Just price calculation principle

There are many ideas about how to calculate the just price of things according to the natural law. Here I rule out some of them, with the following proposition:

No concrete claim about the just price of something can be founded on the current actual prices of anything, since it is not known if those prices are, themselves, just.

This is certainly true, when all the things being calculated are under subjection to just laws. It may be that, sometimes, the price of obliging some unjust demands must enter into the calculation; but such demands could only be required to be obliged by the laws of an unjust nation.

Illustration with wages

For illustration, take, for instance, the just wage. It is unclear what the just wage requires, but suppose, for the sake of this argument, that it must require that the employer provide the means of the worker’s achieving some definite standard of sustenance, through buying some definite quantity of food.

Since the worker is required by justice to pay exactly the just price to the food seller, and no more or less than that, the quantity which should be paid to the worker for the reason of his sustenance should, accordingly, be exactly equal to the just price of food.

If the food seller is charging a price above, or below, the just price, a buyer is not required, by justice, to oblige the seller’s unjust demand. The buyer is obliged to pay the just price; if the seller asks him to pay more than that, or less than that, the buyer may rightly sue the seller under the natural law, for charging an unjust price.

Since no just state would require a buyer to comply with the unjust demand of a seller, then accordingly, under no just state can the employer be required to finance such compliance. So, the actual prices of food cannot enter into the calculation of the just wage, which must instead take into account only the just prices of food.

The exception I had mentioned applies as follows: if it be deemed required that the employer finance the purchase of food from a seller that lives in a foreign nation, which is ruled by unjust laws and will require, by force, the payment of an unjust price, then in that case, the actual price of food may enter into the calculation of the just wage; but in no other case.

Consequences

Setting a minimum wage different from the just wage, without knowledge of the just wage, is dangerous, since the state may be commanding an injustice, by requiring that employers pay an unjust price for labor. It follows that no country has any right to calculate the minimum wage from the actual cost of living, since it recklessly risks commanding an injustice. Only just prices may be used to calculate just prices.

Furthermore, the government will almost certainly be wrong if it attempts to determine the just wage by guessing – in fact, certainly wrong, if we assume that the just wage is a definite number, which may be any of the infinitely many values within a continuous range of possible wages.

This doctrine does not forbid legal prices from being set upon some other basis than actual prices, if such a basis can be found. In fact, I hope that such a basis can be found, which would be a great aid to all moralists. But actual prices cannot be the basis of just prices, nor of legal prices.

While it allows for the theoretical possibility of completely objectively determined prices, this doctrine is, in one way, a stronger claim than a libertarian ethic would make. For this doctrine also forbids the hypothetical private law society, with the consent of the governed, from setting, by contract, any minimum or maximum price calculated in terms of any actual prices. This is because one cannot, in justice, even by voluntary contract, command an unjust practice.

Knowing God Differently Problem

I keep asking people about this question, especially theology nerds on Facebook. So I decided to title it the “Knowing God Differently Problem”, KGDP for short, so that I can refer to it more easily in conversations.

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Take a look at these Propositions, each defended by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiæ (ST):

Proposition A: God is perfectly simple (ST 1.3)

Proposition B: the divine essence is seen ‘in itself’, not through a created likeness (ST 1.12.2)

Proposition C: of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another (ST 1.12.6)

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It seems to me that proposition C might enter into conflict with either A or B, and I think this more or less because of the reason given by Objection 3:

Further, that anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.

To this, Thomas replies:

The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all—viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.

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But again, how is the “faculty of the intellect” diverse? What makes someone have “more intellectual power”?

I assume that differences in ‘intelligence’, such as we see in humans, are caused by bodily differences – one man has a better configured brain, more acute senses, better nutrition, than another. This is frankly the only way that these things make sense to me. But this means that holding the three Propositions requires some way in which pure minds (like the angels) could nevertheless differ in “intellectual power”.

When I asked people about this question, of how angels can differ in intelligence, I was told things to the effect that, some angels are able to know what they know by means of a smaller number of more universal “intelligible species” – those are the smarter angels –, and others only by a greater number of less universal “intelligible species” – those are not as smart. Now, I have no idea what “intelligible species” are, but this all seems pretty irrelevant, because, again (Prop. B), “God is not seen through a created likeness”, and I assume such “intelligible species” would have to be created likenesses.

ST 1.12.2, in answer to objection 3, is very clear that God is not even understood by a concept (like everything else we understand),[1] but instead he is “united to the created intellect as the object actually understood” (whatever that means), so that we can not even say that one man has a clearer, or more distinct, concept of God than another, which is how we usually explain the fact that two men understand the same thing more or less perfectly. It is not clear at all how two men, having the same, perfectly simple (Prop. A) notion in their minds (Prop. B), could understand it differently, one more perfectly than the other, (Prop. C) in any way.

Someone help me, please!

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Footnote 1

By the way, while ST 1.12.2 certainly emphasizes that God cannot be understood through a created likeness, it is not clear at all on the reasons to believe this. As I had complained elsewhere:

• If “by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known”, is that meant to preclude, for instance, learning about living creatures from photos of them? If not, what does it mean?

• Objection 2 says that Augustine says that “when we know God, some likeness of God is made in us”. The reply says that this refers to “the knowledge of God here on earth”. But the three arguments in the corpus seem to conclude that it is impossible to know God in any way by a likeness, whether here or elsewhere; so what gives?

• I don’t understand the reply to objection 3. Why does the divine essence being ‘existence itself’ result in the conclusion it gives?

• Also, how would one explain the idea from the third argument, that “every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing”? I think that that one might be the best argument, but I don’t understand it.

I swear, I don’t have trouble understanding most of the ST, but that article was seriously very opaque to me...