed here and here.
apparent, adj. technical sense. see appearance. [cf.]
appearance, n. an actual or possible object of the senses or imagination. [cf.]
appetite, n. an apparent thing’s faculty of desiring, i.e., having desires, q.v.
concupiscible appetite, a part of the sensitive appetite; see concupiscible desire. [cf.]
irascible appetite, a part of the sensitive appetite; see irascible desire. [cf.] The irascible appetite inclines us to strive and fight for sensible goods that are difficult to preserve or to attain.
natural appetite, final causality; the fact that a thing naturally seeks its end, and therefore may be said to “desire” it, in a very general sense. This term is avoided in this blog.
rational appetite, a.k.a. the will; the fact that reason desires knowledge, and by extension desires all things which it conceives of as good, i.e., in accordance with their concepts. [cf.]
sensitive appetite, the power of having sensitive desires. [cf.]
authority, n. a right existing within innate relationships, all of which are unequal; it gives the superior a right to control the inferior and his property, as well as responsibility for the inferior’s welfare and development. [cf.]
autonomous, adj. having free will, q.v. [cf.]
aversion, n. see hatred. [cf.]
being, n. whatever is the object of understanding, i.e., intelligible. As such, it includes only universals, not particulars. To say that something belongs to this class, we might say that it is, without a complement, as in, “God is”; but since this usage is not readily understood today, the circumlocution “is being” is often used. [cf.] With an article, as in, “a being”, it refers to a particular thing that is understood.
bicodicism, n. the idea that morality and law have different intrinsic principles, so that some things are intrinsically opposed to law regardless of whether there are actual laws against it, and those things are not necessarily the same things that are immoral. [cf.]
body, n. 1. any extended thing. 2. the human body, as contrasted with the mind; the source of the senses and passions.
bourgeoisie, n. the middle one of three social classes, discussed here and here.
capitalism, n. renounced word; not used since 2020-10-05. [cf.]
cause, n. any of the four things implied by our understanding of an apparent, changing object, especially the efficient cause. [cf.]
composed cause, a cause that is composed of multiple other causes, as for instance many bricks come together to cause a house. [cf.]
final cause, the fact that some of an apparent object’s changes may be referred to its form; the form, in this respect, is called the end, and those changes are said to be ordered to its end. [cf.]
formal cause, the form that is understood through an apparent object. [cf.]
efficient cause, the appearance which is a means to understanding a particular appearent object’s position in time and space. [cf.]
material cause, the fact that an object appears; may refer to forms that are understood through parts of its appearance, such as e.g. wood, in relation to a wooden chair. [cf.]
per accidens cause, an accident belonging to a per se cause. “For example we say that the grammarian builds; the grammarian is called the cause of the building per accidens, not in so far as he is a grammarian, but in so far as it happens to the builder that he is a grammarian.” [cf.]
per se cause, the cause of something, as such. [cf.]
simple cause, a cause that is not composed of other causes. [cf.]
ceptibilism, n. the opinion that what exists is what is “ceptible” or “ceivable”, i.e., either conceivable or perceivable. This opinion is embodied in the definition of “existence” in this glossary. [cf.]
character writing, phrase. a genre of writing that attempts something like a character sketch of a type of persons, rather than a specific person. [cf.]
choice, n. an exercise of willpower, q.v. [cf.]
clarity, n. the virtue of tending to effectively convey what you think; contrasted with transparency, q.v. [cf.]
cognition marker, phrase. a phrase, such as “by nature” or “by definition”, which marks a sentence as representing an analytic or a synthetic judgment. [cf.]
compassion, n. the body’s instinctive awareness, by way of a kind of ‘matching’, of the passions of other animals, including other human beings. [cf.]
compassivity, n. a virtue which regulates the passion called compassion toward the rational measure. [cf.]
communication, n. any act oriented to produce belief in the minds of others. [cf.]
concept, n. “the intellect’s representation in itself of the form or essence of a thing.” (Wuellner) This blog is neutral on issues of the location and origin of concepts, and of whether they are really distinct from forms or essences, since I take such questions to be ill-conceived. [cf.]
contradictory concepts, concepts of which one negates the other, as for instance in the concepts of “rational” and “irrational” (meaning “not rational”). [cf.]
concupiscence, n. the sensitive appetite, q.v. [cf.]
condition, n. that which allows a cause to produce its effect; this may be done positively, as an instrument or a means (e.g., a bow is a condition of violin-playing), or negatively, by removing obstacles (e.g., proper tuning is a condition of piano-playing). (definition taken from Jolivet, Cours de philosophie, cf.)
conspiracy theory, phrase. 1. neutral sense. a theory that explains some facts by supposing that there was a secret agreement between some people; such a secret agreement is called a conspiracy. 2. negative sense. a theory that, besides explaining some facts by postulating a conspiracy, also discredits all opposing reports by postulating that there are many widespread lies about it; lies which were, at least initially, spread intentionally, as a means to further the interests of the conspiracy. [cf.]
contract, n. a promise joined to a conditional transfer of property, such that, if the promise is not fulfilled, some property is transferred from the promising party to the other party, or to a third party. This contractual transference of property is not a punishment. [cf.]
corporeal, adj. bodily, having a physical location. Typically taken to be extended, occupying space; technically, Euclidean points are corporeal, but they are generally irrelevant. [cf.] Corporeal things have commensurable magnitudes; so, although you may imagine a boat in your mind, there is no way to compare the size of your mental image with the size of a real boat, which renders that image incorporeal, though it represents a corporeal thing.
corruption, n. “motion [away from] form”, i.e., a change which makes a certain form no longer be intelligible through its object. May be distinguished into corruption simpliciter, which corrupts a substance, and corruption secundum quid, which corrupts an accident. [cf.] Contrasted with generation.
cruelty, n. a vice opposed by way of defect to the virtue of compassivity, causing someone to be lacking in the passion called compassion. [cf.]
damages, n. compensation paid for wear, use, or other damage done without permission to property which someone did not own. Distinct from punishment and restitution, q.v. [cf.]
desire, n. 1. very general sense; avoided in this blog. natural appetite, q.v.; final causality. 2. an inclination in a conscious being to seek an apparent good, or turn away from an apparent evil. [cf.]
correct rational desire, a desire which is fully rational, since reason suffered no sensitive interference, and therefore produced true knowledge and well-ordered desire. In my usage, rational refers only to the desire’s being caused by reason rather than the senses, while the addition of correct or incorrect is what expresses the desire’s being reasonable or not. [cf.]
concupiscible desire, a sensitive desire to seek what is sensibly pleasant, or to avoid what is unpleasant or painful. [cf.]
irascible desire, a sensitive desire to seek what is useful for obtaining something sensibly pleasant, or to avoid what is dangerous because it will lead to something painful. [cf.]
incorrect rational desire, a desire which is rational but not correct; see rational desire and correct rational desire.
natural desire, a desire which comes to an apparent thing from its nature; the term is generally avoided in this blog, since I do not believe that there are “artificial desires”. [cf.]
rational desire, a desire which is caused by reason; primarily, it is the desire for knowledge, and secondarily, for all things insofar as they are intelligible, i.e., for all being. [cf.] Reason’s power of desiring is called the rational appetite, or will.
sensitive desire, a desire which is caused by the sensitive powers and has sensible things for its object. [cf.]
dialogical motivations, phrase. motivations that someone gives in dialogue for their own belief, as contrasted with psychological motivations, which include your full mental model of how they came to the belief. [cf.]
difference, n. “otherness; a lack of sameness or of identity between two or more.” (Wuellner)
difference in appearance, the fact that two images appear different in some way; lack of resemblance. [cf.]
difference in kind, the fact that two images are understood through different concepts. [cf.]
difference in number, the fact that two images are discontinuous in place or time. [cf.]
discernment, n. a philosophical virtue relating to the first rule of philosophy, and which consists in always being rational and thinking about things clearly and distinctly. [cf.]
disutility of servitude, phrase. the fact that it is generally unpleasant to obey someone else. [cf.]
division, n. tends to be used in the logical sense, as in, the separation of a genus into species by means of differences; I believe that philosophy must begin with two fundamental divisions, which I call the first and second. [cf.]
first division: the division of everything into being (the intelligible) and non-being (the unintelligible). [cf.]
second division: the division of everything into matter (sensible), form (intelligible), their compounds (both), and nothingness (neither). [cf.]
element, n. said of the material things out of which something is composed, and most properly of those things which are not, in turn, composed of other things. According to modern theories, the elements are the so-called “elementary particles”; premodern theories gave different divisions of elements, with the most popular being the classical division into fire, earth, air, and water. [cf.]
end, n. something’s final cause, q.v.; also called last end.
enthusiasm, n. used in a sense derived from Hume’s essay on superstition and enthusiasm, but characterized further by the notes that it generally involves attributing natural things to human artifice, and that it is generally promoted by proletarian ideology. [cf., and also]
empathy, n. a synonym of compassion, q.v.
equipassism, n. an aversion, caused by an excess of compassion (hypercompassivity), to claims that different groups of human beings will have different passions in the same circumstances. [cf.]
evidence, n. the quality of being evident, or easy to understand. The concrete sense, as in, “I have evidence for this”, is a renounced word, not used since 2022-01-05. [cf.]
evil, adj. metaphysical sense. non-being; whatever is unintelligible, especially privation, q.v. [cf.]
evil, n. any evil thing; see the adjective.
examined, adj. said of a sensitive desire, or sensitive habit, that has been judged by reason with regard to whether it is in accordance with reason, i.e., identical in priority to a correctly-formed rational desire, or rational habit, regarding the same object. [cf.]
exist, v. to have, or be part of, existence, q.v.
existence, n. hopelessly ambiguous term, which I should like to renounce, but must retain at least in the more popular use. In my usage, existence refers either to (intelligible, universal) being or to (imaginable, particular) appearance. I believe that any usage which refers to neither is incomprehensible. [cf.; and also]
extended, adj. occupying space; having parts in different locations; having physical dimensions, such as length, width, breadth; having size. All extended things are corporeal. [cf.]
faith, n. belief taken on trust in someone’s authority. [cf.]
divine faith, faith in God.
human faith, faith in a human being.
feminism, n. the belief that, in your current society, women suffer injustice for being women. [cf.]
filiation, n. the unequal, innate, autotelic human relationship that exists by nature between parents and children; also called parenthood. [cf.]
form, n. something intelligible, or being; in the philosophical sense, the use of this term is usually to refer to the form of some appearance, i.e., whatever is intelligible about the appearance; but whatever is understandable is form as well as being. [cf.]
formal, adj. belonging to form, q.v.
friendship, n. an equal autotelic human relationship; occurs to the extent that two human beings share the same knowledge, which causes them to love each other and be unable to enter into action conflicts about property, so that they effectively hold all that they own in common. It is, objectively, the best possible kind of human relationship. [cf.]
generation, n. “motion to form”, i.e., a change which makes a certain form intelligible through its object. May be distinguished into generation simpliciter, which generates a substance, and generation secundum quid, which generates an accident. [cf.] Contrasted with corruption.
god, n. a rational animal that always contains the final cause of its motions, and is therefore immortal, or incorruptible; [cf.] not to be confused with God, with a capital G.
God, n., the same as being, taken as a form or concept. [cf.]
good, adj. desirable, i.e., able to be desired. [cf.]
metaphysically good, a possible object of correct rational desire, q.v. [cf.]
morally good, in accordance with the nature of a rational being; an action or habit that is metaphysically good. [cf.; and also]
good, n. any common object of desire, q.v.
economic good: usually, any common object of desire, q.v.; in Murray Rothbard’s usage, it sometimes referred to proper objects of desire, or to common objects conceived of as answering to a particular configuration of proper objects. [cf.]
the good: all things of which the adjective “good” may be said. [cf.; definition from G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica]
goodwill, n. rational desire for the good of another being; when had for human beings, tends to cause compassion. [cf.]
habit, n. an enduring disposition to act in a certain way; a permanent quality which disposes a human being to perform certain types of actions with ease, accuracy and consistency. [cf.]
rational habit, a habit of the rational powers; a tendency for a rational desire to reoccur and become foremost, and be acted upon. [cf.]
sensitive habit, a habit of the sensitive powers; a tendency for a sensitive desire to reoccur and become foremost, and be acted upon. [cf.]
hatred, n. a passion consisting in sensitive desire for something which is thought to be opposed to something that is currently apparent, causing in turn a desire for that actually apparent thing to disappear, so that the sensitive desire may possibly be fulfilled. As such, only hatred of privation is in accordance with reason. [cf.]
hermeneutical dogmatism, phrase. the belief that the true meaning of a written text can be determined with clarity and certainty, in the absence of its author and of any interpreting authority, by means of careful reading and historical research. [cf.]
hermeneutical scepticism, phrase. the belief that the true meaning of a written text cannot be determined with clarity and certainty without recourse to its author or to a living interpreting authority, no matter how much wisdom and research is brought to bear upon it. [cf.]
human being, phrase. a rational, mortal animal that reproduces sexually; see this post for more details.
hypercompassivity, n. a vice opposed by way of excess to the virtue of compassivity, causing someone to be excessive in the passion called compassion. [cf.]
image, n. something represented by the senses or the imagination.
contrary images, images which cannot be imagined appearing at the same place and time. [cf.]
disordered image, an image in the imagination which represents something that has not appeared under the external senses, and could not be understood if it did so appear. [cf.] This term was coined to complete a division of terms, and never actually used as of now.
imagine, v. to represent in the imagination.
imaginable, adj. a possible object of the imagination.
imagination, n. an internal sense, which allows images to be formed in the mind. [cf.] This is a traditional term, on which I have cited Poissy’s manual before. [cf.] I claim that this is involved in all mental movements, including incorporeal thoughts, such as “I think, therefore I am”. [cf.] The intellect only acts by itself in motionless understanding of concepts. I nevertheless deride undue use of the imagination in philosophy, resulting in corporeal notions such as “in” and “out” being applied to incorporeal things. [cf.]
incorporeal, adj. not corporeal, q.v. [cf.]
individual appropriation, phrase. the allocation of unowned property to particular human beings, especially individuals as opposed to groups. [cf.]
inextended, adj. not extended, q.v. [cf.]
inspiration, n. a miracle which is observed in a human being’s own imagination. [cf.]
integrity, n. a philosophical virtue relating to the third rule of philosophy, and which consists in never trying to rationalize anything. [cf.]
intellect, n. see reason. [cf.]
intellectual, adj. belonging to the intellect, i.e. the reason, q.v.
intelligible, adj. understandable; capable of representation by mental concepts. Whatever is intelligible is, to that extent, being; and vice-versa. So, this includes only universals, not particulars. [cf.]
intelligibility differential, phrase. the fact that in some apparent things, the movement is more easily referred to the form than others; the ground of all rational value judgments between appearances. [cf.]
intuition, n. renounced word; not used since 2022-01-05. [cf.] Used in the Kantian sense in posts about Kant. [cf.]
inverse law of ignorance and contempt, phrase. a sorry attempt that I made at coining a name for the idea that “the less you know, the less you know about your ignorance”, which is often mislabeled the Dunning-Kruger effect. [cf.]
joy, n. the mind’s awareness of the fulfilment of rational desire; compare pleasure. [cf.]
know, v. I give no technical meaning to this term, and it can refer loosely to any of the kinds of belief, although I believe it belongs most truly to the understanding of forms.
Knowing God Differently Problem (KGDP), phrase. the fact that question 12 of the first part of the Summa Theologiae claims that “of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another” (1.12.6), and that “this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power”, but keeps it unintelligible how it is that persons can “differ in intellectual power” in a way that matters to the special way that God is known, which is somehow so direct that it does not even involve concepts (cf. 1.12.2). [cf.]
knowledge, n. whatever is known; see know. Often used broadly, to refer to all the contents of a human mind, as e.g. here.
law, n. an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated. (from ST, I-II, 90.4, cf.)
lie, n. an act oriented to produce a belief which differs from what is believed by the agent. [cf.] Also called an “act of lying”.
injurious lie, a lie intended to injure someone else. (definition from ST II-II, 110.2)
jocose lie, a kind of lie admitted by Thomas Aquinas, but not by me; included here for clarity. [cf.] (For Thomas’s theory, see the S.T. and Cath.En.)
officious lie, a lie intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. (definition from ST II-II, 110.2)
libertarian, n. used to refer to people who believe in some form of “libertarian ethics”, with such tenets as the “non-aggression principle”. [cf.]
love, n. 1. broadest sense, almost never used. anything that attracts something to something else; natural appetite, q.v.. 2. broad sense. goodwill, q.v. 3. as it exists between human beings. a composite of goodwill and compassion, q.v. [cf.]
marriage, n. a voluntary, heterotelic relationship, meant for the purpose of raising the children that result from an entelechic sexual act. [cf.]
modern concept of marriage: a notion of marriage which would make it basically a close friendship with some more formalities. [cf.] My definition is called the “traditional concept” when contrasted with this one.
material, adj. belonging to, or composed of, matter.
matter, n. 1. the subject of appearance and change. whatever is perceived through senses or imagined; whatever undergoes change of any kind. These definitions are coextensive because change in reality is impossible, and appearance and reality exhaust everything. [cf.] Not to be confused with the Cartesian sense of the term, since I believe that matter can be inextended, or incorporeal. [cf.] 2. something’s material cause, q.v.
mercy, n. 1. the virtue of clemency, i.e., the virtue that moderates anger and inclines someone to be forgiving or lenient in punishing. [cf.] 2. waiving one’s right to punish someone else; this sense may be called an “act of mercy” or an “exercise of mercy”. [cf.]
mind, n. the incorporeal, thinking part of a human being; can be affected by passions and by the senses, including the imagination. All thoughts and feelings are metaphorically said to be “in” the mind, though such language is unduly spatial. [cf.]
miracle, n. an appearance which communicates something, and which does so through means which no human agent could control with his natural powers. [cf.]
morality, n. synonymous with ethics. [cf.]
motion, n. often used in the philosophical sense, where it can mean change of any kind, although I try to use “change” so people won’t understand it as meaning only changes of place. [cf.]
nature, n. the form which is understood through a particular apparent thing. [cf.]
human nature, the nature of human beings.
natural law, phrase. 1. the laws of a nature, i.e., the general principles, deduced from our understanding of the form of a given apparent thing, which govern our judgment that its motions are, or are not, in accordance with its last end. 2. the laws of the human nature, in particular. 3. the laws of all natures, taken together. [cf.]
necessity, n. an apparent thing’s connection with its cause; this is called absolute necessity in the case of the material and efficient causes, and conditional necessity in the case of the formal and final causes. [cf.]
need, n. renounced word, not used since 2021-10-21. [cf.] The corresponding verb is also renounced, when used without such a qualification as in, “I need X in order to Y.”
non-being, n. whatever is not being, q.v. [cf.]
nonservility, n. a hatred of obedience, caused by the fact that obedience is generally unpleasant (disutility of servitude). [cf.]
nothingness, n. what is neither imaginable nor intelligible; although it can be named, but nothing can be affirmed of it. [cf.]
object, n. “any thing or feature of a thing to which action, thought, feeling, or willing is directed.” (Wuellner)
common object, something to which a power, or desire, tends naturally, but not immediately; its possible material object. The common sensibles are common objects of all the senses; while the proper object of thirst is water, any beverage its common object. [cf.]
direct object of desire: an object of a desire which is not dependent on any other desires; may also be called a final end, or consumer’s good. Direct objects are said to be desired “intrinsically”, or “as an end”. [cf.]
indirect object of desire: an object of a desire which is dependent on yet another desire; may also be called a means, intermediate end, or producer’s good. Indirect objects are said to be desired “instrumentally”, “extrinsically”, or “as a means”. [cf.]
proper object, something to which a power, or desire, tends naturally and immediately; its formal object. For instance, color is the proper object of sight, and water is the proper object of thirst. [cf.]
obscurity, n. the vice opposed, by way of defect, to the virtue of clarity, q.v.; the quality of someone who is unable to effectively convey what he attempts to convey, as contrasted with opacity, q.v. [cf.]
occasion, n. an accidental circumstance which creates conditions favorable to an action; see condition. (definition taken from Jolivet, Cours de philosophie, cf.)
opacity, n. the vice opposed, by way of defect, to the virtue of transparency, q.v.; the quality of someone who is insufficiently inclined to say what he thinks, as contrasted with obscurity, q.v. [cf.]
opposition, n. “the state of being very different from, set against, standing on the other side of, or excluding another.” (Wuellner)
contradictory opposition, the opposition that exists between contradictory concepts, q.v. [cf.]
contrary opposition, the opposition that exists between contrary images, q.v. [cf.]
ownership, n. private property, q.v. [cf.]
self-ownership, n. a human being’s ownership of his own body. [cf.]
pain, n. the body’s awareness of the appearance of evil; a passion that represents privation in the body. [cf.]
parenthood, n. see filiation.
passion, n. 1. broad sense. any bodily motion of which a human being is aware, including the senses. 2. narrow sense. emotions; motions caused by the sensitive appetite. [cf.]
person, n. I do not distinguish this from “human being”, as some do. I have once cited Boëthius’s definition of it, but only as a curiosity. [cf.]
phantasm, n. an image, q.v.
philosophy, n. 1. the search, through natural reason, for certain knowledge of all things according to their first principles. [cf.] 2. the form of writing that characterizes philosophy, and which obeys the rules of philosophy. [cf.]
physics, ethics, and logic, phrase. a traditional division of the parts of philosophy; the order may be changed. When “physics” is used together with the other two terms, it does not refer to modern physics. [cf.; and also]
pleasure, n. the body’s awareness of the fulfilment of some sensitive desire, q.v. [cf.]
poetry, n. general sense, opposed to philosophy. any writing which disobeys the rules of philosophy, and, therefore, is not philosophy. Includes not only fiction, but also history and the natural sciences. [cf.]
potency, n. something which does not appear, but which is imaginable, and which could be referred to a thing’s nature if it did appear; a possible consequence of a nature. [cf.] Often compared with act, sense 2.
potentiality title (to interest), phrase. a theory that interest may be justified, and therefore not usury, by virtue of the lender’s expected loss in potential to consume. [cf.]
power, n., an ability to act in some way; see action.
sensitive power, see sense.
speaking power, a power, exercised through the larynx and vocal tract, oriented to the end of producing articulated sound; used by human beings to communicate. [cf.] Also called the “power of speech”.
vegetative power, the biological powers of metabolism, growth, and reproduction. [cf.]
principle, n. that from which something begins in some way, especially a cause. [cf.]
privation, n. an appearance, insofar as it is unintelligible; an apparent thing that falls short of the nature that is understood by it; an appearance that can only imperfectly be referred to a form. [cf.]
proletariat, n. the lowest of three social classes, discussed here and here.
promise, n. a communication of your will, i.e., an act of communication that communicates something that the agent intends to do in the future. [cf.]
proportionality, n. about crimes and punishments. see retribution.
property, n. 1. a human being’s right to control a physical object; in this sense, it is also called the “property right”. 2. any actual or possible object of ownership. [cf.]
intellectual property, a state grant of monopoly to a person over a given defined class of product; sometimes misconceived of as a kind of private property. [cf.]
private property, the allocation of property rights to particular human beings; ownership. [cf.]
public excess judgment, phrase. a moral judgment of the form, “society, as a whole, ought to spend less (or more) time (or money, or attention) on X”, where X is neither intrinsically wrong, nor obligatory for each individual, and is therefore strictly judged to be in excess or insufficient. I believe that such judgments are never justified. [cf.]
punishment, n. an act which interferes, directly or indirectly, with a human body, and which is intended to correct vices in the person interfered with. [cf.]
coercive punishment, an act of punishment which interferes directly with the person or property of the punished. May only be given by legitimate states.
uncoercive punishment, any act of punishment that is not a coercive punishment, q.v.
rational, adj. an appearance which is understood to be capable, by nature, of containing the final cause of its own motions. [cf.]
real, adj. technical sense. see being and intelligible. [cf.]
reality, n. whatever is real, q.v.
reason, n. intellect; the power which allows rational beings to understand forms, define and divide them, make judgments about them, and deduce conclusions from those judgments; the source of rational appetite; the source of rationality itself. [cf.]
reformation, n. the determination of the measure of a punishment in accordance with an understanding of psychology, so that the punishment itself, apart from the threat of it, will be able to correct the relevant vices in an evildoer’s mind. [cf.] Also called “rehabilitation”.
rehabilitation, n. see reformation.
relation, n. 1. I have sometimes used this word to refer to what I more properly call a relationship, q.v. 2. logical sense. a reference to another object which is used as a means to understand an object; includes all causes. [cf.]
relationship, n. the fact of two human beings seeking the same end ‘coordinately’, i.e., by means of at least one of them being allowed by right, in certain conditions, to control property which the other owns. [cf.] Sometimes called a “human relationship”.
autotelic relationship, a relationship whose end is the whole good of its constituent persons; contrasted with a heterotelic relationship.
equal relationship, a relationship where any relevant property is owned in common between the members, there being no priority among them.
heterotelic relationship, a relationship that seeks a particular end, as opposed to an autotelic relationship.
innate relationship, a relationship that may be entered into by birth; contrasted with a voluntary relationship.
unequal relationship, a relationship where one person has priority over the other(s) in decisions about what to do with the property relevant to the relationship.
voluntary relationship, a relationship that can only be entered into by consent; contrasted with an innate relationship.
religious freedom, phrase. the right of a human being to not be coerced, by any other human beings, to act in accordance with purported divine revelation which he does not accept. [cf.]
responsibility, n. the aspect of authority which constitutes an obligation of the superior to care for the inferior. [cf.]
restitution, n. the return of specific objects that were stolen. Does not include any attempt to compensate for the fact that they must have suffered wear and use, and possibly have been damaged, since the theft; for which see damages. [cf.]
retribution, n. an attempt to “match” the measure of a punishment with the “gravity” of a crime, so as to produce a threat of punishment which causes the precise influence required to effectively deter evildoers. [cf.]
romance, n. the coexistence, between human beings, of love with sexual desire. [cf.]
rule, n. always used in the usual dictionary sense of “a prescribed guide for conduct”.
rule of philosophy: the rules of philosophy are “use reason”, “do not stop using reason”, and “reason from principles to conclusions”; they are derived from the definition of philosophy. (see the post)
First Rule, Second Rule, Third Rule: used in various posts to refer to the respective “rules of philosophy”.
Unanimity Rule: that we can only say that “social welfare” (or better, “social utility”) has increased due to a change, if no individual is worse off because of the change (and at least one is better off). (definition taken from Rothbard, cf.)
first rule of conversation, and first rule of being an intellectual: defined in an old post respectively as “say something”, and “do not speak about what you do not understand”; not referred to since.
self-evident, adj. said of some truths that seem to be known immediately, without reference to any appearance. Includes the laws of logic, the first two divisions, and the fact that apparent things are knowable. [cf.]
sense, n. a power in an animal which makes it aware of particular apparent things; may include the internal senses or not. [cf.]
common sense: I do not tend to use this term in the usual sense of “ordinary sound practical judgment.” The common sense is a traditional philosophical sense, also called the central sense, which unites the perceptions from the several external senses into a single image. (see Poissy)
external sense: a sense which is an independent source of images; hence, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and the senses that we call touch, as well as some others.
internal sense: a sense which has the images from the other senses as its object; hence, the common sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and sensitive memory. (see Poissy)
sensible, adj. what can be sensed; may include the imaginable, but may also include only the objects of external senses.
sensible, n. something that is sensible, q.v. [cf.]
common sensible, a form which can be understood through the perceptions of multiple senses, such as size/dimensions, figure/shape, and motion or rest.
proper sensible, the formal object of each sense, as color is of sight, sound is of hearing, etc.
sensitive, adj. an apparent thing which is understood to be capable, by nature, of containing the formal cause of its own motions. [cf.]
serenity, n. a philosophical virtue relating to the second rule of philosophy, and which consists in being impervious to the passions, or impassive. [cf.]
sexual act, phrase. any use of the reproductive powers. [cf.]
antiphysical sexual act, a use of the reproductive powers not in accordance with the purpose of reproduction.
entelechic sexual act, a use of the reproductive powers in accordance with the purpose of reproduction.
society, n. another name for heterotelic relationships. Equal ones are called “democratic societies” and unequal ones are called “hierarchical societies”. [cf.]
sorrow, n. a bodily passion caused by an intellectual judgment that some object of sensitive desire could not be attained. [cf.]
soul, n. 1. ancient, proper sense; not generally used in this blog. the form of a living body, especially the human body. 2. modern, Cartesian sense; most common in this blog. the mind, q.v. [cf.]
state, n. political sense. an innate, autotelic relationship which exists independently of filiation. [cf.] A merely putative state is called “illegitimate.”
Stoicism, n. may be used in the strict sense, referring to the philosophical school of that name, or, more loosely, referring to a tendency to emphasize an opposition between passions and reason. [cf.]
submission, n. an unequal, autotelic human relationship. There are two innate kinds of submission, viz., that between parents and children, and that between the ruler of a legitimate state and its citizens. There are also various voluntary kinds. [cf.]
substance, n. something that can be imagined by itself, and understood. [cf.]
superstition, n. used in a sense derived from Hume’s essay on superstition and enthusiasm, but characterized further by the notes that it generally involves attributing artificial things to nature, and that it is generally promoted by aristocratic ideology. [cf., and also]
taste, n. aesthetic sense. the collection of someone’s “likes and dislikes”, i.e., desires. [cf.]
thing, n. this word, which is absolutely universal in extension (i.e., a transcendental property of being), is usually used with an adjective that contracts it, as in, apparent thing.
transparency, n. the virtue of tending to often say what you think; contrasted with clarity, q.v. [cf.]
understand, v. to think of something through a universal concept.
unexamined, adj. not examined, q.v.
unintelligible, adj. not intelligible, q.v.
valid, adj. true, as opposed to merely putative. For instance, an invalid sacrament is not truly a sacrament, but only seems to be one.
value scale, phrase. an ordinal ranking of our desires in our minds, whereby we always act on the “foremost”, or most wanted, desire. The value scale varies between persons and across time. [cf.]
vice, n. any habit that is evil, i.e., not in accordance with a human being’s rational nature. Not identical with ignorance of its object; all vices are sensitive habits. [cf.]
known vice, a vice whose object is known, and which, therefore, only occurs through a failure of the willpower. [cf.]
virtue, n. any habit that is good, i.e., in accordance with a human being’s rational nature. Identical with knowledge of its object; all virtues are rational habits. [cf.]
philosophical virtue, a virtue defined by the general application of one of the rules of philosophy as a habit of life. [cf.]
welfare, n. when said by itself, usually refers to material welfare.
bodily welfare, someone’s ability to fulfill his desires, of whichever kind. [cf.] May be called material welfare, after a Cartesian usage of “matter”.
general welfare, the bodily welfare of an entire society. [cf.]
spiritual welfare, someone’s ability to fulfill his rational desires, i.e., the lack of vices, or virtue in a broad sense. [cf.]
will, n. the rational appetite, q.v. [cf.]
free will, the human willpower, q.v. [cf.]
weakness of will, the existence of known vices, q.v.
willpower, n. the rational power to examine our sensitive desires, and to bring them into accordance with reason if they are incorrect. [cf.]
