Lying

I define communication, lying, and the two kinds of lie; I also explain how my opinions differ from those of others.

0. Contents

1. Communication and lying
2. Speech
3. Difference from others
4. Officious vs. injurious lies
5. Mental reservations
6. Notes

1. Communication and lying

I define communication as “any act oriented to produce belief in the minds of others”, and lying as “an act oriented to produce a belief which differs from what is believed by the agent”.[1] Lying is, therefore, a kind of communication.

Since lying will, insofar as the agent knows, produce false beliefs in the mind of the listeners, and since false beliefs are an imperfection in a rational mind, it follows that acts of lying are necessarily oriented, insofar as the agent knows, to produce imperfection, which is to say, they are evil acts.

2. Speech

The possibility of acts of communication follows from our rational and sensitive natures, taken generally; the foremost acts of communication are acts of speech, which are uses of our power of speech, or speaking power.

The power of speech, being a power of particular body parts, was not defined in the anthropology, so I define it here as a power, exercised through the larynx and vocal tract, oriented to the end of producing articulated sound. Not all acts of speech are acts of communication.

3. Difference from others

Not all acts of communication are acts of speech, either; so, neither are all acts of lying. This is one way in which I differ from many moralists. I also clearly differ from the popular definition of lying as “to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive”, which has already been criticized just about everywhere.

Although, considered objectively, acts of lying are evil without reference to the agent’s intentions, it is obvious that unintentional acts are never intrinsically culpable. It is possible for someone to accidentally lie, by my definition, as would happen if, for instance, he were honestly mistaken about the meaning of a word.

I also differ from Thomas Aquinas. Thomas seemed to think that the “literal” meaning of words is what determines the genus of the act of speech. Accordingly, he seemed to think that many of the jokes we tell are what he called “jocose lies”:

A jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. (ST II-II, 110.3, ad 6)

I do not believe in such a thing as a lie which does not deceive by the way it is told. The way that a sentence is said is part of the act of communication. If you can say a sentence that is “literally” false, in a way that is not oriented to deceive anyone, then you are not lying when you say that sentence in that way.[2]

4. Officious vs. injurious lies

While jocose lies do not exist, there do exist what Thomas called officious lies, which are lies “intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured”. Such lies are less harmful than the so-called injurious, hurtful, or mischievous, lies, which are intended “to injure another”. They are, nevertheless, evil, by nature of being lies; so it is wrong, for instance, to lie to the murderer at the door.[3]

5. Mental reservations

My doctrine of lying seems to pretty clearly allow for most “wide mental reservations”, but no “strict mental reservations”, which accords with the common doctrine of moralists. (See the Catholic Encyclopedia for explanations of these terms.)

I note that I have sometimes heard that it would not be a lie to tell a Nazi inspector, “I have no vermin in my house”, expecting him to understand that you have no Jews in your house, when in fact you know that you really do have Jews in it. This is a consequence of Thomas’s ideas about “the literal sense”, and I find it to be absurd. Your statement in such a situation, especially in the tone you would have to say it in, is clearly oriented to produce a false belief in the inspector; the act of communication, as a whole, is a lie, though an officious one.

6. Notes

[1] The term oriented is meant here in the sense of final causality.

[2] I have referred to deception to follow the usage in the translated Summa Theologiae. In more proper terms, I would rather say:

I do not believe in such a thing as a lie which does not, by the way it is told, communicate a belief which differs from what the agent believes. The way that a sentence is said is part of the act of communication. If you can say a sentence which, in its “literal” sense, expresses something you do not believe, but can say it in such a way that is not oriented to produce, in anyone, beliefs which differ from yours, then you are not lying when you say that sentence in that way.

[3] Obviously, no one has a duty to tell the truth to the murderer, and one may be silent or not answer. Of course, in that situation, being silent is not as useful for saving lives as lying. I bring it up because some people do seem to think that if it is wrong to lie, then it must be obligatory to tell the truth. As was proved above, it is always wrong, by definition, to lie, even to someone who has no “right to the truth”.