Substance and accident

I continue my commentary of Hume’s Treatise at the next section, §1.1.6. See my commentary on the previous section here.

0. Contents

1. Origin of substance (¶ 1)
2. Nature of substance (¶ 1–2)
3. Substances and accidents
4. End

1. Origin of substance (¶ 1)

Hume begins the section like this:

I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner?

I think I might be one of those philosophers. So I think I should answer Hume’s question.

The concept of substance comes from the fact that we are capable of understanding sensible things.

When we understand a sensible chair, for instance, the object of understanding is, of course, a form, which we might call ‘chairness’. But we also understand various other things about the chair which are not involved in chairness – for instance, it may be a four-footed, wooden chair with a circular back. Since we understand those things, they are also form.

The concept of substance comes by when we understand the chair throughout its undergoing various changes.

We notice that some changes, which are involved in our understanding of chairness, prevent the appearances that we see from being understood through the form of chairness any longer – e.g., if the chair loses its back, we may only be able to understand it as a stool.

Other changes, however, are not involved in our understanding of chairness, and do not prevent our understanding the object as a chair. If the chair somehow loses its woodenness or four-footedness, or the back loses its circularity, we may possibly still understand the resulting object to be a chair – chairness is retained.

In order to distinguish the changes which affect the form by which we understand an object of experience, from those that do not, we come up with the concept of substance. We say that there has been an accidental change when we still understand the object by the same form, and a substantial change when we can no longer do so.

2. Nature of substance (¶ 1–2)

Hume continues:

If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist.

Sure, yeah. Reflection. That sounds like how a concept works, alright.

But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance.

What? Where the hell did he get that idea? Concepts don’t have anything to do with passions and emotions. I hope he explains this later, but I suspect he won’t.

We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.

The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection.

This is not quite right, but it is not quite wrong, either. A substance is an appearance through which we can understand a certain form. Since an appearance is a collection of proper sensible qualities – which Hume calls “simple ideas” – it is correct to say that a substance is such a collection given a name, as long as we keep in mind that the name is given because of a form that we understand through the collection.

Accidents, however, are also appearances through which we can understand a certain form, as was said above. So, in what follows, I will distinguish substances from accidents.

3. Substances and accidents

Substances are capable of being imagined by themselves. Accidents can only be imagined as part of the larger collections which we call substances, which is to say, “in a subject”.

So, although the forms which we understand through accidents can be conceived of independently of a subject, they cannot be imagined as existing in this way, which is the same as to say, that they cannot appear without a subject in experience.

This is why Aristotle said that “everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.” (Cat., 2b5) Existence here is to be understood as appearance, not being – without substances, there would be no external world, since accidents are incapable of appearing without substances.

Since I have clearly defined substances as a kind of appearance, I do not use Aristotle’s term “secondary substance”. What he called “secondary substances”, I call “forms”.

4. End

I do not find it profitable to give any comments on the rest of ¶2, or on ¶3. I say nothing about modes because, to date, I have never found a use for the term mode when thinking about anything. If I ever wish to talk about modes of anything, I will define the term when I get there.