Integralism

I agree with the contentions of the integralists that, supposing that there is a legitimate state, it should, at least ideally, be subordinated to the Catholic Church, and that “politics must be instructed by divine revelation”, in a broad sense.

However, in my case, these contentions are moderated by my belief that divine revelation is not a proper foundation for practical judgments by political authority. The object of this blog post is to prove this proposition, which shall be proved as proposition 5, below, after some preliminary propositions and definitions have been laid down.

I also wanted to try this style out; I thought it looked cool.

Definitions

Def. 1. A human being is a rational animal. [cf.]

Def. 2. An evil act is an act contrary to the nature of the agent; a good act is an act in accordance with the nature of the agent. [cf.]

Def. 3. To accept a set of doctrines as divine revelation is to believe that the doctrines are divinely revealed, and to make an act of divine faith towards them, that is, to assent to the doctrines because of the authority of God, who revealed them.

Def. 4. A right of someone to something consists in the obligation, of all other human beings, to not interfere with his having, or seeking, it. This obligation consists in the fact that it would be evil to do so.

Def. 5. The right of religious freedom is the right of a human being to not be coerced, by any other human beings, to act in accordance with purported divine revelation which he does not accept.

Def. 6. Political authority is a relationship had by an individual or group, called the superior, with another individual or group, called the inferior. It consists in the superior’s right to coercively control, for any good purpose, the inferior’s body and property. [cf.]

Def. 7. Something is proper, in the sense used here, when it is better suited to the purpose for which it is used than the available alternatives.

Axioms

Ax. 1. An act of divine faith requires divine grace. (ST II-II, 6)

Ax. 2. Only God can move a human being to freely accept divine grace. (ST I-II, 112)

Ax. 3. It is evil to force someone else to do something evil.

Ax. 4. A relationship is virtuous if at least one party becomes more capable of doing good acts, and none becomes less.

Ax. 5. Regarding their practical aspect, we may divide beliefs, as Augustine did, into knowledge, faith, and error. Probable judgments are called knowledge for this division.

Propositions

Prop. 1. It is evil for a human being to attempt to coerce another human being to make an act of divine faith.

Dem. It is impossible (by ax. 1 and 2) for a human being to move another human being, through coercion, to make an act of divine faith. So, to attempt to do so is irrational, and therefore (by def. 1 and 2) evil, q.e.d.

Prop. 2. All human beings have, by nature, the right of religious freedom.

Dem. For a human being to act in accordance with purported divine revelation which he does not accept, is to act contrary to his own beliefs, which is irrational, and therefore (by def. 1 and 2) evil. So, (by ax. 3) it is evil to coerce him to do so. But (by def. 4 and 5) this is the same as for him to have, because of his nature, the right of religious freedom, q.e.d.

Besides, it says so in Dignitatis Humanae.

Prop. 3. Political authority is virtuous in cases where the superior has knowledge which the inferior does not, and only in those cases.

Dem. If, and only if, the superior has knowledge which the inferior does not, then he is able to command the inferior to do acts which proceed from knowledge that the inferior does not have. Since such acts proceed from knowledge, they are rational, and therefore, the inferior’s capacity to do good acts is improved. By ax. 4, political authority is virtuous in such cases.

If the superior commands an act which proceeds from divine faith, and the inferior also accepts the purported revelation, then the superior is no different from the inferior, and superfluous. But if the inferior does not accept the revelation, then the superior’s command is evil, according to prop. 1 and 2.

The remainder of the division from ax. 5 is exhausted by noticing that, since beliefs held on human faith rest on probable judgments about the human authority in question, commands proceeding from them are either from knowledge, as before, or from error. Evidently, error is evil (by def. 1 and 2), and a command proceeding from error is evil also (by ax. 3). So, political authority is only virtuous in the cases where the superior has knowledge which the inferior does not, q.e.d.

Coroll. Since these are the only cases where political authority has a good purpose to fulfill, which is required by def. 6, it follows that other commands of political authority go beyond its right, and are, therefore, evil.

Prop. 4. Divine revelation is not a proper source of understanding.

Dem. Whatever divine revelation contains, it is either within the scope of human reason, in which case it can be more clearly understood through philosophy, or above reason, in which case it can not be clearly understood at all. So, whoever seeks understanding, rather than mere belief, ought not to make use of divine revelation, q.e.d.

Prop. 5. Divine revelation is not a proper foundation for practical judgments by political authority.

Dem. Since practical judgments made by political authority ought to be founded on knowledge (since this is a condition of its commands being good, by coroll. prop. 3), which is not properly to be found in divine revelation (by prop. 4), political authority ought not to make use of divine revelation, q.e.d.