Controverted Questions

Having talked about most of the rest of philosophy to my satisfaction, I resolve here a variety of controversial questions that are very popular, despite being very uninteresting.

0. Contents

1. God
2. Immortality of the soul
3. Nature of time
4. The ship of Theseus
5. Brain-in-a-vat scenarios

1. God

Existence is a very problematic and ambiguous word. In my opinion, it means either that something is sensible or that it is intelligible. Obviously, no one thinks that God is the former, so if the word “exists” is taken in the sense of appearance, as it very often is, then the atheists are right: God does not exist. But if it is taken in the sense of intelligibility, which I identify with being and reality, then God does exist, since God may be understood by a concept; since certainly, the persons who use the word “God” mean something definite by it.

The common meanings of the word God reduce to the notions of, “something absolutely perfect”, and, “the cause of all other things”. In my ontology, both of these things may be said of the most general form, or concept, viz., being, when said without qualification. Since all being is good, and all things are good precisely insofar as they are, being taken by itself must be absolutely good, and much better than any more particular concept. And being is the formal cause of all other forms, since all of them belong to the same genus. So, the “existence of God”, taken in the sense of intelligibility, really follows at once from the principle of non-contradiction, and nothing else can be understood without it. The identification of God with the Platonic “form of the good” is very well-known; since goodness is identical with intelligibility, this is exactly what I’m saying here.

The “attributes of God” are the properties which we believe to be “pure perfections”, i.e., always absolutely better to have than not to have. Since they ascribe no limitation to the things of which they are predicated, they may without falsehood be ascribed to the concept of being, although being does not thereby become a composite concept, since it still means nothing but intelligibility, i.e., understandability through a concept. Since this is not composed of anything else, divine simplicity is also assured.

Regarding religion, the question may be raised of the precise respect in which the blessed in heaven have a superior knowledge of God. At the moment, I suppose that their knowledge is superior in that they are allowed to have an adequate concept of some pure perfections that we cannot understand from our current experience here on earth. So, they know more about what may be said of God. Probably, the more holy and virtuous persons will be granted more of this than the less holy and virtuous.

2. Immortality of the soul

I know of no good arguments for the belief that individual human minds are incorruptible; the arguments that I have seen seem to rely on improperly imaginative thinking. However, I figure that Catholics may believe, by faith in the Catholic Church, that God somehow preserves human minds after the bodies die.

3. Nature of time

Debates in the philosophy of time seem to turn upon the question of whether the past and the future exist or not. Again, existence means either sensibility or intelligibility; I see no other meaning to the word. Now, the past and future are not intelligible as such, since pure concepts have no tense; the forms are timeless and eternal. And the past and future are obviously not sensible. So, they don’t exist right now in any proper sense of the word; in the sense of appearance, it may be said that the past used to exist, and the future will exist, when it happens. This seems to commit me to “presentism”.

4. The ship of Theseus

The question of the ship of Theseus seems to be whether a ship is the same ship after all of its planks have been replaced by other planks. It seems that it does, since throughout each of the replacements, there was still a single collection of appearances (substance) which was understood to be a ship. If the original planks, after being taken out, are used to build another ship made out of the original material, this does not seem to change anything; that ship is a new ship.

It may also be asked whether a ship is the same ship if the new planks are made out of a different material, e.g., metal rather than wood. Here, I figure that it matters whether your concept of a “ship” includes something about the properties of these materials or not. If it is still a ship, then it is the same ship. But if it has come to be understood through a different concept, e.g., if you think that ships have to be wooden, and the new material makes it a boat rather than a ship, then it has become something else, so it is not the same ship, since it is not a ship anymore.

5. Brain-in-a-vat scenarios

I think we have no reason to be absolutely sure that we aren’t brains in a vat, but we have no reason to suspect that we are, either. Either way, the external world that we experience certainly does exist, in the sense that it is apparent, or sensible. It is also intelligible as a whole, though not every part of it is intelligible. There is nothing more to it.