While researching stuff to make my compilation post on the threefold division, I found various curious things about it which I thought to talk about, but I didn’t want to interrupt the compilation, which was already a big post by itself. So I made a post with this curious stuff I found. I found almost all of this material while making the previous post, but couldn’t put it together nicely until now.
In this post, I will cite things that were quoted in that other post by merely saying the name of the author. If you are curious about something I mention here, look it up in the other one.
0. Contents
1. Confused origin
2. Plato united philosophy
3. Theoretical, productive, and practical
4. Augustine saw the Trinity in it
5. Roger Penrose and primacy
6. Random things I found
1. Confused origin
Where did it begin, after all? The compilation post did not make this obvious, and it was not obvious to me when I was done with it.
Plato
It seems that some of the ancients, especially Neoplatonists, thought that the division came from Plato. In the compilation post, you can see this claim made by Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, and Eusebius. Augustine makes this claim, but he was probably following Cicero – or so says a footnote I saw once somewhere.
However, I have not found it explicitly anywhere in Plato’s works, insofar as I have read them (not completely); nor is any citation of his works given when the division is attributed to Plato.
I have seen two contemporary writers characterize Plato’s theory of forms as saying that the forms are divided into these three kinds. The first is John Messerly, who writes in this summary that “there are physical, mathematical, and moral forms”. The second is John Dillon. In his paper “The Platonic Forms As Gesetze”, he writes:
We have here what is generally regarded as the first clear assertion of the “classical” Theory of Forms, such as is given fuller development in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus, according to which the ‘Forms’ of all ethical, mathematical and natural concepts are viewed by the human soul in a previous, disembodied state of existence, where they exist eternally and immutably, quite independently of either minds or physical objects, and are merely ‘recollected’ in this life, with varying degrees of accuracy, in response to suitable stimuli.
So we see that Dillon divides the forms into “ethical, mathematical and natural”. There may be a ground for the division in Plato, but I am not sure where it is. More on Plato in relation to this division in section 2.
Aristotle
Aristotle gives us the earliest clear and explicit statement of “physical, ethical and logical” as a division of something. But it is not a division of philosophy or of the sciences, but of kinds of propositions, and it is in his logical work called the Topics. He does not use this for the sciences, unless we characterize his own division of the sciences – into “theoretical”, “productive”, and “practical” – as correlative with it, on which see section 3.
The Stoics
The division is most clearly associated with the Stoics. It is given in a characterization of Stoic doctrines by Pseudo-Plutarch, in a description of Chrysippus by Plutarch, and in a description of the Stoics by Diogenes Laërtius; and it is found explicitly in Seneca, as well as other Stoic sources, especially when you take into account its association with the three Stoic “disciplines” of “assent, desire and action”, as explained in the paper by Christopher Fisher. Ramelli calls it “the typical Stoic tripartition of philosophy”, and it really is typical of them.
But given what we know from above, it is strange to say that it was an invention of the Stoics. Cicero was very influenced by the Stoics, but he attributes it to Plato. I don’t know. They definitely took it and ran.
2. Plato united philosophy
Some Platonists, wishing to gain honor for Plato, claimed that Plato united the three parts of philosophy, which were merely scattered and separate inquiries before him. The Platonists Atticus and Aristocles, as cited by Julia Annas, said something to this effect. Apuleius also made this claim, saying that he took “philosophy of nature from the Pythagoreans, logic from the Eleatics, and moral philosophy right from the source of Socrates”. Diogenes Laërtius, in an analogy with the development of tragic drama, says that “in early times [philosophy] discoursed on one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and Plato the third, dialectics, and so brought philosophy to perfection”.
I think that the claim is probably sound. It is proved from the facts that Plato discoursed on all three subjects, and that no one did so before him – that everyone before Plato had only talked about one or two of the subjects.
That no one did so before him seems clear enough, as far as I can tell. The Presocratics, as a general rule, seemed to only talk about “physical”/“natural” topics. Socrates, especially when counting only what can most safely be ascribed to “the historical” Socrates, only seemed to care about ethics, as the ancients agree in saying. Logic, which may have existed previously with the Eleatics or the geometers, was not combined by either of them with moral philosophy. Indeed, it seems that, before Plato, it was much more common to merely state moral opinions without argument.
That Plato himself did discourse on all three subjects is best illustrated by the ancient division of his works which claims some of them as logical, some as physical, and some as ethical or political, with some other ones being ‘zetetic’. Sir Alexander Grant says that in Plato, “Logic has no separate existence; there is only a dialectic which is really metaphysics.” But the peculiar attention that he paid to definition and division (e.g., in the Phaedrus) seems to constitute a treatment of logic, though its existence may be said to not be “separate.”
It may also be denied that logic, when not “in use” in ethics or physics, is a part of philosophy rather than, for instance, being only an art. This opinion was popular with Scotists, if I remember correctly. And it was the opinion of the Platonist Olympiodorus, in his Introduction to Logic (17,32–7):
Logic is a tool when considered as empty schemata, as when I say: ‘from two universal affirmations a universal affirmative conclusion follows’. But it is a part when used together with the things themselves, as when I say: ‘the soul is self-moving, what is self-moving is immortal, therefore the soul is immortal’, and again, ‘everything just is good, everything good is noble, therefore everything just is noble’.
So I think we can safely say, with good sense, that Plato united the three parts of philosophy. If we accept the threefold division as “the true” division of philosophy, this adds credence to the idea that Plato invented philosophy, which some people wish to deny, although the SEP accepts it.
3. Theoretical, productive, and practical
While we are finding the threefold division across various places, with so many combinations of the names “physical”, “logical”, “ethical”, “rational”, “moral”, “natural”, “real”, “mathematical”, etc., it may be tempting to associate it with other things.
Some of these things are sound. St. George William Joseph Stock, whose first name was actually “St. George”, says that the division is grounded on that “philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or man, and if it studies man, it must regard him either from the side of the emotions or of the intellect.” This is probably true. We might choose to say “the will” rather than the emotions, but besides this, he has probably drawn its ground correctly.
Some of these things are questionable, and may be thought sound or unsound from different points of view, as when Augustine associated it with the three persons of the Trinity, on which see section 4.
Some of these things appear sound at first, but aren’t. And I think this is the case with Aristotle’s division of philosophy into theoretical, productive, and practical. Although it is a division of philosophy, and the terms seem similar and related, it is simply not drawn the same way.
If we were to relate the terms, it would seem that theoretical pairs with logic, practical with ethics, and productive with physics. But all of the philosophy of nature, as well as theology, went, for Aristotle, into the theoretical part.
Productive sciences would include poetics and rhetoric, which would probably simply have no place in the usual threefold scheme, being relegated into the arts rather than the sciences. If they went anywhere, they would seem to have the most affinity with logic, not with physics.
4. Augustine saw the Trinity in it
Augustine related the threefold division to the Trinity. It seems that the Father would relate to physics, the Son to logic, and the Holy Spirit to ethics. I did not find this relevant enough to make it clear in the original post, but I do think it is important enough to be noted in this one.
The most relevant passages would be from the City of God, 8.4 and 11.25; I did quote from the former in the compilation, but not at enough length for this to be clear. It takes quoting at some length to show the point, and I decided not to burden people with this; you can check the book if you want. Here, I will quote from a couple of commentators who talked about the subject.
He also points out that instruction in rhetoric teaches men to discuss three kinds of questions: whether something is, what it is, and how it is and whether it is to be approved or disapproved (Ep. 11, 4; De div. quaest., q. 18; Conf., X, 10, 17). It is doubtful that the rhetorical formula was the sole basis of the insight, for it was long in coming and was probably suggested by biblical passages like Romans 11, 36 and Wisdom 11, 21. But a formula like this, or, again, Varro’s division of philosophy into natural, logical, and ethical (C. Faust., XX, 7; De civ. Dei, XI, 24-28), was important because it furnished his Trinitarian doctrine a reference point in general philosophical knowledge and encouraged him in his belief that all finite actuality is a reflection of the Trinity.
— Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, pp. 120–121
Plato’s speculations even bear the mark of the Trinity, since he divides philosophy into its three parts (natural, logic, and ethics): “Plato is said to have been the first to discover and promulgate this distribution, and he saw that God alone could be the author of nature, the bestower of intelligence (intelligentiae dator), and the kindler (inspirator) of love (amoris) by which life becomes good and blessed” (CD 11.25; see also Conf. 7.9). Plato’s understanding of God implicitly hints at the Trinity insofar as both Plato and Christianity affirm God as the first cause of existence, as the cause of intelligence and intelligibility, and the mover of all things to God through love. Augustine does not conclude that natural reason could know that God is triune, however.
— John von Heyking, Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World, p. 181; note that it uses “CD” to abbreviate Civitate Dei.
The neo-platonic reditus is in Trinitarian fashion radicalized, since the play of Trinitarian light across created shadowy trinities show them to be emanating perpetually forth from themselves, but always beyond themselves, into the full brilliance of the Trinity. It is for this reason that Augustine has to rein in his tongue lest he falsely ascribe conscious knowledge of the Trinity to Plato, whose threefold division of philosophy into natural, logical and ethical Augustine finds to have a deeply Trinitarian resonance.
— Jeffrey Biebighauser, Augustine and the phenomenological tradition, p. 280 (PDF page 281; the link goes directly to the PDF)
5. Roger Penrose and primacy
Roger Penrose, in his book The Road to Reality, defends an opinion according to which there are three “worlds”: a Platonic mathematical world, the physical world, and the mental world.
This is plainly the threefold division. It may not seem so to some people, because of the unique words used. But it was common in various of the divisions of philosophy and of the sciences to write “mathematical” instead of “logical” or “rational”, probably because of the close relation between logic and mathematics; this may be seen by inspecting the compilation post. “Moral” or “ethical” philosophy/science, to premoderns and even the early moderns, included all mental phenomena; much of what was called “moral philosophy” by the Scottish Enlightenment would be called “social science” today.
Penrose has stumbled upon the threefold division, and doesn’t seem to notice it. I have not read his whole book, but I have leafed through it, and he does not seem to acknowledge that he has predecessors in drawing this division. What became most famous with regard to his division were his figures 1.3 and 1.4, which I have reproduced here.
These figures were famous mostly because Penrose does not believe that any of the worlds is “primary”, or that there is any hierarchy between them, but rather that their dependence is cyclical. As he says in the book (p. 1029), his opinion is that
each of three worlds—Platonic-mathematical, physical, and mental—has its own kind of reality, and where each is (deeply and mysteriously) founded in the one that precedes it (the worlds being taken cyclicly). I like to think that, in a sense, the Platonic world may be the most primitive of the three, since mathematics is a kind of necessity, virtually conjuring its very self into existence through logic alone. Be that as it may, there is the further mystery, or paradox, of the cyclic aspect of these worlds, where each seems to be able to encompass the succeeding one in its entirety, while itself seeming to depend only upon a small part of its predecessor.
The ancients drew various orders and hierarchies to the division, as the compilation post shows us. It seems to me that the orders of study that were most concerned with being systematic have gone with either logic–physics–ethics, or logic–ethics–physics. But we are told by Sextus Empiricus, soon after the quoted passage, that there were ancient examples who began with physics and with ethics too.
That said, Penrose was not the first to draw no hierarchy between the parts of the division, either. Julia Annas says (pp. 110–111), citing a 1979 paper by Pierre Hadot, that the Stoics saw no hierarchy when they defended the division, and that this is shown by the metaphors that, according to Diogenes Laërtius, they used to explain it:
What is interesting about the enthusiastic Platonist use of what may originally (pace Xenocrates) have been a Stoic way of looking at philosophy is that it brings with it a characteristic position about the structure of philosophy. The tripartite view is non-foundationalist; no part has primacy in that it forms the basis for the others, and there is no set hierarchy of the parts. Just this is what makes the Stoic tripartite view distinctive. The metaphors the Stoics use for philosophy bring out the idea that the parts are interdependent; the unity of the whole depends equally on the contribution of all the separate and very different parts. Philosophy is a living being, logic being the skeleton and muscles, ethics the flesh and blood, and physics the soul. (Or physics is the flesh and blood, and ethics the soul.) Or: Philosophy is an egg, logic being the shell, ethics the white, and physics the yolk. Or: Philosophy is an orchard, logic being the wall, physics the trees, and ethics the fruit. Obviously, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness as to which part of philosophy is identified with which part of an egg, or an animal, or whatever. What is important is to get across the idea that, in their distinctively different ways, the different parts of philosophy are mutually interdependent. The yolk, white, and shell of an egg don't form a hierarchy, but they do need to hold together in a distinctive and mutually interdependent way, or you no longer have an egg. Similarly with a living thing, whose parts are all necessary in a mutually interdependent way to its continued function as a living thing.
Ryan Johnson, the author of Deleuze, a Stoic, concurs (p. 7):
While the order of philosophical topics remained a problem to which different Stoics offered different responses, they almost all agree that the three parts are integrated. For the Stoics, ‘no part [of philosophy] is separated from another, but the parts are mixed’ (DL 7.40). In order to explain the exact nature of this mixture, the Stoics compare the tripartite integration of philosophy to various things. [...]
The passage goes on to give the metaphors, but they were all mentioned in the Annas quote, as well as by Diogenes Laërtius himself in the compilation post. Johnson also gives this table, which is pretty neat:
If not for these commentators, I would not have noticed that the Stoics were communicating a lack of hierarchy when they gave these metaphors, but that does seem to be their meaning, or at least a very plausible interpretation of it. Johnson goes on at length about the egg and the Stoic division, drawing relations to Deleuze that would probably be interesting to someone who has actually read any Deleuze.
So Dr. Penrose’s new opinion seems to be, in at least one respect, the Stoic mainstream.
6. Random things I found
Here go other things which were less worth noticing.
Grammar
It seems that the division was used by some grammarians. I don’t know whether these writers are very important, but they illustrate the fact:
4. Adverbial proposition of causality. We have here the numerous and complicated relations of the ground, consequence, and purpose: 1. The real ground, or cause; 2. The moral ground, or motive; 3. The logical ground, or reason ; 4. The possible ground, or condition; 5. The adversative ground, or conception; 6. The ultimate ground, or purpose. But as the real, moral, and logical grounds express simply the logical relations of thoughts, such propositions properly belong to the co-ordinate form, and they take the form of the subordinate proposition only in an abnormal way. [...]
— Review of A Grammar of the English Language by Samuel S. Greene; reviewer unknown
The factitive, however, expresses the kindred effect and contains the principal idea of the thought expressed and has the principal accent. In German it is nicely distinguished by special forms of the objective relations, mostly after prepositions. It seldom agrees with the passive object, the verbs werden, bleiben, heissen, nennen, and schelten, forming the only exceptions, (i. e. take the factitive without prepositions). According to the action expressed, this relation may be classified under three heads: real, moral and logical.
— Sylvester Primer, On the Factitive in German, p. xxvii (PDF p. 3)
13. The new philology distinguishes three kinds of causal relations; viz: the real ground; as, ‘he went to London, being carried thither;’ the moral ground; as, ‘he went to London, wishing to engage in business there;’ and the logical ground; as, ‘he went to London, being seen there by many persons.’ Such distinctions bring grammar into harmony with logic.
This point, I believe, is not noticed by Mr. Morell.
— Josiah W. Gibbs, Philological Studies, p. 12
Attributes of God
This Greek Orthodox website claims that the attributes of God
have been divided into natural, logical and ethical attributes. Under the natural attributes three things are implied: that He is ever-present, eternal and almighty. Under the logical attributes, all-knowledge and all-wisdom. Under the ethical attributes, holiness, righteousness and love. All the three are interrelated and arise since the finite being of humanity is not able to grasp the substance of God as a unique oneness. It follows therefore that the classification is conventional.
I was unable to confirm this from any theologian of note; the article does not give citations for it.
Islamic
It seems that medieval Islamic authors, such as al-Farabi, used the division sometimes, or something similar. I have not yet found any primary quotes in English to support this, but I have found one Islamic book that seems to be drawing on such sources:
Philosophy is sometimes used in a broader sense whereby it is coterminous with knowledge. Obviously, since knowledge encompasses every awareness that reflects reality and has cognitive worth, in its general sense, philosophy even comprises the empirical and natural sciences. Therefore, in a general division, knowledge or philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical branches.
Theoretical wisdom (al-hikma al-nadhariyya) or philosophy is the inquiry of things, which exist irrespective of the human will and conduct. This section of philosophy bears numerous divisions. Its chief sections are as follows:
The higher wisdom (al-hikma al-‛ulyā), also called the first philosophy (al-hikma al-ūlā). It is this branch of knowledge to which the term philosophy is applied in its specific sense. Since higher philosophy is also concerned with the cognition of the Necessary (al-Wājib), it is called theology (Ilāhiyāt).
The middle wisdom (al-hikma al-wustā), also called mathematics.
The low wisdom (al-hikma al-sufla). This section of knowledge comprises the natural and experimental sciences.
Natural sciences are concerned with the inquiry of physical things. Mathematics studies things that have intermediate corporeality (al-tajarrud al-barzakhī), that is, although they lack physique, they do have quantity. The first philosophy, the discipline to which the current applications of philosophy and hikma is exclusive, is the inquiry of absolute reality. Its predicates are those accidents of absolute reality, which precede its division by the various mathematical, natural, moral, and logical delimitations.Practical wisdom (al-hikma al-‛amaliyya) analyzes things that exist because of the human will. It is further divided into three kinds: ethics, home economics, and public administration.
This division of knowledge that al-Fārābī and other Islamic philosophers have elucidated its details, illustrates that philosophy, in its general sense, has never been a single discipline. It has had a wide application by which it subsumed many diverse disciplines. As for the first philosophy, or philosophy in its specific sense, it is a particular branch of knowledge that has never encompassed other disciplines. Therefore, the much celebrated opinion that philosophy used to encompass every branch of knowledge and the empirical sciences separated from philosophy as they gradually evolved, lacks foundation.
If by philosophy its general meaning is meant, it has never been a single discipline with a specific subject of inquiry. And if it’s specific meaning is in view, then it has never included other disciplines. However, if it is meant that with the empirical sciences’ advance, rational and incorporeal methods of knowledge became obsolete and experiential perspectives replaced metaphysical views, it is a valid statement. Nevertheless, except for their intellectual universals (al-kulliyāt al-‛aqliyya) that are not subject to experiment, natural sciences were founded on experiment from the beginning.
— Āyatullah Abdullah Jawādī Āmulī, A Commentary on Theistic Arguments (PDF)
Bakunin
I think it’s funny that Bakunin uses this division in his God or Labor. The division is so traditional and ancient, and he uses it for such an impiety as the following.
Against the creed of the theologians I set these propositions:
1. That if there wore a God who created it the world could never have existed.
2. That if God were, or had been, the ruler of nature, natural, physical, and social law could never have existed. It would have presented a spectacle of complete chaos. Ruled from above, downwards, it would have resembled the calculated and designed disorder of the political State.
3. That moral law is a moral, logical and real law, only in so far as it emanates from the needs of human society.
4. That the idea of God is not necessary to the existence and working of the moral law. Far from this, it is a disturbing and socially demoralizing factor.[...]
Quote added 2021-12-16 — He also says something that sounds similarly evocative in his God and the State:
We recognize, then, the absolute authority of science, because the sole object of science is the mental reproduction, as well-considered and systematic as possible, of the natural laws inherent in the material, intellectual, and moral life of both the physical and the social worlds, these two worlds constituting, in fact, but one and the same natural world.
Titles
I do not know the relevance of these publications to the division, since I have not read them, but they contain the keywords in their very titles, and I thought to mention them, since I found them while researching.
- Eckehart Köhler, On Neurath’s Writings on Logic, Ethics and Physics
- Richard Montague, Logical necessity, physical necessity, ethics, and quantifiers
- John Corcoran, The Inseparability of Logic and Ethics
And, most tenuously,
- Sheryle Bergmann Drewe, The logical connection between moral education and physical education
Et cetera
This section will just have every other quote that I had gathered while researching for the main compilation post, but decided not to feature in it. It is ordered from most to least interesting.
If one leaves theology out of account, one may say that the hierarchical relation of the special sciences and philosophy is of Aristotelian origin. The Aristotelian origin comes out in the very notion of a science which aims at unity, and in the relation between the sciences and philosophy. Since the latter rests upon the former, it remains in permanent contact with the facts and is anchored to the very rocks of reality. The Aristotelian inspiration appears finally in the inner articulation of philosophy itself. During the first centuries of the Middle Ages the Platonic division of philosophy into physics, logic, and ethics was for a long time in force. The thirteenth century definitely rejects it or rather absorbs it into new classifications. Compared with Aristotle—the most brilliant professor that humanity has ever known—Plato is only a poet, saying beautiful things without order or method. Dante was right when he called Aristotle “the master of those who know.” But to know is before all things to order: sapientia est ordinare: the mission of the wise man is to put order into his knowledge. Even those who do not accept the ideas of the Stagyrite acknowledge his kingship when it is a question of order or clearness. [...]
— Maurice de Wulf, The Teaching of Philosophy and the Classification of the Sciences in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 369–370
Philosophy was defined by the Stoics as ‘the knowledge of things divine and human’. It was divided into three departments; logic, ethic, and physic. This division indeed was in existence before their time, but they have got the credit of it as of some other things which they did not originate. Neither was it confined to them, but was part of the common stock of thought. Even the Epicureans, who are said to have rejected logic can hardly be counted as dissentients from this threefold division. For what they did was to substitute for the Stoic logic a logic of their own, dealing with the notions derived from sense, much in the same way as Bacon substituted his Novum Organum for the Organon of Aristotle. Cleanthes we are told recognised six parts of philosophy, namely, dialectic, rhetoric, ethic, politic, physic, and theology, but these are obviously the result of subdivision of the primary ones. Of the three departments we may say that logic deals with the form and expression of knowledge, physic with the matter of knowledge, and ethic with the use of knowledge. The division may also be justified in this way. Philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or man; and, if it studies man, it must regard him either from the side of the intellect or of the feelings, that is either as a thinking (logic) or as an acting (ethic) being.
— St. George William Joseph Stock, A Guide to Stoicism (added 2021-08-01)
Burt’s interpretation of Augustine, though often enlightening, is frequently excessively Aristotelian, in both substance and terminology. The very division between speculative and practical philosophy, which serves as background to the book’s title, bespeaks a division first found in Aristotle, but never in Augustine. Would not a division into physical, logical, and ethical be more Augustinian? Aristotelian aphorisms, not Plato and Platonism, regularly provide intellectual background for Burt in understanding Augustine’s thought. Several chapters begin with summaries of philosophia perennis. Such recapitulations can be a useful magisterial tool and, doubtless, Augustine contributed greatly to the Western philosophic endeavor. But how much of this acquired wisdom does Burt read back into Augustine? [...]
— Frederick Van Fleteren, review of Augustine’s World, by Donald Burt
Designed in an especial manner for the People, though adapted for all classes, the work will be found to comprise those subjects on which information is of the most importance; such as the more interesting branches of science—physical, mathematical, and moral; natural history, political history, geography, and literature; together with a few miscellaneous paper which seem to be called for by peculiar circumstances affecting the British people.
— William and Robert Chambers, Chambers’s Information for the People, preface
The Ballet [Comique de la Reine] was a musical drama with dancing set in an elaborate recreation of the island of Circe. The surviving text associated with the performance presents four allegorical expositions, based explicitly on Comes’ work: physical or natural, moral, temporal, and logical or interpretive.
— Wikipedia on Natalis Comes; I was unable to verify this
Physical, mathematical and moral are the three kinds of truth prevalent in the world, and each is a standard for its own type, and each differs from the other. What is physical truth? It is truth or evidence made patent to one of the five senses, such as the sight, hearing, smelling, tasting or touching. These are the five senses of the human mind. And by the use of them we reason the truth or falsehood of certain material ideas. The great failure with the Infidels in England, that I have seen, was this, that they take the physical test and apply it to the moral subject. So with the mathematical test; and because the moral does not agree with the physical or mathematical, they say that it is not true.
— The Underwood-Marples Debate
Before I begin this Chapter, I shall take Notice, that there are three sorts of Philosophy, viz. Natural, Moral, and Rational. The natural Part (which I here treat of) relates to the World: The Moral, to the good or ill that concerneth Man’s Life: And the Rational Part is Discourse and Disputation, grounded on Reason. And as it may be necessary to make some Mention of the Great Author of this World, I presume first to give you the Opinions of the greatest Men on the Consistence or Essence of the Almighty.
— Giles Jacob, The Country Gentleman’s Vade Mecum, p. 108
Sovereign Lord, thank You for creating the physical, mathematical and moral laws of the universe that give us order. Teach me what is right, and enable me to live by it.
— prayer in this devotional by LivingTruth.ca
Now it is clear at the outset that the president is “empowered to act individually” only in very exceptional instances and those exceptional instances are indicated explicitly in the Constitution. This is a natural, logical and ethical corollary to the general principle adopted by the Constitution that the president is “non-accountable.” Simply put, if the president is non-accountable, he/she has to be “powerless,” or share his/her powers with other “accountable” parties like the prime minister and the ministers.
— H. Levent Köker, Erdoğan’s presidency and the Constitution
In political idealogy, it is very important to consider stoicism. If a system is research from 3 corners: physical, logical and moral grounds, it is call stoicism.
(1) Physical check; Does the Burmese constitution physically show the sign of turning toward Democracy?
(2) Logical check: The Constitution approves a military role more than a civilian one. The regime said Burmese democracy is nearly complete. But, more and more politicians are behind bars. Is this logical?
(3) Democracy based on freedom of speech. If freedom of speech is violated every time, how can Burma democracy stand up for moral test?
If Obama’s administration does not consider stoicism to fix Burma or the world, it will end up empty and getting nowhere.
— “Tom Tun”, in this random 2009 Internet comment. I just thought it was neat and funny how he laid it out.
