Fundamental metaphysics

We attempt to begin doing philosophy, in accordance with the Rules. This is my third try.

We must begin with what is self-evident, even before we have admitted anything from the senses. The only such things are the laws of logic. Such are the basis for the first division.

The first division is between being and non-being. Given anything, it either is or is not. What is, we call being. What is not, we call non-being. This is exhaustive; tertium non datur.

What can we find out about being and non-being? Again, before using the senses. I think we can know the following things.

Possibility: Being can, and must, be. Non-being cannot be. This follows from the definitions of being and non-being.

Intelligibility of being: Being can be thought about, conceived, understood, known. This may also be said as that “all being is intelligible”. We must admit this if we set out to do philosophy, according to the First Rule.

Unintelligibility of non-being: Non-being cannot be thought about, conceived, understood, known. This is self-evident; “you cannot know what is not.” There must be something there for you to know it. “All non-being is unintelligible.”

Intelligibility: The last two propositions may be summarized as, “it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.”

Desire: Here I just note that we are still not using the senses, and speaking only of rational desire, a.k.a. intellectual desire, or will.

Desirability: Being can be desired, wanted, loved, willed. This is to say that “all being is desirable”, or, which is the same thing, that “all being is good”.

This follows from the fact that all being is intelligible, and from that we set out to do philosophy, which means nothing other than that we desire to understand all things.

From the unintelligibility of non-being, we know that things must be, in order that we may understand them. So, in order to desire to understand them, which we do, we must desire that they be, which is nothing other than to desire them.

Since it is not, non-being cannot be desired, wanted, loved, willed. Which is to say, “all non-being is undesirable”, i.e., “all non-being is evil”.

Exhaustion of the first division.— The foregoing findings seem to be exhaustive. I think nothing else may be learned without admitting something from the senses. Having seen all that we could, we must now carefully open our eyes.

Survey of the sensible world.— There are many appearances in the sensible world. The most relevant at the moment is motion, or change, which I shall use interchangeably. Our senses give us the appearance of things coming to be, and of things passing away. This happens constantly.

Given what was said before, this poses a problem. By definition, being cannot fail to be, and non-being cannot be. The appearance of ‘passing’ from one to the other can only, then, be illusory.

Nevertheless, something does appear to us, and the First Rule requires that we apply reason to it. We must distinguish what appears and is, from what appears and is not – which is not, in turn, to be confused with what does not even appear. In order to do so, we give the apparent subject of change a name. Doing so is the basis for the second division.

The second division is between matter and form.

Matter is the subject of change, as presented by appearances. Properly speaking, it is not, since, like motion, it cannot be understood in itself, and all being is intelligible.

Form is the object of understanding. It is what was called being in the first division, and as such, it cannot be the subject of change.

Nothingness, then, shall be that non-being which, besides being unintelligible, is not even possibly apparent, either. It is that which, although we can name, we can neither understand nor imagine.

Given the two fundamental divisions, we may move on to admit and examine even more appearances from the senses. To do so, until we have understood everything, would be the object of a completed philosophy. This is just the start.

Derivation of the four causes.— For my own purposes, it is convenient to move on in this direction in particular.

Suppose that we can understand a particular moving object that we see in the sensible world. What does that imply?

First, it implies that the object is, so that it can be understood. This is its formal cause.

Second, it implies that the object appears, so that it can be seen. This is its material cause.

Third, it implies that the object’s motions can be related to the object, as it is understood. Something about the appearance leads particular motions to be referred to the form. The relation of motion to form is the object’s final cause.

Finally, since form is motionless, something movable must be referred to the motions of the object in order that their particular arrangement in time and space may be understood. This movable principle of motion is its efficient cause.

That’s enough for today.