Punishment

Since all vices are of bodily origin, it is possible for interference upon the body to correct vices. Such interference is punishment; an act intended to do this is an act of punishment. The successful correction of vices is sometimes called the spiritual welfare of the punished.

Since we can only know vices through evil acts, we can only punish the guilty. The threat of punishments, however, may help correct vices in those yet innocent; such threats are perfectly reasonable, and this secondary correction is deterrence.

Other acts may be materially the same with an act of punishment, such as restitution for theft or injury, the protection of society through incapacitation of the evildoer, or the quelling of the public’s anger at him. But they are not formally the same;[1] the act is only punishment insofar as it is understood through the foregoing definition.

Threats of punishment usually attempt to correct vices by threatening such a measure of pain, or of privation of pleasure, as would be proportionate to the evil done, in the sense that a threatened person’s sensitive desires will be affected by the threat of punishment in such a way as to neutralize the influence of his vices, possibly permanently. This method of determining the measure of punishment is the proper notion of retribution;[2] it is subordinate to deterrence, since the punishment itself is only an aid to it insofar as it makes such a threat credible.

Sometimes, the acts of punishment themselves are intended to correct vices, by affecting the evildoer’s mind in accordance with a particular understanding of psychology. This method of determining the measure of punishment is that which is called rehabilitation or reformation.

All methods of determining the measure of punishments are doubtful, with regard to their effectiveness at correcting vice. Proportionality is a tenuous notion which can never be understood with precision; and in most cases, the science of psychology is not yet advanced enough to have a distinct understanding of reformation.

The people usually have a vague understanding of retribution, and no understanding at all of reformation; so, it is best to avoid punishments which, when known by the public, will appear to them to be disproportionately grave. Any measure beyond their sense of proportion will not seem to be punishment, but mere unjust abuse.

Punishments may be divided into coercive and uncoercive punishments.[3] Coercive punishments may only be exacted by a legitimate state, because they directly interfere with the person or property of the punished, which is an infringement when done by those without authority. All other acts of punishment are uncoercive.

Some evil acts may not indicate vices in the agents who committed them, when there is reason to believe that the sensitive desire which motivated the act was caused by a circumstance which was peculiar to the particular act. In such cases, it is rational for the state to exercise mercy, which is to say, to not punish, and waive its right to punish. It may still rationally punish the acts, however, in order to maintain the power of deterrence in the threats of law.[4]

Since coercive punishments are necessarily detrimental to the bodily welfare of the punished,[5] and therefore, necessarily, to the general welfare, insofar as it is known; and since the effectiveness of all punishments, in general, at improving the spiritual welfare of the punished is doubtful; it appears that coercive punishments should only be applied to crimes against person and property, which are themselves detrimental to the general welfare, insofar as it is known. Even then, mercy should be exercised whenever it may be safely and rationally exercised.

Catholics should believe, however, that no coercive punishments should be given to any crimes, since there are no legitimate states.

Notes

[1] The following examples may make this clearer to the uninstructed.

If a thief repents and returns what he stole, restitution has been made to the victim, but no punishment has been exacted.

If I expel a man from my community because I believe that his mental condition will make him prone to dangerous acts, I have protected my community by removing the dangerous man and making him incapable of such acts; but I have not punished him, since I did not know him to be vicious.

If society is put under the convincing illusion that a man has been punished, their avenging sentiments are quelled, but no punishment has been actually given to the man.

If I announce that, after the punishment of this last person, the law forbidding his act will be abolished, such that no one will be punished for it anymore, then the punishment will not deter, since deterrence is actually a function of the threat of punishment, which the punishment only serves to make believable.

[2] Although the earlier mentioned idea, of quelling the public’s vengeful passions, is often called retribution, all defenses of retribution make it something independent of that, and closely tied to proportionality; so that I believe that I have assigned the name correctly.

I believe that there is no other intelligible way for a punishment to be proportionate to a crime.

[3] I almost called them “punishments of law” and “punishments of opinion”, following a division from J.S. Mill, On Liberty, §1. I might still do that in some places for rhetorical effect, but for technical purposes, Mill’s nomenclature may be misleading, since uncoercive punishments might not consist merely in voicing opinions about the punished, but also in depriving them of gifts, of access to certain private locations which they do not own, and of certain business relationships.

[4] The most common reasons to doubt the presence of vice are usually inscribed into law as universal exceptions to its application, as in cases of insanity or duress. Mercy only pertains to unexcepted cases.

[5] Bodily welfare, or simply welfare, is the ability to fulfill desires, as may be contrasted with spiritual welfare, which was defined just earlier. Violations of private property, including self-ownership, necessarily deprive a human being of the ability to fulfill his desire to continue to control the property, which is a desire that he demonstrated through his actions, since if he did not have this desire, he would give the property away. Violations of contract are also detrimental to welfare, insofar as they are violations of property. The general welfare is the bodily welfare of the entire society.

Human nature

The reader who would form a just estimate of the reasonings of these volumes, cannot perhaps proceed more judiciously, than by examining for himself the truth of these principles, and the support they afford to the various inferences interspersed through the work.

— William Godwin, Enquiry, Summary of Principles

Ethics, as was shown, is supposed to be deduced from human nature. What, then, is human nature?

0. Contents

1. Methodological excursus
2. Postulates
2.1. Rationality and autonomy
2.2. Individual animality
2.2.1. Senses
2.2.2. Sensitive desires
2.2.3. Passions
2.2.4. Vegetative and other powers
2.3. Social animality
2.3.1. Relationships in general
2.3.2. Possible kinds of relationships
2.3.3. Voluntary relationships
2.3.4. Innate relationships, and authority
2.3.5. Human reproduction
2.3.6. Knowledge inequality

1. Methodological excursus

Too many books on ethics leave human nature implicit, simply stating various rights and duties and saying vaguely that they are rooted in human nature. Sometimes they are more specific, but even then, you would have to piece the author’s anthropology from the various rights and duties that he derives from it – much of it never seems to be mentioned outside of ethical demonstrations.

Because of this, the suspicion duly arises that the author is thinking backwards – that he is starting from a certain collection of moral rules that he wants to defend, and then figuring out some reason – often vague or specious – to say that they are natural to mankind after all. Since abduction is forbidden in philosophy, this method would be opposed to philosophy, and would rather constitute poetry.

Sometimes, the authors explicitly use poetry in place of philosophy – that is, they write thought experiments, where they imagine men acting in a supposed ‘state of nature’. Then, if the imaginary experiment seems to show some principle at work, and if the things imagined sound realistic, they think themselves to have found a universal law of nature.

But, of course, imagination is forbidden in philosophy too. A thought experiment could illustrate your conception, but never constitute it.

To avoid all such suspicions, I will make explicit my concept of human nature, as I have understood it from the relevant appearances. In the future, every ethical proposition which I attempt to demonstrate in this blog will be demonstrated through reference to one or more of the principles shown here. No new principles, different from the ones written here, will be introduced as belonging to ‘the human nature’ as a whole. The nature of particular human body parts, however, remains undefined, and I may define it in the future, with new principles peculiar to each part.

One benefit of this is that, if I have made a mistake in my conception, my readers may find this out at the outset, before any ethical demonstrations have been made. I am only one human being, trying my best to observe myself and other human beings, and I may err. That said, I have tried to compose my concept using only what I believe to be very basic, common, and old notions about human nature. They are ones which I believe to be sound, and I take responsibility for the judgment that they belong to human nature; but I also take comfort in my belief that, if I err, I err with mankind. If any of my principles should be disproved, of course, my demonstrations will also be shown to be unsound.

2. Postulates

I accept the traditional idea that man is a rational animal. But I think that this is not an essential definition, which would mean that all rational animals must be men. Human beings, besides being rational, are a particular kind of animals, in ways that I think are metaphysically and ethically relevant.

If there were other rational animals, then, they might not have every single right and duty which I ascribe to human beings.

Nevertheless, even if it is not our specific difference in the logical sense, rationality is still our “highest” and most ethically relevant property, as was shown. It does belong to us by nature in some way.

While I do not dare to attempt a new definition, the following sketch of human nature will exhaust the properties which I find fitting to ascribe to it.

2.1. Rationality and autonomy

Human beings are rational. By this, I mean that they have reason, or intellect. This is the ability, or power, to understand forms, define and divide them, make judgments about them, and deduce conclusions from those judgments. Because of this, human beings have rational desire, which is the desire for knowledge, and therefore for being, generally.

Human beings are also autonomous agents, or free actors, by which I mean that they have free will. As explained before, free will is essentially characterized as the ability to moderate irrational desires and follow rational ones. Without rational desire, and the power to make it apparent, which is the free will, human nature could not be understood as rational.

Since human beings are the only rational parts of the material world, they rightfully have dominion over external things, or property, as was shown.

Following a modern convention, this blog will routinely refer to the human powers of intellect and will as constituting the soul, whereas all other motions will be said to come from the body. This may confuse some traditional metaphysicians; more on this here.

2.2. Individual animality

Human beings are animals, by which I mean only that they are animate and sensitive, having the ability to contain within themselves the efficient and formal causes of their own motions.

This means little without a characterization of human animal powers, which I shall provide next. This section will cover only the human animal powers which I do not immediately find relevant to the consideration of human beings in society, wherefore I titled it “individual”.

2.2.1. Senses

First, human beings have senses, or sensitive powers, which are powers that allow them to perceive appearances. I admit of all the senses that are in common usage.

The external senses include sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; the internal senses include the common sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and sensitive memory. There are other senses, which are not usually as relevant. I mean all of these terms in their common meanings, and I do not find it useful to define them.

2.2.2. Sensitive desires

Second, human beings have sensitive desires, which are desires for sensible things. The power of having sensitive desires is the sensitive appetite, as may be contrasted with the rational appetite, which is the ability to have rational desire.

The sensitive appetite is sometimes distinguished into concupiscible and irascible; the former, also called concupiscence, includes desires to seek what is sensibly pleasant, and to avoid what is unpleasant or painful.

The irascible appetite includes desires to seek what is useful for obtaining something sensibly pleasant, and to avoid what is dangerous because it will lead to something painful; these desires incline us to strive and fight for sensible goods that are difficult to preserve or to attain.

Some typical sensitive desires are hunger, thirst, and sexual desire; other sensitive desires don’t tend to have names, such as the desires for warmth or sleep.

2.2.3. Passions

Third, human beings have passions. While all bodily motions of which human beings are aware, including the senses, may be called passions in a general sense, a narrower sense includes only those motions which are caused by the sensitive appetite, and may also be called emotions. Those passions are sensitive desire itself, pleasure, pain, sorrow, anger, hatred, and compassion. Besides the sensitive desires, which were just explained, I will now define the other passions.

Pleasure is the body’s awareness of the fulfilment of some sensitive desire. Joy, which is the soul’s awareness of the fulfilment of rational desire, is also sometimes called a passion, but this is improper, since it is caused by the rational appetite rather than the sensitive.

Pain and sorrow are the body’s awareness of the appearance of evil. Evil, generally, is a defect in a material thing which makes its appearance more difficult of being understood through its form; in the human being, it is something which would prevent the proper functioning of body parts. Pain is the appearance of evil to the senses, and therefore belongs only to evils afflicting a human being’s own body; sorrow, while also bodily in origin, is caused by a judgment of the intellect regarding some object of sensitive desire.

Hatred, or aversion, is a sensitive desire for something which is opposed to something that is currently apparent, and, therefore, a desire for that apparent thing to disappear. Hence, the proper object of hatred is evil, in the sense just defined.

Anger, properly speaking, differs from hatred in that it is only directed against the perceived injustice of a particular person, and therefore creates a desire that that person be punished.

Compassion, or empathy, is the body’s instinctive awareness, by way of a kind of ‘matching’, of the passions of other animals, including other human beings. This instinct causes a sensitive desire for the apparent good of those animals for which we feel compassion.

I believe that love of other human beings, or of other animals generally, is not completely a passion, but a composite of rational desire for the good of the other, a.k.a. goodwill, and of compassion. This composite is distinct from sexual desire, and completely separable from it; when they exist together, this is what is called “romance”.

Goodwill tends to cause compassion, and, when examined and found to be in accordance with reason, compassion will cause goodwill as well. So it usually makes more sense to speak of love than of either of its components.

2.2.4. Vegetative and other powers

Fourth, and least relevant here, human beings have the so-called vegetative powers, i.e., the powers of metabolism, growth, and reproduction. Since reproduction is very relevant to the consideration of human beings in society, it will be covered in §2.3.5, below.

Human beings also have motor powers; they have arms and legs and such. And they have the power to speak and communicate. As said in the beginning, I intend to define particular human body parts as they become relevant. This sketch only covers what I think belongs to the human being as a whole.

While property in general is derived from the rationality of man, private property, or individual appropriation, exists because of our animal nature. Since human beings have passions and senses, they are not always fully rational; because of this, they may have irreconcilable disagreements about what to do with material objects. Since material objects can not be used for conflicting purposes at the same time, property rights must be assigned, as was shown.

As was also shown, rational assignment of property rights requires the right of self-ownership, which is each human being’s property right over his own body; this will be relevant in later sections.

2.3. Social animality

I will now consider human beings in society, which means, in relationships of various kinds with each other. I will define and divide relationships, and postulate the properties of human nature which create special kinds of relationships.

2.3.1. Relationships in general

By relationship I mean the fact of two human beings seeking the same end ‘coordinately’, i.e., by means of at least one of them being allowed by right, in certain conditions, to control property which the other owns.

2.3.2. Possible kinds of relationships

Accordingly, all possible human relationships may be divided into four kinds, as follows.

According to the end which they seek, relationships may be divided into autotelic and heterotelic. A relationship is autotelic when it seeks the whole good of its constituent persons as its end; it is heterotelic when instead it seeks, as its end, some particular good.

According to their effect upon property, relationships are either equal or unequal. They are equal when the relevant property is owned in common, with no priority between persons; they are unequal when the will of one person has priority over that of the other in decisions about what to do with the property.

These two divisions yield four possible kinds of relationships, viz., the equal autotelic, unequal autotelic, equal heterotelic, and unequal heterotelic.

2.3.3. Voluntary relationships

Voluntary relationships are entered into by the consent of all parties. Since nothing in nature compels anyone to enter any of them, they may exist within any of the four possible kinds.

An equal autotelic voluntary relationship is called a friendship. It is, objectively, the best possible kind of human relationship, since each party receives the greatest benefit that the other can give; it is peculiar to rational animals.

Perfect friendship would occur when two human beings have the same knowledge, which causes them to love each other. Since they have the same knowledge, they have the same plans, so they do not enter into conflicts about what to do with any property. So, between themselves, perfect friends would own all things in common.

Since it is impossible for two human beings to have exactly the same knowledge, there are no perfect friendships in the world. But some relationships approach very nearly to that ideal, so they are called friendships by analogy with that.

An unequal autotelic voluntary relationship is one of voluntary submission. It occurs when two persons love each other, but they recognize that one of them is in some respects wiser and more knowledgeable. The inferior person then agrees, partly for his own good, to submit to the superior’s judgment about those things, and the superior, therefore, effectively controls the inferior’s property regarding them. Since the superior loves the inferior, he will try to teach him what he knows, so that eventually, if conditions are favorable, voluntary submission will become friendship.

An equal heterotelic voluntary relationship, or democratic society, is a relationship entered for a particular purpose, such as business, and in which some property, set apart for the purpose, is put into the common control of all parties. If not all parties involved are perfect friends with each other, this allows for unsolvable conflicts over property to arise, possibly leading to violence. Because of this, democratic societies are contrary to reason, and all heterotelic relationships ought to be unequal.

An unequal heterotelic voluntary relationship, or hierarchical society, is a relationship entered for a particular purpose, such as business, and in which some property, set apart for the purpose, is owned by all parties, but one of them has decision-making priority about it for as long as the relationship lasts. This includes all businesses which are organized hierarchically.

2.3.4. Innate relationships, and authority

Besides voluntary human relationships, there are also innate human relationships, that is, relationships which someone can enter by being born. Those relationships are created by particular properties of human nature which will be explained in the following sections.

In innate relationships, a natural circumstance causes a particular adult person to have control over, love for, and a presumption of superiority in knowledge over, the newborn person. Since this circumstance is created by nature, these things exist by right, and so, the new person is born into an innate kind of unequal autotelic relationship, becoming the inferior of the adult. The adult, becoming his superior, is then said to have authority.

Authority, therefore, gives the superior person the right to, for any good purpose, control the inferior’s property, including the inferior’s body, as well as to be obeyed by the inferior; and it also makes the superior responsible for the inferior’s material welfare and virtuous development.

The inferior is still the owner of his body and property, and although authority may override this for an objectively good purpose, it may not do so for a bad one, which remains an infringement. So, it remains true that no human being is ever the rightful owner of another.

2.3.5. Human reproduction

Reproduction, as it happens in humans, is the source of two natural passions as well as two special kinds of human relationships, marriage and filiation, which together constitute the society called the family.

First, human beings are born particularly helpless, having no knowledge and little physical strength. Parents also have, by nature, especially strong compassion for their children, which property is called the passion of parental love. These natural human properties create the authority of parents over children, and the innate submission of children is called filiation.

Second, human beings reproduce sexually. This is the source of sexual desire, which is a distinct passion, and separable from love. Since sex naturally results in children, it is naturally sought within a voluntary heterotelic relationship, called marriage, which is meant for the purpose of raising the children that result from the sexual act. Since equal heterotelic relationships are contrary to reason, marriage is naturally hierarchical, but nothing in nature makes it necessary that the man, rather than the woman, always be the head of it.

2.3.6. Knowledge inequality

Since human beings are material, and enter the world at different locations in space, they all have different knowledge. Further, some human beings may have a great preponderance, in knowledge, over others. The possibility of such human beings, who may be called sages, or the wise, if actualized, would make it advantageous that all others enter into voluntary submission to them.

Further, it would make it possibly advantageous for God to grant such sages authority over all human beings born in a certain area. This area would be called a state, and the authority of its wise ruler(s) would be called its legitimacy.

It is unclear how precisely God would grant this authority, if he ever did; but it would have to be through some sensible sign that a certain sage, who manifestly has the military means to exercise authority, also has a presumption of superior knowledge over others in the area, and responsibility for them. Nothing other than God could grant this.

After it were given, though, no sensible sign of state authority would have to remain; a legitimate state would, intelligibly, continue to be legitimate until it underwent manifest substantial change.

The human natural property that legitimate states are possible is what I would mean by the traditional phrase that “man is a political animal”. Although political in ancient Greek philosophy referred more to a natural tendency to organize into cities (poleis), in much of modern philosophy it refers to coercive states, which I do believe to be, in certain possible circumstances, compatible with human nature.

I know of no grounds in philosophy or experience to believe that any of the currently existing states are legitimate, or are not. Rationally, non-Catholics may either suspend judgment or take certain facts, such as the apparent beneficial (or not) nature of existing states, as probable indications of their legitimacy (or illegitimacy). Catholics, however, ought to believe on grounds of papal authority that none of the currently existing states are legitimate.

Introduction to natural law ethics

Although all matter is non-being, nevertheless some apparent things can be understood, because, through their appearances, we can understand the forms.

0. Contents

1. Intelligibility differential
2. Application to genera and species
3. Application to individuals
4. Objective value
5. Notes

1. Intelligibility differential

We notice that in some apparent things, the movement is more easily referred to the form than others; the form is, therefore, made more intelligible by those appearances than by others.

Those appearances, being more intelligible, provide us with improved access to form, and therefore to being. Since all being is good, those appearances may be judged to be better – not in respect of themselves, since appearances are not, but in respect of the form which they make more intelligible.

This fact, which I shall call the intelligibility differential, is the only ground of all rational value judgments between appearances.[1]

2. Application to genera and species

The intelligibility differential allows us, first, to judge which kinds of apparent things are better, as follows.

First, animate things are better than inanimate things. This is because animate things, sometimes and to some extent, have within themselves, by their nature,[2] the efficient cause of their own motions. To the extent that this happens, more of their motions can be referred to their form, and therefore they are more intelligible, and so, better.

Second, animate beings that are capable of sensation are better than animate beings which are not capable of sensation. This is because sensitive beings, sometimes and to some extent, have within themselves, by their nature, the formal cause of their own motions – i.e., some appearance which they receive through sense. Their nature determines not only how they move, but also when, and under what conditions. To the extent that this happens, more of their motions can be referred to their form, and therefore they are more intelligible, and so, better.

Third, sensitive beings that are capable of understanding are better than sensitive beings which are not capable of understanding. This is because rational beings, sometimes and to some extent, have within themselves, by their nature, the final cause of their own motions – i.e., some knowledge which they receive through intellect. They are able to seek the ends which their nature determines, not only as they appear, but as they are. To the extent that this happens, more of their motions can be referred to their form, and therefore they are more intelligible, and so, better.

So, to use the Porphyrean definitions, men are better than beasts, and beasts are better than plants, which in turn are better than inanimate things. Nowadays, of course, Porphyry’s assumption that plants are devoid of sensation has been shown to be false. Some people are also trying, with less success, to prove that some of the infrahuman animals have rational powers.

3. Application to individuals

The intelligibility differential allows us, second, to judge which individual apparent things are better, within a certain kind.

This is clear enough – of multiple appearances through which we understand the same form, some of them allow for better understanding of the form. This is because their motions are more conformable to the principles which follow from the form – in other terms, they are more often the cause of their motions than not, and their actions are more in accordance with their last end.[3]

Since more of their motions can be referred to their form, they are more intelligible, and so, better. The best members of a species may be said to be the exemplary ones, the ones that best exemplify the form of the species.

4. Objective value

What it means for any apparent object to be objectively better, metaphysically, has thus been explained. All of the material world could, in principle, be ranked on an objective value scale according to the intelligibility differential; the scale would start from the best human being on earth, then pass through every other human being, then every infrahuman living creature, and then reach the inanimate things, finally stopping at the worst inanimate thing.

A notable special case of this is the case of mankind. Since we are rational, we are able to discover the laws of our nature, i.e., understand the human form, in order to act conformably to it, and therefore become objectively better human beings. The project of doing this is called natural law ethics.[4]

5. Notes

[1] Value judgments are necessarily between things, not about things, since value is ordinal, rather than cardinally quantitative. This is true of both economic value and metaphysical goodness.

[2] The nature of an apparent thing is the form which may be understood through it.

[3] Actions of an object are motions which are efficiently caused by it. Some actions of an object may be referred to its form; this reference, as defined before, is called the final cause. In this context, the form is called the last end.

The motions that are referred to the form, then, are said to be in accordance with, or conformable to, the last end. The motions that are not referred to the form are said to be not in accordance with the last end, or possibly contrary to the last end, if their appearance is judged contrary to the sort of appearance which would be conformable to the end. (Contrary opposition between appearances was defined in §6 of this post.)

[4] The laws of a nature may be defined as the general principles, deduced from our understanding of its form, which govern our judgment that the motions of an apparent thing are, or are not, in accordance with its last end. Natural law may refer, depending on context, to the laws of a specific nature, to the laws of all natures taken together, or to the laws of the human nature in particular.

Fundamental metaphysics

We attempt to begin doing philosophy, in accordance with the Rules. This is my third try.

We must begin with what is self-evident, even before we have admitted anything from the senses. The only such things are the laws of logic. Such are the basis for the first division.

The first division is between being and non-being. Given anything, it either is or is not. What is, we call being. What is not, we call non-being. This is exhaustive; tertium non datur.

What can we find out about being and non-being? Again, before using the senses. I think we can know the following things.

Possibility: Being can, and must, be. Non-being cannot be. This follows from the definitions of being and non-being.

Intelligibility of being: Being can be thought about, conceived, understood, known. This may also be said as that “all being is intelligible”. We must admit this if we set out to do philosophy, according to the First Rule.

Unintelligibility of non-being: Non-being cannot be thought about, conceived, understood, known. This is self-evident; “you cannot know what is not.” There must be something there for you to know it. “All non-being is unintelligible.”

Intelligibility: The last two propositions may be summarized as, “it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.”

Desire: Here I just note that we are still not using the senses, and speaking only of rational desire, a.k.a. intellectual desire, or will.

Desirability: Being can be desired, wanted, loved, willed. This is to say that “all being is desirable”, or, which is the same thing, that “all being is good”.

This follows from the fact that all being is intelligible, and from that we set out to do philosophy, which means nothing other than that we desire to understand all things.

From the unintelligibility of non-being, we know that things must be, in order that we may understand them. So, in order to desire to understand them, which we do, we must desire that they be, which is nothing other than to desire them.

Since it is not, non-being cannot be desired, wanted, loved, willed. Which is to say, “all non-being is undesirable”, i.e., “all non-being is evil”.

Exhaustion of the first division.— The foregoing findings seem to be exhaustive. I think nothing else may be learned without admitting something from the senses. Having seen all that we could, we must now carefully open our eyes.

Survey of the sensible world.— There are many appearances in the sensible world. The most relevant at the moment is motion, or change, which I shall use interchangeably. Our senses give us the appearance of things coming to be, and of things passing away. This happens constantly.

Given what was said before, this poses a problem. By definition, being cannot fail to be, and non-being cannot be. The appearance of ‘passing’ from one to the other can only, then, be illusory.

Nevertheless, something does appear to us, and the First Rule requires that we apply reason to it. We must distinguish what appears and is, from what appears and is not – which is not, in turn, to be confused with what does not even appear. In order to do so, we give the apparent subject of change a name. Doing so is the basis for the second division.

The second division is between matter and form.

Matter is the subject of change, as presented by appearances. Properly speaking, it is not, since, like motion, it cannot be understood in itself, and all being is intelligible.

Form is the object of understanding. It is what was called being in the first division, and as such, it cannot be the subject of change.

Nothingness, then, shall be that non-being which, besides being unintelligible, is not even possibly apparent, either. It is that which, although we can name, we can neither understand nor imagine.

Given the two fundamental divisions, we may move on to admit and examine even more appearances from the senses. To do so, until we have understood everything, would be the object of a completed philosophy. This is just the start.

Derivation of the four causes.— For my own purposes, it is convenient to move on in this direction in particular.

Suppose that we can understand a particular moving object that we see in the sensible world. What does that imply?

First, it implies that the object is, so that it can be understood. This is its formal cause.

Second, it implies that the object appears, so that it can be seen. This is its material cause.

Third, it implies that the object’s motions can be related to the object, as it is understood. Something about the appearance leads particular motions to be referred to the form. The relation of motion to form is the object’s final cause.

Finally, since form is motionless, something movable must be referred to the motions of the object in order that their particular arrangement in time and space may be understood. This movable principle of motion is its efficient cause.

That’s enough for today.

Rules for doing philosophy

Suppose that we decide to engage in philosophy. Philosophy can here be understood as “the search, through natural reason, for certain knowledge of all things according to their first principles”.

If, for whatever reason, we decide to do that, there are some steps we should take to make sure we stick to that project, and don’t end up doing something else instead.

1. Use reason. In order to search for knowledge of all things through natural reason, you must avoid the doctrines and vices which prevent its application to some objects.

2. Do not stop using reason. In order for your knowledge to truly be attained through natural reason, you must avoid admitting any unexamined appearance from the senses, passions, or imagination. This is achieved by trying to put your thoughts into clear speech.

You must also avoid admitting anything on trust from any authority.

Both authorities and appearances may be used to illustrate what was already demonstrated, of course. Rhetoric is useful in teaching philosophy, but cannot substitute for philosophy.

3. Reason from principles to conclusions. If you are to know things through their principles, you must avoid knowing the principles through the things. Abduction is forbidden in philosophy, and is rather the method of poetry.

If you stick to these rules, you will do philosophy. Insofar as you depart from them, you won’t.

The rule of spirit

Having written its opposite, I write here my blog post on free will. As before, no one should read it.

0. Contents

1. Choice
1.1. Types of desire
1.2. Willpower
2. Sufficient reason
3. Burdened by flesh
4. Control over desire
5. Order

1. Choice

I believe that in human acts, we always do what we most desire to do. (Most, as in, we always have a range of concomitant desires, and we fulfill the foremost.) Plainly, “I did what I did not most want to do” is a description of an accident, not of a choice.

I also believe that we do not, ultimately, choose what it is that we desire (although, see §4).

In light of these facts, I have been asked, whence moral responsibility? Clearly, if we have no control over our desires, and no choice affecting which one will become foremost at any given time, then we never make any choice which affects the actions that we will take, which appears to be Trouble 4 Moral Responsibility.

The answer, in short, is that regardless of whether it really is so troublesome, I do not actually believe that we have no control at all over our desires – I believe that we have some ability to moderate our irrational desires. The same answer in slightly longer form is what follows.

1.1. Types of desire

I believe that desires can be divided into two main kinds – rational desires, caused by the soul, and sensitive desires, caused by the body. (And no more – see §2.)

Rational desires are caused by the operation of reason. Barring some interference with the natural operation of the rational faculty – which can only be caused by the body (see §3) – such desires always follow strictly from the known truth about things; they may be said to be deduced.

The way this works is that goodness, being really identical with being, can be known with as much certainty by reason as anything else. When reason knows an object to be good, the will desires it (with rational desire) in exact proportion to how good it is; nothing else can happen (although, see §5). Regarding those desires, “the will desires of necessity whatever it desires”, which is against what Thomas had said.

Sensitive desires, on the other hand, are caused by the operation of the body’s “power of sensuality”; this is further divided into irascible and concupiscible, but this is not relevant here. What is relevant is that sensitive desires, being caused by a non-rational power, can be either in accordance with reason or against it (cf. §3). We can know whether they are in accordance with reason (i.e., “properly ordered”, “correct”) by examining them with the rational faculty.

1.2. Willpower

Given those desires and their causes, this is what we can choose to do. We can either examine our sensitive desires or not; if upon examination we find them to be incorrect, we can either bring them into accordance with reason (see §4, §5) or not; if we do not do so, then they will be allowed to become our foremost desires for irrational reasons, and we can act upon them. This is always our fault, being a result of choice.

These choices are determined only by how just we are, i.e., how strongly we desire to “avoid evil and do good”. Which is to say, they are free. The power rightly to make these choices may be termed “willpower”, and may be construed as our “attention” and “diligence” in examining our desires and bringing them into accordance with reason. In connection with the latter operation, we may bring up another necessary to it, which is that of deriving the logical consequences of the principles of the natural law in application to each particular case. Defect of willpower is always fully our fault.

2. Sufficient reason

Rational and sensitive desires comprise an exhaustive division of desires. This means that we never desire anything without either a physical cause (sensitive desires) or a logical reason (rational desires), caused by the operation of our minds on our knowledge.

So, I do not believe, as some people think must be admitted to safeguard free will, that any action is ever done for no reason at all, and in that sense “undetermined”. I think that that is pretty much nonsense.

You have always had your body, and you have always had access to the floor. When have you last rolled on the floor? For most people, it has been some weeks, perhaps months – we simply lack any reason to roll on the floor most of the time. Every other action is like this – we never do things for no reason, but only when some reason comes up. How could it be otherwise?

3. Burdened by flesh

The will desires whatever appears to it under the aspect of good, in precise proportion to how good it appears. If, then, we ever desire anything out of proportion to how good it is, this must be because a false appearance has been admitted to be a reality.

There is no way for reason to create a false appearance; its natural operation is to deduce rightly from known premises. So if a false appearance has been admitted into the soul, it must be through the senses, whose natural operation is that of chaotic material causes, prone to lead us to error if we are not diligent.

It is always through defect of the will that we fail to act rightly. But it cannot happen without the senses as a motive. Without the body, we would have no disordered desires, and even the weakest willed man could be a saint.

4. Control over desire

To be clear – for willpower to bring a desire into accordance with reason amounts to making us desire it less. All of our desires are ordinally placed in a “value scale”, from foremost to hindmost, and we always act upon the most wanted one; for a sensitive desire to be disordered, or mistaken, is for it to be quite literally out of order on this scale, and what reason can do, through willpower, is to bring it into rational order, i.e., to lower it in the scale.

Our control over our desires, then, amounts to the fact that, at some given times, there are things which we can choose to desire less than we currently do.

We do not choose which things it is that we rationally desire, since this is a necessary rational deduction. And we do not ultimately choose which things it is that we desire with our senses, since we lack sufficient control over the external world to decide which things will even come before our eyes. (Although, of course, sometimes we know enough to avoid near occasions of sin.)

We do not, then, in any ultimate sense choose what it is that we desire; what we can do is to bring our irrational desires into line. This is what I had meant in §1.

(For now, I have nothing more to say on the idea of “second-order desires” – desires to have other desires – besides what was said in §1.1 of this other post.)

5. Order

Given the opinions above, it can technically be said that having a disordered sensitive desire is the same as having a disordered rational desire. For if a sensitive desire is above its proper place in the scale, and if it sometimes does (as it does) surpass for the time being the place of any rational desires, then those rational desires are, of course, below their proper place.

Here I would note that, yes, sometimes some rational desires are beneath their proper place with respect to some sensitive ones; but every rational desire is always in its proper place in relation to every other rational desire. It is only sensitive desires which can be out of order absolutely, i.e., in relation to every other desire of any kind. So it is more proper to speak of disordered sensitive desires than rational ones.