Public excess judgments

By public excess judgments I mean moral judgments of the form:

society, as a whole, ought to spend less (or more) time (or money, or attention) on X

where X is neither intrinsically wrong, nor obligatory for each individual.

Which is to say, society is judged to be vicious, as a whole, due to an excess or a defect in X. In itself, X is not bad, or morally obligatory, but society nevertheless currently engages in X to an insufficient, or excessive extent, and this is bad.

I think that it is not possible for anyone to prove, or to rationally believe, a public excess judgment. This is because X is something such that you cannot tell that the desire for it is disordered merely by knowing what X is, and I think that you cannot tell that a desire is disordered by examining any other mere external. In particular, knowing the quantity of time (or money, or attention) that society spends on X in the aggregate can tell you nothing about whether this amount is insufficient or excessive, in a morally relevant way.

It is possible to know that a close friend is doing something in excess, or not enough, because by close acquaintance and frequent conversation with him, you can get to know his mind to some extent, and so, find out that his desires are being formed irrationally. But no such acquaintance can be had with the aggregate of society, regardless of whether the “whole” is taken to mean the totality, a majority, or even merely a plurality of persons.

So, for example, the following judgment is always unprovable and irrational, if ought is taken morally:

society ought to spend less money on sports, and more time reading books

I think just one example is sufficient.