Private property

Whatever then comes into my possession, without violence to any other man, or to the institutions of society, is my property. This property, it appears by the principles already laid down, I have no right to dispose of at my caprice; every shilling of it is appropriated by the laws of morality; but no man can be justified, in ordinary cases at least, in forcibly extorting it from me.

— William Godwin, Enquiry, §2.5

In this blog post, I explain why I am in favor of property, and of private property, as well as my opinions about individual appropriation.

0. Contents

1. Property
2. Private property
2.1. Unity of purpose
2.2. Action conflicts
2.3. Rational conflict resolution
3. Applications
3.1. Self-ownership
3.1.1. Victimless crimes punishable
3.1.2. Chattel slavery impossible
3.2. Common property is a perversion
3.2.1. Friendship not an obstacle
3.2.2. Societal hierarchy ideal
3.3. Intellectual property is impossible
4. Notes

1. Property

The material world, taken as a whole, is a single substance. While it is not usually helpful to mention it, this follows plainly from the definition of substance, since the world is “neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject” (Cat., 5.2a11). Moreover, the world can be formally understood as a single whole, without any reference to anything external to it. Regarding its origin and end, of course, reference must be made to its Creator.

This substance is an animal. This must be, since the entire substance is corporeal, and some parts of it – those we call animals – are, evidently, sensitive and alive. Now, whenever a part of a substance is sensitive and alive, the whole must also be said to be sensitive and alive.[1] So the world, being a “sensitive animate corporeal substance”, is an animal. (cf. Isag., 10.6)

Now, in every animal, the lower parts are subordinate to the higher, and are always rightly used as means to the ends of the higher. For instance, an animal may use its locomotive or nutritive faculties in unusual ways, that are contrary to nutrition or locomotion, if this will remove an obstruction from its eyes. The end of the part is subjected to the end of the whole.

Since man is the only rational part of the material world, then, it follows that every other part of the material world is subordinate to man, and is rightly used as means to man’s ends. When man uses a lower creature to fulfill his own purposes, he subjects its end in-itself, or intrinsic end, to its end as-a-part-of-the-world, or partial end. It is always good for a higher part to subject a lower part’s intrinsic end to that same lower part’s partial end.

This is why it was said that “the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect”, and “man has a natural dominion over external things”, wherefore it is lawful for him to possess them; that is, not to rule their nature, which only God can do, but to have the use of them for whatever good purpose he has in mind.

The goodness of property being established, we may move on to private property, or individual appropriation.

2. Private property

2.1. Unity of purpose

Regarding a given material thing, it is possible for different men to have no conflicting plans about how to use it, and instead, to be entirely agreed about how it should be used, and by whom, at a given time. This always happens between friends, which is why “friends hold all things in common”.

Men who are not friends may also, incidentally, have coinciding plans about what to do with a specific thing, or they may, through argument, arrive at a common purpose – either because one man is rationally convinced that the fulfillment of the other’s goal is a greater good, or because they both, recognizing the good elements in each other’s plans, resolve to follow a third plan instead, which was not the one that either of them began with.[2]

These non-conflicting situations may be summarized as coincidence, conviction and compromise, respectively. They are certainly all possible.

2.2. Action conflicts

But it is also possible for different men to have conflicting purposes to achieve with the same material thing, and for them to be unable to come to any unity of purpose in practice – especially in relation to time constraints, which are intrinsic to all human action.

Purposes are conflicting if they require the same material thing, or part of it, to be in different places at the same time, which is impossible.

In such cases, an action conflict is created. Two men wish to act in incompatible ways, and they cannot do so without solving the conflict, i.e., deciding which one’s purpose should be fulfilled.

The natural law provides a means for the beasts to resolve such conflicts among themselves, viz., violence. But regarding conflicts among men, it merely gives us reason and bids us use it.

Supposing that an action conflict is solved, it must result in the performance of one, and only one, of the actions which were had in mind by the conflicting actors. This action shall be called the winner’s action, and any other actions are then to be called the losers’ actions.

The rational resolution of an action conflict must result in a right of ownership, or private property, which lasts at least for the duration of the winner’s action. For ownership is nothing other than the right to control property. While the winner’s control over the property, lasting at least for the duration of his action, is the necessary result of any conflict resolution, even a violent one, the result of a rational conflict resolution must also be that he has the right to control the property for at least that duration.

2.3. Rational conflict resolution

While “the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law,” as Thomas said, nevertheless there is a method of rational action-conflict resolution which is most perfect, and is therefore the one to which human reason naturally tends. This is to allow, in all cases, that the first user of a thing be its first rightful owner.

This is because men do not only make plans to do physically disturbant actions with material things, but may also have it in their designs to keep them sitting still, available for a planned, foreseen later use. In such cases, the thing may be physically indistinguishable from a thing which was given up, and may be appropriated by any; yet, any man who uses it will be using it for plans which are incompatible with those of the man who planned to keep the thing available.

To avoid such situations, property rights must be held to last beyond a given visible physical action, and to exist, instead, for as long as a man has purposes to fulfill with the property. But since this is not always knowable without the ability to know other men’s minds, and since a purpose to keep some property available is so common, other men must suppose that a man continues to have purposes to fulfill with the property indefinitely into the future, after his first use of it.

The first use of a natural thing typically causes a visible, physical disturbance, which is hard to confuse for a natural operation, and much harder to lie about than a mere declaration of ownership. In fact, a mere declaration may itself be a lie, in that a man may claim to have a purpose to fulfill with a thing, without really having any such purpose in mind. The disturbance is unambiguous, objective proof that a man once had a purpose to fulfill with a given thing, and therefore may still be expected to have one.[3]

This is why allowing that the first user of a thing be its first rightful owner is the most perfect method of rational action-conflict resolution, and should always be followed.

The perfection of this method is the reason why it is actually already what people spontaneously do, anyway, which is what led Locke to think that it was part of the natural law. The early moderns had a lot of trouble distinguishing people’s spontaneous behavior from the law of nature.[4]

2.4. Other benefits of private property

I believe that the only essential purpose of private property, or individual appropriation, is the one outlined above, the avoidance of action conflicts. Yet, there have been other benefits raised by authors of note, which I do not deny.

First among them is the fact that common property is liable to tragedies of the commons. “Every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants.” (S.T., II-II, 66.2c)

Another inessential benefit is the fact that it makes it possible for people to exercise the virtue of generosity in practice.

I also acknowledge that private property is a marvellously beneficial institution in many ways that are not yet fully understood. But certainly it would be unphilosophical to claim that its essential purpose is merely to be beneficial, with no specification of the means by which it is beneficial. This is, nevertheless, an opinion that I have heard from respectable persons.[5]

Since Thomas is likely to be counted as an authority by my readers, I would like to note that the other two benefits of appropriation given in the same article by Thomas Aquinas, who was just quoted, seem to reduce to the avoidance of action conflicts, and therefore also of their violent resolution.

Thomas also says that regarding the use of external things, as distinguished from their “procurement” and “dispensation”, man “ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need.” However, since there are no needs, this has no rigorous meaning. It should be taken to mean only what the quoted verse itself says, viz., that we, especially the rich of this world, should be generous, ready to share, thus accumulating as treasure a good foundation for the future, so as to win the life that is true life. (1 Timothy 6:18–19)

3. Applications

3.1. Self-ownership

Given the fundamental purpose of private property as was just defined, it seems that self-ownership must be admitted to exist. That is, each human being must be admitted to have property rights over his own body.

This is because each human being is his own body’s first user. Furthermore, a man’s body is always in his control – he cannot irrevocably relinquish his control over it while he lives, so he is always able to enter into action conflicts regarding it. If he does not desire to act in any way at all, we may doubt whether he is really alive.[6]

3.1.1. Victimless crimes punishable

I deny that self-ownership necessarily has libertarian consequences. No one has a right to do anything that is evil, and so, no one has a right to misuse his body either – an evil purpose ought not, in principle, to prevail in any action conflict. It is good to coercively stop someone from doing any evil act with his body, if the action is manifestly evil, that is, known to be evil from external observation; this is what justifies violent self-defense. It is also just, in principle, for a legitimate state to punish any act that is evil, although in practice it may be imprudent.[7]

3.1.2. Chattel slavery impossible

Given self-ownership, chattel slavery is actually impossible, in strictness of terms; it is impossible for one man to rightfully own another man’s body. What is, in fact, done by “slaveowners” is to continually, or habitually, infringe upon another man’s self-ownership. Which is unjust, of course.

Other forms of forced labor may be just, in certain conditions.

3.2. Common property is a perversion

Common, or communal property, means plainly for there to be appropriation of some resource to a group, rather than to a single person. While this avoids action conflicts between members of the group and outsiders, it still allows for action conflicts within the group. So, it is necessarily imperfect with respect to individual property. It is a perversion of appropriation, since it partly frustrates the purpose of avoiding conflicts.

3.2.1. Friendship not an obstacle

Of course, friends do hold all things in common, but if they are truly perfect friends, they must be able to act as though their property is in common, while all of it is still socially recognized as being owned by one of each of them, and merely used by the other at times. So there can be no purpose to common property as an institution. Certainly, perfect friendship is rare, if even possible on this earth, so that clearly-defined property rights are an advantage, should a conflict come up within what was thought to be a friendship.

3.2.2. Societal hierarchy ideal

For the same reason, societies that own societal property, such as business enterprises, ought to be hierarchical, that is, to have a single leader. For if there is no final decider of societal property decisions, action conflicts may arise.

3.3. Intellectual property is impossible

Since action conflicts are founded upon the fact that the same material thing cannot be in two places at the same time, which is not true of ideas, there can be no action conflicts about ideas, and therefore no private property in them, strictly speaking. If there is even property in them, they remain at the natural common property, and have no reason to be appropriated.

Of course, intellectual property is usually the name of a mere grant of monopoly by the state, which is not necessarily thought to be, strictly, a kind of property right. I have written my opinions about it here and here.

4. Notes

[1] Otherwise, any animal may be disqualified by the fact that its feet are not, in isolation, capable of sense; or the fact that its nails and hair are not, taken apart, the subject of development or metabolism.

[2] In case you couldn’t tell by now, I am using plan, purpose and goal – later, I also say design – interchangeably in this discussion, to refer to a man’s idea about what to do with a given thing at a given time.

[3] Incidentally, it also proves that the man had some capability of physically using the thing – which, in the early economies in which appropriation usually happens, is nearly the only purpose for which he could eventually want it, since it would be difficult to use it in exchange. This gives some apparent reasonableness to the first user’s claim, which adds to the appeasement of other actors, although it is not the essential reason for it.

[4] This opinion about Locke’s motivations, and about the early moderns, is just, like, my opinion. That’s what things seem like to me, as my general impression from my meager readings. I have no sources to give you on that.

[5] Brian Besong, in the conversation that led up to my latest post about intellectual property, had seemed to think that the essential reason for its existence was that it is “necessary for the pursuit of happiness”, which is certainly extremely vague, although he may be able to put a finer point on it.

[6] To be clear: supposing that a man did relinquish his self-ownership, he would have to never act again, because any action would be an infringement upon the property of his body’s new owner. Being unable to act, he would be unable to even communicate his desire to get his body back.

[7] See my posts about human nature and about punishment. This paragraph and footnote were rewritten in 2022-05-04.