Philosophical virtues

Corresponding to the three rules of philosophy, three philosophical virtues may be defined.

0. Contents

1. The virtues
1.1. Discernment, or clarity
1.1.1. Name
1.1.2. Precept
1.1.3. Models
1.2. Serenity, or tranquility
1.2.1. Name
1.2.2. Precept
1.2.3. Models
1.3. Integrity, or honesty
1.3.1. Name
1.3.2. Precept
1.3.3. Models
2. Their distinctness and uniqueness
3. Opposing vices

1. The virtues

1.1. Discernment, or clarity

The first rule enjoins, in philosophy, the persistent application of reason to all possible subjects. Accordingly, a virtue may be defined regarding the application of reason to life in general.

1.1.1. Name

This may be called discernment. The word appropriately conveys the first activity of reason, which is to divide and distinguish, and then to define. All failures of thought are failures to discern.

This may also be called clarity, since whatever is not thought about is left unclear, indistinct, confused.

1.1.2. Precept

The precept of discernment may be phrased as, “be rational” – or, for emphasis, “be rational about everything”. Since always acting rationally is, ultimately, the only rule of human conduct, another precept would be, “aim to be perfect”.

1.1.3. Models

The chief model of discernment is Socrates, who, in the Crito, was unwilling to save his life, unless he could be rationally convinced that it was right. Since it is also the virtue of clarity, exceptionally clear writers, such as Thomas Aquinas, may serve as virtuous models in relation to it – “how would Thomas think about this?”

1.2. Serenity, or tranquility

The second rule enjoins, in philosophy, the use of nothing other than reason; in particular, the senses and passions are to be kept at bay. Accordingly, a virtue may be defined regarding the control of the passions in life in general.

1.2.1. Name

This may be called serenity, or tranquility, which properly calls to mind such a person as is unperturbed by his environment. Any person who shows emotion is always acting immorally, and all moral errors are caused by the senses and passions.

1.2.2. Precept

The precept of serenity may be phrased as, “be impassive” – which is a perfectly good rendering of the Stoics’ apatheia. Of course, the problem is not so much with feeling emotions, as they sometimes seemed to imply, as with acting upon them. In view of an ultimate ideal, another precept could be, “aim to be impassible”.

1.2.3. Models

Anyone who met his death with patience is so far a model of serenity. Many Christian martyrs may be included here, but also Socrates again, and possibly Seneca. 

The thought of Stoic philosophers, in general, often emphasized tranquility and freedom from the passions, and may be kept in mind as a model, if not their lives themselves. Kant also emphasized this, and was once referred to as “the serene philosopher”. Others could be mentioned.

1.3. Integrity, or honesty

The third rule forbids, in philosophy, the use of abductive reasoning. Accordingly, a virtue may be defined forbidding, in life in general, the construction of reasons for predefined conclusions, which is rationalization, or deception.

1.3.1. Name

To prevent yourself from rationalizing is to have integrity; and to prevent yourself from lying is to have honesty. Both things are prevented if abductive reasoning is forbidden in life; and honesty carries the full meaning of integrity if one allows talk of “being honest with oneself”. To always act upon deduced reasons is to always act upon true ones.

1.3.2. Precept

The precept of integrity, put in a general way as the prohibition of contrived reasons, may be termed as, “be pure-hearted” – although the figure of the “pure heart” is not always well-understood, and sometimes implies naïveté, which is no virtue. In view of an ultimate ideal, another precept could be, “aim to be incorruptible”.

1.3.3. Models

The chief models of integrity are such persons as did what they thought was right, even when this went against all possible motives of regard to their welfare. This includes such preachers as, again, Socrates and the Christian martyrs.

But also, any philosopher who carried a difficult deduction to its end, even when this went against all common opinion, is worth mentioning here – Parmenides, for one, and possibly Spinoza. Of course, such persons are often accused of going against the multitude in favor of their passions, rather than their reason, so that choosing examples can be difficult.

2. Their distinctness and uniqueness

These virtues are not very distinct or unique. As defined, may be thought to be equivalent to the cardinal virtues. Discernment appears closest to prudence or courage, serenity to temperance, and integrity to justice.

Each of them is, in fact, equivalent to all four cardinal virtues; each one, if perfectly attained, would lead a man to the entirety of human perfection. For they enjoin nothing but the persistent and proper use of reason, which is the only rule of human conduct. Any moral error will break all of their precepts.

Which does not prevent their being equivalent to the cardinal virtues, of course, since “the unity of the virtues” is such a well-known concept. At any rate, since my approach here was not a standard one in ethics, I have picked new names.

This derivation of these virtues from the rules of philosophy, which in turn were derived from its definition, supports Socrates’ contention that the aim of the philosopher is to become like the gods – who are, of course, perfect, impassible, and incorruptible.

It also supports my best friend’s emphasis on what she called “intellectual virtue”, which she has always thought was the root of all virtue, though as the name implies, it is seen most clearly in expositions of one’s thoughts. I do not pretend this post to be expounding her doctrine, but I think that it seemed to agree with my own.

3. Opposing vices

The viciousness of a defect in discernment, serenity, or integrity is clear enough. I will give some names here. Persons lacking discernment may be thought to be unthinking or obscure; persons lacking serenity may be thought to be oversensitive or thin-skinned; persons lacking integrity may be thought to be dishonest or divided.

Since they are equivalent to the whole of virtue, I would contend that these virtues are pure perfections, and so, properly, there can be no excess of them. Still, they may appear to be beyond measure in some cases.

A condescending attitude, of explaining things too much, may appear to be an excess of clarity; an insensitive or cruel attitude may appear to be an excess of tranquility or impassivity; and an indiscreet attitude, of revealing too much information, may appear to be an excess of honesty.

They are, of course, no such things. There is a difference between always having reasons, and always making them explicit; between disregarding emotions, and disregarding the real evils which cause them; between never lying, and never having secrets. Still, the popular association between these attitudes makes them bear mentioning here.