Human nature

The reader who would form a just estimate of the reasonings of these volumes, cannot perhaps proceed more judiciously, than by examining for himself the truth of these principles, and the support they afford to the various inferences interspersed through the work.

— William Godwin, Enquiry, Summary of Principles

Ethics, as was shown, is supposed to be deduced from human nature. What, then, is human nature?

0. Contents

1. Methodological excursus
2. Postulates
2.1. Rationality and autonomy
2.2. Individual animality
2.2.1. Senses
2.2.2. Sensitive desires
2.2.3. Passions
2.2.4. Vegetative and other powers
2.3. Social animality
2.3.1. Relationships in general
2.3.2. Possible kinds of relationships
2.3.3. Voluntary relationships
2.3.4. Innate relationships, and authority
2.3.5. Human reproduction
2.3.6. Knowledge inequality

1. Methodological excursus

Too many books on ethics leave human nature implicit, simply stating various rights and duties and saying vaguely that they are rooted in human nature. Sometimes they are more specific, but even then, you would have to piece the author’s anthropology from the various rights and duties that he derives from it – much of it never seems to be mentioned outside of ethical demonstrations.

Because of this, the suspicion duly arises that the author is thinking backwards – that he is starting from a certain collection of moral rules that he wants to defend, and then figuring out some reason – often vague or specious – to say that they are natural to mankind after all. Since abduction is forbidden in philosophy, this method would be opposed to philosophy, and would rather constitute poetry.

Sometimes, the authors explicitly use poetry in place of philosophy – that is, they write thought experiments, where they imagine men acting in a supposed ‘state of nature’. Then, if the imaginary experiment seems to show some principle at work, and if the things imagined sound realistic, they think themselves to have found a universal law of nature.

But, of course, imagination is forbidden in philosophy too. A thought experiment could illustrate your conception, but never constitute it.

To avoid all such suspicions, I will make explicit my concept of human nature, as I have understood it from the relevant appearances. In the future, every ethical proposition which I attempt to demonstrate in this blog will be demonstrated through reference to one or more of the principles shown here. No new principles, different from the ones written here, will be introduced as belonging to ‘the human nature’ as a whole. The nature of particular human body parts, however, remains undefined, and I may define it in the future, with new principles peculiar to each part.

One benefit of this is that, if I have made a mistake in my conception, my readers may find this out at the outset, before any ethical demonstrations have been made. I am only one human being, trying my best to observe myself and other human beings, and I may err. That said, I have tried to compose my concept using only what I believe to be very basic, common, and old notions about human nature. They are ones which I believe to be sound, and I take responsibility for the judgment that they belong to human nature; but I also take comfort in my belief that, if I err, I err with mankind. If any of my principles should be disproved, of course, my demonstrations will also be shown to be unsound.

2. Postulates

I accept the traditional idea that man is a rational animal. But I think that this is not an essential definition, which would mean that all rational animals must be men. Human beings, besides being rational, are a particular kind of animals, in ways that I think are metaphysically and ethically relevant.

If there were other rational animals, then, they might not have every single right and duty which I ascribe to human beings.

Nevertheless, even if it is not our specific difference in the logical sense, rationality is still our “highest” and most ethically relevant property, as was shown. It does belong to us by nature in some way.

While I do not dare to attempt a new definition, the following sketch of human nature will exhaust the properties which I find fitting to ascribe to it.

2.1. Rationality and autonomy

Human beings are rational. By this, I mean that they have reason, or intellect. This is the ability, or power, to understand forms, define and divide them, make judgments about them, and deduce conclusions from those judgments. Because of this, human beings have rational desire, which is the desire for knowledge, and therefore for being, generally.

Human beings are also autonomous agents, or free actors, by which I mean that they have free will. As explained before, free will is essentially characterized as the ability to moderate irrational desires and follow rational ones. Without rational desire, and the power to make it apparent, which is the free will, human nature could not be understood as rational.

Since human beings are the only rational parts of the material world, they rightfully have dominion over external things, or property, as was shown.

Following a modern convention, this blog will routinely refer to the human powers of intellect and will as constituting the soul, whereas all other motions will be said to come from the body. This may confuse some traditional metaphysicians; more on this here.

2.2. Individual animality

Human beings are animals, by which I mean only that they are animate and sensitive, having the ability to contain within themselves the efficient and formal causes of their own motions.

This means little without a characterization of human animal powers, which I shall provide next. This section will cover only the human animal powers which I do not immediately find relevant to the consideration of human beings in society, wherefore I titled it “individual”.

2.2.1. Senses

First, human beings have senses, or sensitive powers, which are powers that allow them to perceive appearances. I admit of all the senses that are in common usage.

The external senses include sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; the internal senses include the common sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and sensitive memory. There are other senses, which are not usually as relevant. I mean all of these terms in their common meanings, and I do not find it useful to define them.

2.2.2. Sensitive desires

Second, human beings have sensitive desires, which are desires for sensible things. The power of having sensitive desires is the sensitive appetite, as may be contrasted with the rational appetite, which is the ability to have rational desire.

The sensitive appetite is sometimes distinguished into concupiscible and irascible; the former, also called concupiscence, includes desires to seek what is sensibly pleasant, and to avoid what is unpleasant or painful.

The irascible appetite includes desires to seek what is useful for obtaining something sensibly pleasant, and to avoid what is dangerous because it will lead to something painful; these desires incline us to strive and fight for sensible goods that are difficult to preserve or to attain.

Some typical sensitive desires are hunger, thirst, and sexual desire; other sensitive desires don’t tend to have names, such as the desires for warmth or sleep.

2.2.3. Passions

Third, human beings have passions. While all bodily motions of which human beings are aware, including the senses, may be called passions in a general sense, a narrower sense includes only those motions which are caused by the sensitive appetite, and may also be called emotions. Those passions are sensitive desire itself, pleasure, pain, sorrow, anger, hatred, and compassion. Besides the sensitive desires, which were just explained, I will now define the other passions.

Pleasure is the body’s awareness of the fulfilment of some sensitive desire. Joy, which is the soul’s awareness of the fulfilment of rational desire, is also sometimes called a passion, but this is improper, since it is caused by the rational appetite rather than the sensitive.

Pain and sorrow are the body’s awareness of the appearance of evil. Evil, generally, is a defect in a material thing which makes its appearance more difficult of being understood through its form; in the human being, it is something which would prevent the proper functioning of body parts. Pain is the appearance of evil to the senses, and therefore belongs only to evils afflicting a human being’s own body; sorrow, while also bodily in origin, is caused by a judgment of the intellect regarding some object of sensitive desire.

Hatred, or aversion, is a sensitive desire for something which is opposed to something that is currently apparent, and, therefore, a desire for that apparent thing to disappear. Hence, the proper object of hatred is evil, in the sense just defined.

Anger, properly speaking, differs from hatred in that it is only directed against the perceived injustice of a particular person, and therefore creates a desire that that person be punished.

Compassion, or empathy, is the body’s instinctive awareness, by way of a kind of ‘matching’, of the passions of other animals, including other human beings. This instinct causes a sensitive desire for the apparent good of those animals for which we feel compassion.

I believe that love of other human beings, or of other animals generally, is not completely a passion, but a composite of rational desire for the good of the other, a.k.a. goodwill, and of compassion. This composite is distinct from sexual desire, and completely separable from it; when they exist together, this is what is called “romance”.

Goodwill tends to cause compassion, and, when examined and found to be in accordance with reason, compassion will cause goodwill as well. So it usually makes more sense to speak of love than of either of its components.

2.2.4. Vegetative and other powers

Fourth, and least relevant here, human beings have the so-called vegetative powers, i.e., the powers of metabolism, growth, and reproduction. Since reproduction is very relevant to the consideration of human beings in society, it will be covered in §2.3.5, below.

Human beings also have motor powers; they have arms and legs and such. And they have the power to speak and communicate. As said in the beginning, I intend to define particular human body parts as they become relevant. This sketch only covers what I think belongs to the human being as a whole.

While property in general is derived from the rationality of man, private property, or individual appropriation, exists because of our animal nature. Since human beings have passions and senses, they are not always fully rational; because of this, they may have irreconcilable disagreements about what to do with material objects. Since material objects can not be used for conflicting purposes at the same time, property rights must be assigned, as was shown.

As was also shown, rational assignment of property rights requires the right of self-ownership, which is each human being’s property right over his own body; this will be relevant in later sections.

2.3. Social animality

I will now consider human beings in society, which means, in relationships of various kinds with each other. I will define and divide relationships, and postulate the properties of human nature which create special kinds of relationships.

2.3.1. Relationships in general

By relationship I mean the fact of two human beings seeking the same end ‘coordinately’, i.e., by means of at least one of them being allowed by right, in certain conditions, to control property which the other owns.

2.3.2. Possible kinds of relationships

Accordingly, all possible human relationships may be divided into four kinds, as follows.

According to the end which they seek, relationships may be divided into autotelic and heterotelic. A relationship is autotelic when it seeks the whole good of its constituent persons as its end; it is heterotelic when instead it seeks, as its end, some particular good.

According to their effect upon property, relationships are either equal or unequal. They are equal when the relevant property is owned in common, with no priority between persons; they are unequal when the will of one person has priority over that of the other in decisions about what to do with the property.

These two divisions yield four possible kinds of relationships, viz., the equal autotelic, unequal autotelic, equal heterotelic, and unequal heterotelic.

2.3.3. Voluntary relationships

Voluntary relationships are entered into by the consent of all parties. Since nothing in nature compels anyone to enter any of them, they may exist within any of the four possible kinds.

An equal autotelic voluntary relationship is called a friendship. It is, objectively, the best possible kind of human relationship, since each party receives the greatest benefit that the other can give; it is peculiar to rational animals.

Perfect friendship would occur when two human beings have the same knowledge, which causes them to love each other. Since they have the same knowledge, they have the same plans, so they do not enter into conflicts about what to do with any property. So, between themselves, perfect friends would own all things in common.

Since it is impossible for two human beings to have exactly the same knowledge, there are no perfect friendships in the world. But some relationships approach very nearly to that ideal, so they are called friendships by analogy with that.

An unequal autotelic voluntary relationship is one of voluntary submission. It occurs when two persons love each other, but they recognize that one of them is in some respects wiser and more knowledgeable. The inferior person then agrees, partly for his own good, to submit to the superior’s judgment about those things, and the superior, therefore, effectively controls the inferior’s property regarding them. Since the superior loves the inferior, he will try to teach him what he knows, so that eventually, if conditions are favorable, voluntary submission will become friendship.

An equal heterotelic voluntary relationship, or democratic society, is a relationship entered for a particular purpose, such as business, and in which some property, set apart for the purpose, is put into the common control of all parties. If not all parties involved are perfect friends with each other, this allows for unsolvable conflicts over property to arise, possibly leading to violence. Because of this, democratic societies are contrary to reason, and all heterotelic relationships ought to be unequal.

An unequal heterotelic voluntary relationship, or hierarchical society, is a relationship entered for a particular purpose, such as business, and in which some property, set apart for the purpose, is owned by all parties, but one of them has decision-making priority about it for as long as the relationship lasts. This includes all businesses which are organized hierarchically.

2.3.4. Innate relationships, and authority

Besides voluntary human relationships, there are also innate human relationships, that is, relationships which someone can enter by being born. Those relationships are created by particular properties of human nature which will be explained in the following sections.

In innate relationships, a natural circumstance causes a particular adult person to have control over, love for, and a presumption of superiority in knowledge over, the newborn person. Since this circumstance is created by nature, these things exist by right, and so, the new person is born into an innate kind of unequal autotelic relationship, becoming the inferior of the adult. The adult, becoming his superior, is then said to have authority.

Authority, therefore, gives the superior person the right to, for any good purpose, control the inferior’s property, including the inferior’s body, as well as to be obeyed by the inferior; and it also makes the superior responsible for the inferior’s material welfare and virtuous development.

The inferior is still the owner of his body and property, and although authority may override this for an objectively good purpose, it may not do so for a bad one, which remains an infringement. So, it remains true that no human being is ever the rightful owner of another.

2.3.5. Human reproduction

Reproduction, as it happens in humans, is the source of two natural passions as well as two special kinds of human relationships, marriage and filiation, which together constitute the society called the family.

First, human beings are born particularly helpless, having no knowledge and little physical strength. Parents also have, by nature, especially strong compassion for their children, which property is called the passion of parental love. These natural human properties create the authority of parents over children, and the innate submission of children is called filiation.

Second, human beings reproduce sexually. This is the source of sexual desire, which is a distinct passion, and separable from love. Since sex naturally results in children, it is naturally sought within a voluntary heterotelic relationship, called marriage, which is meant for the purpose of raising the children that result from the sexual act. Since equal heterotelic relationships are contrary to reason, marriage is naturally hierarchical, but nothing in nature makes it necessary that the man, rather than the woman, always be the head of it.

2.3.6. Knowledge inequality

Since human beings are material, and enter the world at different locations in space, they all have different knowledge. Further, some human beings may have a great preponderance, in knowledge, over others. The possibility of such human beings, who may be called sages, or the wise, if actualized, would make it advantageous that all others enter into voluntary submission to them.

Further, it would make it possibly advantageous for God to grant such sages authority over all human beings born in a certain area. This area would be called a state, and the authority of its wise ruler(s) would be called its legitimacy.

It is unclear how precisely God would grant this authority, if he ever did; but it would have to be through some sensible sign that a certain sage, who manifestly has the military means to exercise authority, also has a presumption of superior knowledge over others in the area, and responsibility for them. Nothing other than God could grant this.

After it were given, though, no sensible sign of state authority would have to remain; a legitimate state would, intelligibly, continue to be legitimate until it underwent manifest substantial change.

The human natural property that legitimate states are possible is what I would mean by the traditional phrase that “man is a political animal”. Although political in ancient Greek philosophy referred more to a natural tendency to organize into cities (poleis), in much of modern philosophy it refers to coercive states, which I do believe to be, in certain possible circumstances, compatible with human nature.

I know of no grounds in philosophy or experience to believe that any of the currently existing states are legitimate, or are not. Rationally, non-Catholics may either suspend judgment or take certain facts, such as the apparent beneficial (or not) nature of existing states, as probable indications of their legitimacy (or illegitimacy). Catholics, however, ought to believe on grounds of papal authority that none of the currently existing states are legitimate.