Introduction to natural law ethics

Although all matter is non-being, nevertheless some apparent things can be understood, because, through their appearances, we can understand the forms.

0. Contents

1. Intelligibility differential
2. Application to genera and species
3. Application to individuals
4. Objective value
5. Notes

1. Intelligibility differential

We notice that in some apparent things, the movement is more easily referred to the form than others; the form is, therefore, made more intelligible by those appearances than by others.

Those appearances, being more intelligible, provide us with improved access to form, and therefore to being. Since all being is good, those appearances may be judged to be better – not in respect of themselves, since appearances are not, but in respect of the form which they make more intelligible.

This fact, which I shall call the intelligibility differential, is the only ground of all rational value judgments between appearances.[1]

2. Application to genera and species

The intelligibility differential allows us, first, to judge which kinds of apparent things are better, as follows.

First, animate things are better than inanimate things. This is because animate things, sometimes and to some extent, have within themselves, by their nature,[2] the efficient cause of their own motions. To the extent that this happens, more of their motions can be referred to their form, and therefore they are more intelligible, and so, better.

Second, animate beings that are capable of sensation are better than animate beings which are not capable of sensation. This is because sensitive beings, sometimes and to some extent, have within themselves, by their nature, the formal cause of their own motions – i.e., some appearance which they receive through sense. Their nature determines not only how they move, but also when, and under what conditions. To the extent that this happens, more of their motions can be referred to their form, and therefore they are more intelligible, and so, better.

Third, sensitive beings that are capable of understanding are better than sensitive beings which are not capable of understanding. This is because rational beings, sometimes and to some extent, have within themselves, by their nature, the final cause of their own motions – i.e., some knowledge which they receive through intellect. They are able to seek the ends which their nature determines, not only as they appear, but as they are. To the extent that this happens, more of their motions can be referred to their form, and therefore they are more intelligible, and so, better.

So, to use the Porphyrean definitions, men are better than beasts, and beasts are better than plants, which in turn are better than inanimate things. Nowadays, of course, Porphyry’s assumption that plants are devoid of sensation has been shown to be false. Some people are also trying, with less success, to prove that some of the infrahuman animals have rational powers.

3. Application to individuals

The intelligibility differential allows us, second, to judge which individual apparent things are better, within a certain kind.

This is clear enough – of multiple appearances through which we understand the same form, some of them allow for better understanding of the form. This is because their motions are more conformable to the principles which follow from the form – in other terms, they are more often the cause of their motions than not, and their actions are more in accordance with their last end.[3]

Since more of their motions can be referred to their form, they are more intelligible, and so, better. The best members of a species may be said to be the exemplary ones, the ones that best exemplify the form of the species.

4. Objective value

What it means for any apparent object to be objectively better, metaphysically, has thus been explained. All of the material world could, in principle, be ranked on an objective value scale according to the intelligibility differential; the scale would start from the best human being on earth, then pass through every other human being, then every infrahuman living creature, and then reach the inanimate things, finally stopping at the worst inanimate thing.

A notable special case of this is the case of mankind. Since we are rational, we are able to discover the laws of our nature, i.e., understand the human form, in order to act conformably to it, and therefore become objectively better human beings. The project of doing this is called natural law ethics.[4]

5. Notes

[1] Value judgments are necessarily between things, not about things, since value is ordinal, rather than cardinally quantitative. This is true of both economic value and metaphysical goodness.

[2] The nature of an apparent thing is the form which may be understood through it.

[3] Actions of an object are motions which are efficiently caused by it. Some actions of an object may be referred to its form; this reference, as defined before, is called the final cause. In this context, the form is called the last end.

The motions that are referred to the form, then, are said to be in accordance with, or conformable to, the last end. The motions that are not referred to the form are said to be not in accordance with the last end, or possibly contrary to the last end, if their appearance is judged contrary to the sort of appearance which would be conformable to the end. (Contrary opposition between appearances was defined in §6 of this post.)

[4] The laws of a nature may be defined as the general principles, deduced from our understanding of its form, which govern our judgment that the motions of an apparent thing are, or are not, in accordance with its last end. Natural law may refer, depending on context, to the laws of a specific nature, to the laws of all natures taken together, or to the laws of the human nature in particular.