Wednesday, March 16, 2022

David Hume’s tables

In the old days (one supposes) when the philosopher, labouring by lamp-light in his study, came to this point in his argument, he set down his pen, and looked around for an object in the real world to interrogate. Very commonly that object was the nearest one to hand: his writing-table. ‘Table,’ he said, ‘how do I know that you exist, and, if you do, how do I know that my concept, table, represents your real existence?’ The table would look back without blinking, and interrogate the philosopher in its turn. It was an exacting exchange, and according to which one was the victor in the confrontation, the philosopher would inscribe himself as idealist or a materialist. Or so one must suppose from the frequency with which tables appear.

— E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory

I was much amused by the above quote, which was pointed out to me by a friend. This led me to take notice of the quotations which I shall give below. Together, they support the thesis that, if there really was such a fascination with tables among modern philosophers as E.P. Thompson described, then the works of David Hume must have been a major source for it.

(Addition from 2023-10-08: One later philosopher who made notable mention of tables was Bertrand Russell, in Chapter 1 of his 1912 book The Problems of Philosophy. David Bostock’s 2012 book Russell’s Logical Atomism, p. 116, describes Russell as holding the “extreme view that I never perceive such things as tables.”)

0. Table of contents

1. A Treatise of Human Nature
2. An Abstract of a Book Lately Published
3. A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh
4. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
5. Other works

1. A Treatise of Human Nature

In what follows, references will be given by book, part, section, and paragraph, with the paragraph number given separately, since some editions don’t give it. So §1.2.3, ¶4 will refer to Book 1, Part 2, Section 3, paragraph 4. All quotes under this section are from the Treatise, but I will also write “Treatise” into each reference to make it easier to scroll through.

The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. This idea, then, is borrow’d from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour’d points, and of the manner of their appearance. (Treatise, §1.2.3, ¶4) 

When [the mind] considers the dye as no longer supported by the box, it can not without violence regard it as suspended in the air; but naturally places it on the table, and views it as turning up one of its sides. (Treatise, §1.3.11, ¶11)

To begin with the question concerning external existence, it may perhaps be said, that setting aside the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking substance, our own body evidently belongs to us; and as several impressions appear exterior to the body, we suppose them also exterior to ourselves. The paper, on which I write at present, is beyond my hand. The table is beyond the paper. The walls of the chamber beyond the table. And in casting my eye towards the window, I perceive a great extent of fields and buildings beyond my chamber. From all this it may be infer’d, that no other faculty is requir’d, beside the senses, to convince us of the external existence of body. (Treatise, §1.4.2, ¶9)

My bed and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them. (Treatise, §1.4.2, ¶18)

’Tis easy to observe, that tho’ bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is a quite different thing from the solidity; and that they have not the least resemblance to each other. A man, who has the palsey in one hand, has as perfect an idea of impenetrability, when he observes that hand to be supported by the table, as when he feels the same table with the other hand. (Treatise, §1.4.4, ¶13)

That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists of parts. These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. The termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure. (Treatise, §1.4.5, ¶15)

It has been objected to the system of one simple substance in the universe, that this substance being the support or substratum of every thing, must at the very same instant be modify’d into forms, which are contrary and incompatible. The round and square figures are incompatible in the same substance at the same time. How then is it possible, that the same substance can at once be modify’d into that square table, and into this round one? I ask the same question concerning the impressions of these tables; and find that the answer is no more satisfactory in one case than in the other. (Treatise, §1.4.5, ¶25)

When I view this table and that chimney, nothing is present to me but particular perceptions, which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine of philosophers. But this table, which is present to me, and that chimney, may and do exist separately. This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. There is no contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions. (Treatise, appendix)

These other passages of the Treatise were not quoted because, while they also mention tables, the mention does not use tables as an example of a perception: §1.4.5, ¶11; §2.1.3, ¶5; §2.1.10, ¶2; §2.2.5, ¶17; §2.3.8, ¶3; §2.3.10, ¶8; §3.2.3, ¶10, note 75. Nevertheless, they show that tables were present to Hume’s mind.

2. An Abstract of a Book Lately Published

In the Abstract, Hume repeats his example of the two billiard balls from the Treatise, §1.3.14, ¶18; but this time he mentions the table that they are on:

Here is a billiard-ball lying on the table, and another ball moving towards it with rapidity. They strike; and the ball, which was formerly at rest, now acquires a motion. [...] I see a billiard-ball moving towards another. I cannot distinguish whether it moves upon its axis, or was struck so as to skim along the table. In the first case, I know it will not stop after the shock. In the second it may stop.

You may count the table as being implied whenever billiard balls are mentioned, if you wish; I have been counting only explicit tables.

3. A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh

Speaking of scepticism, Hume wrote this rhetorical question into the Letter:

If I be as much assured of these Principles, as that this Table at which I now write is before me; can any Thing further be desired by the most rigorous Antagonist?

4. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

As with the Treatise, I will cite the Enquiry by section and paragraph. I am just calling it Enquiry, since the Moral Enquiry is not as relevant here; see §5 of this blog post for that.

If I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. (Enquiry, §5, ¶11)

It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: Our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.

But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent. (Enquiry, §12, ¶8–9)

5. Other works

David Hume also mentioned tables in other works, but it was not very relevant to the present subject. For completeness, though, and since this is very easy to do:

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