History of thought

The history of thought might be explained in light of the two opposite habits of mind, superstition and enthusiasm, which are the twin enemies of true religion and true philosophy.

To recap, enthusiasm is characterized by an attribution of nature to art, and is most naturally found in proletarian ideology, which is created to support the proletariat’s hopes of cataclysmic revolution. Superstition, on the other hand, is characterized by an attribution of art to nature, and is most naturally found in aristocratic ideology, which is created to support the aristocracy’s maintenance in power. True religion and philosophy, which attribute to each thing its true character, are synonymous with bourgeois ideology, which supports neither revolution nor ossification, but the natural progress of society.

Besides integrating the theory of these habits into class theory, I also use these names for the corresponding habits of mind in regard to economic policy – where enthusiasm will support forcible equality of means, and superstition will support the forcible consolidation of classes – and social habits, especially regarding family and sex – where enthusiasm will support the extreme weakening of the family, likely by means of communal childrearing, and superstition will support its extreme strengthening, with great benefits accruing to membership in certain extended families. Since these names are uncommon in these fields, they have the advantage of not being confused for an a posteriori generalization from the opinions of actually-existent proletarian and aristocratic classes, although I should certainly try to account for any divergences in that regard.

With this theory laid down, we may notice that, since the earliest period of recorded history corresponds to the rise of the first states, it necessarily corresponds to the predominance of superstition. Aristocratic ideology dominates the ancient record, where religion is perverted into a support for the ruler – who is called either divine or divinely favored – and economic and social policy accordingly concur for the preservation of the power of noble families.

This happened at least until the rise of the first democratic states, in ancient Athens. This was a form of government which dominated by enthusiastic tendencies – however limited the franchise was at the time – and remarkably slow to suppress dissent. As a result, the first rise of true religion and true philosophy happened in Athens, largely in opposition to the prevailing enthusiasm of the times, and as a result, leaning (insofar as it erred) in favor of supporting superstition, as may be seen by the aristocratic structure of Plato’s Republic. Still, philosophy was not so perverted as to entirely favor superstition, and Plato’s Republic would be the least oppressive of aristocracies if made actual.

Ever since its creation, philosophy would maintain its middle position, opposing the excesses of enthusiasm on the one hand and superstition on the other; as indicated, it focused on opposing superstition in aristocratic states, and mostly enthusiasm in democratic states. Rome’s mixed constitution gave it reason, at different times, to oppose both.

In the French Revolution, philosophy allied so successfully with popular enthusiasm as to entirely overturn aristocratic superstition, leading to the general proliferation of democratic government. This proliferation, in turn, has made it useful for certain elites to cater to popular enthusiasm, partly overturning the old class allegiances. It became the fashion for violent power to justify itself through its supposed great help in restraining economic inequality. Since the Cold War, therefore, philosophy has had the most occasion to lean towards superstition, allying with the conservatives against the enthusiastic excesses of the socialists.

But the tide may change soon.