Profit of Believing

I try to summarize, or rather reorganize, my favorite work by Augustine. I partition it into elements, simplify some arguments and wordings, and omit some unimportant parts. Section numbers in parentheses refer you back to the original work.

This presentation is meant to emphasize the main thread of argument, as I understood it. However, Augustine’s eloquence is also very enjoyable. So, I have attempted to preserve some of it here, with a minimum of distraction from the argument, by relaying some of his illustrations and comments at the end of the post, and added references to them, in square brackets, next to the relevant parts of the argument. I especially enjoy his story about the Manichæan woman in the comment [2], taken from §13, although in truth it is tangential to the work.

This whole blog post is explicitly a paraphrase, although much of the wording may still be recognized as that of Cornish’s translation. So, I have improved the clarity wherever I could – even in some of the transposed comments. Sometimes, I have checked this edition to do so, but the translation here is mostly Cornish’s, for copyright reasons.

To further highlight what I enjoy about the work, I give here a list of the divisions in it: it has a division of the senses of Scripture (defs. 1–4); a division of the possible kinds of error in reading (defs. 5–7); a division of the kinds of person, with regard to religion (defs. 8–12); a division of the possible kinds of belief (defs. 13–15), which in turn is referred to the kinds of person (axioms 6–8); and a division of all men into the wise and fools (defs. 16–17). Though I found that to be tangential, it also defines “miracle” and divides kinds of miracles – see the comment [15].

On the Profit of Believing

It is then my purpose to prove to you, if I can, that the Manichees profanely and rashly inveigh against those, who, following the authority of the Catholic Faith, before that they are able to gaze upon that Truth, which the pure mind beholds, are by believing forearmed, and prepared for God Who is about to give them light. (§2)

0. Contents

1. Old Testament defended (§§5–9)
2. Catholic Church vindicated (§§10–12)
3. Teachers sought (§§13–21)
4. Faith defended (§§22–24; §26)
5. Religious belief analysed (§25)
6. Wise teachers urged (§§27–29; §34)
7. Heretical teachers rejected (§§30–35)
8. Transposed comments (passim)

1. Old Testament defended (§§5–9)

Concerning then this rashness of the Manichees, whereby they find fault with the Old Testament and the Catholic Faith, listen, I entreat you, to the considerations which move me. (§4)

Definitions

Scripture is handed down... (§5)

Def. 1. according to history, when there is taught what has been written, or what has been done; what not done, but only written as though it had been done.

Def. 2. according to ætiology, when it is shown for what cause anything has been done or said.

Def. 3. according to analogy, when it is shown that the two Testaments, the Old and the New, are not contrary the one to the other.

Def. 4. according to allegory, when it is taught that certain things which have been written are not to be taken in the letter, but are to be understood in a figure.

Do not think me silly for using Greek words.

Propositions

Prop. 1. The Old Testament is expounded according to all four senses in the New Testament. (§§6–8)

Dem. Christ expounded it according to history in Mt 12:3–4, and according to ætiology in Mt 19:8. (§6) Analogy is used by all of the New Testament authors, as the Manichees themselves admit, shamelessly claiming that all such passages were interpolated. (§7) Christ used allegory in Mt 12:40, and Paul used it in 1Cor 10:1–11, as well as in Gal 4:22–26. (§8)

Coroll. Although there is nothing more deadly than for the Old Testament to be understood “to the letter”, there is nothing more healthful than that it be unveiled in the Spirit, (cf. 2Cor 3:6; 2Cor 3:14–16) by expounding it according to these senses. Such exposition will force the earnest and pious student to confess that they are wretched, who will to condemn these before they learn them. (§9)

2. Catholic Church vindicated (§§10–12)

Wherefore I would that they would tell me, in what kind they place the, supposed, error of the Catholic Church. (§12)

Definitions

There are three kinds of error, whereby men err, when they read anything. (§10) 

Def. 5. The first kind of error is, where something which is false is thought true, whereas the writer thought otherwise.

Def. 6. A second kind of error, although not so extensive, yet not less hurtful, occurs when something, which is false, is thought true, but the thought is the same as that of the writer.

Def. 7. A third kind of error occurs when, from the writing of another, some truth is understood, whereas the writer himself did not understand it. In which kind there is no little profit – rather, if you consider carefully, therein lies the whole, entire fruit of reading.

Exp. For examples of each kind of error, see the transposed comment [1].

Propositions

Prop. 2. Errors of the third kind are not only natural to man, but often also most worthy of a man. (§10)

Dem. Suppose that word were brought to me, concerning some one whom I loved, that, when now he was of bearded age, he had said, in the hearing of many, that he was so pleased with boyhood and childhood, as even to swear that he wished to live after the same fashion, and that that was so proved to me, as that I should be shameless to deny it.

In such a case, I should not seem worthy of blame, if I thought that, in saying this, he wished to show, that he was pleased with the innocence, and with the temper of mind alien from those desires in which the race of man is wrapped up, and from this circumstance should love him yet more and more, than I used to love him before – although perhaps he had been foolish enough to love, in the age of children, a certain freedom in play and food, and an idle ease.

Suppose, further, that he had died after this report had reached me, and that I had been unable to make any inquiry of him, so as for him to open his meaning. Then, no one would be so shameless as to be angry with me, for praising the man's purpose and wish, through those very words which I had heard – even a just judge of matters would not hesitate to praise my sentiment and wish, both for that I was pleased with innocence, and for that, as one man about another, in a matter of doubt, I had preferred to think well, even when I could have thought ill.

Prop. 3. The Manichees are unable to blame the Catholic Church for error. (§12)

Dem. They cannot accuse the Church of errors of the first kind, since they themselves do not receive the books. They cannot accuse the Church of errors of the second kind, since she understands true things through them, according to coroll. prop. 1. If they accuse the Church of errors of the third kind, they cannot blame her for the error, according to prop. 2.

Schol. Although the authors of the books were certainly great and divine, so that the Church is certainly not in error when she understands the truth through them, I cannot prove this to you at this time; for now, it is enough not to have been deceived.

3. Teachers sought (§§13–21)

Put the case that we have not as yet heard a teacher of any religion. Lo, we have undertaken a new matter and business. We must seek, I suppose, them who profess this matter, if it have any existence. (§15)

Axioms

Ax. 2. There is indeed nothing more full of rashness, (which at that time, being boys, we had in us,) than, whatever books are in question, to desert those expositors who profess that they can preserve these books and hand them down to their disciples, and to seek out the opinion of those who, under I know not what compulsion, have declared a bitter war against the framers and authors of these books. (§13) [2]

Ax. 3. If there is any true religion, it has been appointed for the sake of the soul. (§14) [3]

Ax. 4. So long as we have not yet attained to true religion, our soul lacks wisdom, and therefore errs, and is foolish. (§14) [4]

Propositions

Prop. 4. If we seek the true religion, and have found many different persons holding different opinions, but certain of those are pre-eminent from being much spoken of, and from having possession of nearly all peoples, we ought to make trial of those teachers first. (§15)

Dem. If you say that the truth is with some few, then you already know with whom it is, and therefore you are not seeking the true religion, according to ax. 4. (§16) So, for the choice of a teacher without having knowledge, this method is best because it is the least shameful in case we err; for so long as we err, being as we are men, we may seem to err with the human race itself. (§15)

Prop. 5. If a multitude of unlearned persons follows a group of teachers, this does not prove that they are not good teachers. (§16)

Dem. In the case of rhetoric, we see that throughout the whole world the schools of rhetoricians are resounding with troops of young men, and yet very few attain to the highest eloquence; and we do not, for this reason, seek to learn from the orations of minor orators such as Cæcilius, or Erucius, rather than those of Cicero.

More generally, there are many disciplines in which “crowds of unlearned persons essay to learn the same, which by the few learned are received as to be learned: yet very few attain, yet fewer practise, the very fewest possible become famous.” It is certainly possible that true religion is some such thing. It is inconsistent to be deterred by numbers in the case of religion, and not in the cases of the liberal arts, or the pursuit of money, honor, or health.

Prop. 6. If teachers seem to make absurd statements, this does not prove that they are not good teachers. (§17)

Dem. It would be rash (as emphasized in [5]) to accept that their statements are absurd from someone else’s assertion, according to ax. 2. And since we are fools, according to ax. 4, we cannot judge them to be absurd ourselves.

Another Dem. It is possible (as illustrated in [6]) that those things, which in those same Scriptures seem to offend some unlearned persons, were so set there for this purpose, that when things were read of such as are abhorrent from the feeling of ordinary men, not to say of wise and holy men, we might with much more earnestness seek the hidden meaning.

Prop. 7. If we are now for the first time seeking unto what religion we shall deliver up our souls, for it to cleanse and renew them; without doubt we must begin with the Catholic Church. (§19)

Dem. For by this time there are more Christians, than if the Jews and idolaters be added together. But of these same Christians, whereas there are several heresies, and all wish to appear Catholics, and call all others besides themselves heretics, there is one Church, as all allow. If you consider the whole world, the Catholic Church is filled with larger numbers of people than any other.

As they who know affirm, the Catholic Church is also more pure in truth than all the rest. But, according to prop. 6, this is irrelevant to a seeker. For those that are still in search of the true religion, then, it is enough to notice that there is one Catholic Church, to which different heresies give different names, whereas they themselves are called each by names of their own, which they dare not deny. From which may be understood, by judgment of umpires who are hindered by no favor, to which is to be assigned the name Catholic, which all covet. So, according to prop. 4, we ought to begin with it. [7]

4. Faith defended (§§22–24; §26)

But perhaps you seek to have some reason given you on this very point, such as may persuade you, that you ought not to be taught by reason before faith. (§22)

Axioms

Ax. 5. Not all who believe something on someone else’s authority are credulous. (§22)

Propositions

Prop. 8. It is not always a fault to believe something on someone else’s authority. (§23)

Dem. If someone is certain that it is always a fault to believe something on someone else’s authority, then it seems to me can have no friend. For, if it is base to believe anything, either he acts basely who believes a friend, or, in not believing a friend at all, I see not how he can call either him, or himself, a friend. (§23)

Another Dem. If what is not known must not be believed, even children must not believe their parents – which would destroy filial affection, the most sacred bond of the human race. (§26) [8]

Prop. 9. In the case of religion, it is not base to believe before one knows. (§23)

Dem. It is more blameworthy to deliver religion to someone who approaches with feigned breast, and is therefore unworthy of it, than to believe religious men affirming anything on the matter of religion itself. (It would be unbecoming you, Honoratus, not to admit this.) So, if you approach a teacher of religion, you must assure him that you are not feigning. But if he believe your words when you make this assurance, then it is only fair that you should believe him when he teaches. (§23)

Another Dem. Many men are not qualified to understand the reasons, by which the human soul is led to know God. So, if we were to set a standard that, to avoid the charge of rashness, a man must be led by reasons even from the beginning of his instruction, then all of those unqualified men are to be denied true religion; whereas it does no harm to those qualified, if they are asked to believe from the beginning, and only be led to reasons afterwards. This sort of equitable standard is especially to be insisted on since we often do not know whether we are among the qualified. (§24)

5. Religious belief analysed (§25)

Wherefore it now remains to consider, in what manner we ought not to follow these, who profess that they will lead by reason.

Definitions

There are two classes of persons, praiseworthy in religion.

Def. 8. The first praiseworthy kind of person is of those who have already found true religion; such persons may be rightly called the blessed.

Def. 9. The second praiseworthy kind of person is of those who are seeking with all earnestness and in the right way, whereby they are most sure to find it. Such shall be called the earnest seekers after truth.

There are three other kinds of men altogether to be disapproved of and detested.

Def. 10. The first blameworthy kind of person is of those who hold an erroneous opinion, that is, of those who think that they know what they do not know.

Def. 11. The second blameworthy kind of person is of those who are indeed aware that they do not know, but do not so seek as to be able to find.

Def. 12. The third blameworthy kind of person is of those who neither think that they know, nor wish to seek.

There are also three things, as it were bordering upon one another, in the minds of men well worth distinguishing...

Def. 13. The kind of belief which we not only believe, but also know, or understand, is called knowledge, or understanding, and is owed to reason.

Def. 14. The kind of belief which we believe, and falsely think that we understand, is called erroneous opinion, or conceit, and is owed to error.

Def. 15. The kind of belief which we believe on trust in an authority, without thinking that we understand it, is called a belief from authority, and is owed to faith.

[Note: Conceit (def. 14) is simply called “opinion” in the original work, confusingly. Augustine also tends to rely on context to distinguish the belief of faith (def. 15) from the other two kinds of “belief”.]

Axioms

Ax. 6. The blessed have knowledge, or understanding, of the true religion.

Ax. 7. Earnest seekers after truth have faith, i.e. belief from authority, regarding the true religion.

Ax. 8. The second and third blameworthy kinds of person have no belief at all regarding religion. [9]

Propositions

And, if these be considered by themselves...

Prop. 10. Understanding is always without fault.

Dem. For the understanding of matters great, and honorable, and even divine, is most blessed. But the understanding of things unnecessary is no injury; but perhaps the learning was an injury, in that it took up the time of necessary matters. But on the matters themselves that are injurious, it is not the understanding, but the doing or suffering them, that is wretched. For, if someone should understand how an enemy may be slain without danger to himself, he is not guilty from the mere understanding, but from the wish to act on it; and, if the wish be absent, what can be called more innocent?

Prop. 11. Belief from authority is sometimes with fault, and sometimes without fault.

Dem. Belief is worthy of blame, when either anything is believed of God which is unworthy of Him, or anything is over easily believed of man. But in all other matters if any believe anything, provided he understand that he knows it not, there is no fault.

For I believe that very wicked conspirators were formerly put to death by the virtue of Cicero; but this, I not only do not know, but I also know for certain that I can by no means know.

Prop. 12. Erroneous opinion is never without fault.

Dem. Conceit is on two accounts very base; in that both he who has persuaded himself that he already knows, cannot learn; provided only it may be learned; and in itself rashness is a sign of a mind not well disposed.

For even if anyone suppose that he knows what I said of Cicero, (although it be no hindrance to him from learning, in that the matter itself is incapable of being grasped by any knowledge;) yet, (in that he does not understand that there is a great difference, whether anything be grasped by sure reason of mind, which we call understanding, or whether, for practical purposes, it be entrusted to common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it,) he assuredly errs, and no error is without what is base.

Prop. 13. The act of belief, which is made by the praiseworthy kinds of person, is itself praiseworthy.

Dem. The first praiseworthy kind of person has knowledge (by ax. 6), which is always praiseworthy (by prop. 10). The second praiseworthy kind of person has belief from authority (by ax. 7), and it is not a blameworthy kind of belief in that case.

6. Wise teachers urged (§§27–29; §34)

But now hear, what I trust I shall by this time more easily persuade you of.

Definitions (§27)

No one doubts that all men are either fools or wise. But now...

Def. 16. I call wise, not clever and gifted men, but those, in whom there is, so much as may be in man, the knowledge of man himself and of God most surely received, and a life and manners suitable to that knowledge.

Def. 17. All others, whatever be their skill or want of skill, whatever their manner of life, whether to be approved or disapproved, I would account in the number of fools.

Propositions

And, this being so, who of moderate understanding but will clearly see... (§27)

Prop. 14. It is more useful and more healthful for fools to obey the precepts of the wise, than to live by their own judgment. (§27)

Dem. Everything that is done, if it be not rightly done, is a sin, nor can that any how be rightly done which proceeds not from right reason. Further, right reason is very virtue. But to whom of men is virtue at hand, save to the mind of the wise? Therefore the wise man alone sins not. Therefore every fool sins, save in those actions, in which he has obeyed a wise man: for all such actions proceed from right reason, and, so to say, the fool is not to be accounted master of his own action, he being, as it were, the instrument and that which ministers to the wise man. Wherefore, if it be better for all men not to sin than to sin; assuredly all fools would live better, if they could be slaves of the wise.

Another Dem. Whereas the wise man is so joined to God in mind, as that there is nothing set between to separate; for God is Truth; and no one is by any means wise, unless his mind come into contact with the Truth; we cannot deny that between the folly of man, and the most pure Truth of God, the wisdom of man is set, as something in the middle. For the wise man, so far as it is given unto him, imitates God; but for a man who is a fool, there is nothing nearer to him, than a man who is wise, for him to imitate with profit. (§33)

This is illustrated by Christ’s conduct in performing miracles, cf. [10].

Prop. 15. If no one doubts of prop. 14 in lesser matters, as in buying and selling, and cultivating the ground, in taking a wife, in undertaking and bringing up children, lastly, in the management of household property, much more in religion. (§27)

Dem. For both human matters are more easy to distinguish between, than divine; and in all matters of greater sacredness and excellence, the greater obedience and service we owe them, the more wicked and the more dangerous is it to sin. (§27)

Another Dem. The love of any things whatsoever, save God and the soul, may be termed “the filth of the soul”. The more any soul is cleansed from this filth, the more easily it sees the truth; so that the soul which is still very filthy is utterly unable to cleave to the truth. But to purge the soul from this filth is the very purpose of true religion; which makes it evidently perverse and preposterous that any one should wish to see the truth, in order to purge his soul, when in fact, it is purged for the very purpose that he may see. (§34)

Coroll. Therefore you see henceforth that nothing else is left us, so long as we are fools (by ax. 4), if our heart be set on an excellent and religious life, but to seek wise men, by obeying whom we may be enabled both to lessen the great feeling of the rule of folly, while it is in us, and at the last to escape from it. (§27)

Schol. No one doubts that such an authority prevails, in part by miracles, in part by multitude. (§34)

Prop. 16. A fool cannot recognize a wise man. (§28)

Dem. There are no signs by which someone can one recognize anything, unless he knows the thing itself, of which they are signs.

But the fool is ignorant of wisdom. For although in the case of gold and silver and other things of that kind, we are allowed to recognize them, by sight, without possessing them, this is not the case with wisdom, which cannot be seen by the mental eye of someone who does not have it.

For whatever we touch by bodily sense is presented to us from without; and so we may perceive, by the eyes, things that belong to others, although we ourselves do not possess them or anything like them. But what is perceived by the understanding is within the mind, and to have it is nothing else than to see.

But the fool has no wisdom, and therefore he does not know wisdom. For he could not see it with the eyes: so, he cannot see it without having it, and he could not have it and still be a fool. Therefore, he does not know it, and, so long as he does not know it, he cannot recognize it in another place.

Accordingly, as long as anyone is a fool, he cannot be completely sure of finding a wise man, by obeying whom he may be set free from the great evil of folly.

[Note: This argument parallels Plato’s Protagoras, 313c–314b.]

Prop. 17. Whoever seeks the true religion must seek the help of God, in order that he may be freed from the evil of error. (§29; §33)

Dem. Many wish to appear wise. (§33) For although hardly any one dare openly to claim the name of wise, yet most men lay claim to indirectly, since they disagree so much with each other in the very matters, in the knowledge of which wisdom consists, so that it must needs be that either none of them, or but some certain one, be wise. (§28) And it is no easy matter to discern whether they be fools; (§33) indeed, someone who seeks the true religion, since he is still a fool (by ax. 4), cannot possibly do so, according to prop. 16.

Coroll. Nor, indeed, unless we believe both that God is, and that He helps men’s minds, ought we even to enquire after true religion itself. (§29; §34) [11] [12]

7. Heretical teachers rejected (§§30–35)

Wherefore that heretic, I ask you, what reason he alleges to me? (§30)

Axioms

Ax. 9. The belief that God helps men’s minds can only be supported by faith in Christ’s assertion, that “he that seeks shall find” (Mt 7:7).

Ax. 10. The Catholic Church is the only group that has great antiquity, teaches a unified doctrine, is followed by many peoples, and teaches that Christ has given profitable teachings and commandments.

Propositions

Prop. 18. A heretic who asks you to believe nothing on faith in authority, and yet wishes to be called a Christian, can give no coherent reason for his request. (§30)

Dem. If he asks you to believe nothing on faith, then you cannot have faith that God helps men’s minds, and therefore, being unable (by ax. 9) to believe this, will not seek the true religion at all (by coroll. prop. 17). But if he asks you to seek it, by arguing from the verse, that “he that seeks shall find” (Mt 7:7), then he falls into a contradiction, since he asks you to have faith in order to support his request that you have no faith. [13]

Prop. 19. A heretic cannot coherently ask you to believe in Christ and not believe the Catholic Church. (§31)

Dem. We have not seen Christ Himself, as He willed to appear unto men, Who is said to have been seen by them, even by common eyes. So, if we are to believe in Him, we must do so by means of reports concerning Him, such as the Scriptures; but to believe such reports, we must believe those that bring it forward.

Now, if a heretic asked you to believe the reports concerning Christ, he would not be able to argue from the antiquity or wide acceptance of the reports, without (by ax. 10) effectively asking you to believe the Catholic Church concerning Christ. So, he would have no coherent way to claim that the Catholic Church is lying about His doctrines, as though the Church is trustworthy about only some things.

And if a heretic asked you to believe the reports on his own authority, then he should not be believed, since all heretical groups are not worthy of authority, lacking the supports of antiquity, of numbers, and of agreement within themselves.

Prop. 20. If a heretic asks you to not even believe in Christ from Christ’s authority, without the support of reason, then such a heretic is not a Christian. (§32)

Dem. We see that Christ Himself, so far as that history, which the heretics themselves believe, teaches, willed nothing before, or more strongly than, that He should be believed in – since they, with whom He had to do, were not yet qualified to receive the secret things of God. For, for what other purpose are so great and so many miracles, He Himself also saying, that they are done for no other cause, than that He may be believed in?

He used to cry out, that He should be believed in, and to praise such as believe in Him. If Christ was not to be believed, then we must disregard His miracles, such as changing water into wine; and we must make no account of that saying, “Believe ye God, believe also Me” (Jn 14:1); and we must charge that man with rashness, who did not will that Christ should come into his house, believing that the disease of his servant would depart at His mere command. (Mt 8:8) [14] [15]

Prop. 21. The Catholic Church(, besides having antiquity, unison, and numbers,) is (also) evidently holy, which gives credit to her claim to being favored by God. (§35)

Dem. Any habits whatever have so great power to hold possession of men’s minds, that even what in them are evil, which usually takes place through excess of lusts, we can sooner disapprove of and hate, than desert or change. Do you think that little has been done for the benefit of man, that not some few very learned men maintain by argument, but also an unlearned crowd of males and females in so many and different nations both believe and set forth, that we are to worship as God nothing of earth, nothing of fire, nothing, lastly, which comes into contact with the senses of the body, but that we are to seek to approach Him by the understanding only? That abstinence is extended even unto the slenderest food of bread and water, and fastings not only for the day, but also continued through several days together; that chastity is carried even unto the contempt of marriage and family; that patience even unto the setting light by crosses and flames; that liberality even unto the distribution of estates unto the poor; that, lastly, the contempt of this whole world even unto the desire of death? Few do these things, yet fewer do them well and wisely: but whole nations approve, nations hear, nations favor, nations, lastly, love. Nations accuse their own weakness that they cannot do these things, and that not without the mind being carried forward unto God, nor without certain sparks of virtue. This has been brought to pass by the Divine Providence, through the prophecies of the Prophets, through the manhood and teaching of Christ, through the journeys of the Apostles, through the insults, crosses, blood, of the Martyrs, through the praiseworthy life of the Saints, and, in all these, according as times were seasonable, through miracles worthy of so great matters and virtues. When therefore we see so great help of God, so great progress and fruit, shall we doubt to hide ourselves in the bosom of that Church, which even unto the confession of the human race from the apostolic chair through successions of Bishops, (heretics in vain lurking around her and being condemned, partly by the judgment of the very people, partly by the weight of councils, partly also by the majesty of miracles,) has held the summit of authority?

Coroll. To be unwilling to grant to her the first place, is either surely the height of impiety, or is headlong arrogance. For, if there be no sure way unto wisdom and health of souls, unless where faith prepare them for reason, what else is it to be ungrateful for the Divine help and aid, than to wish to resist authority furnished with so great labor? And if every system of teaching, however mean and easy, requires, in order to its being received, a teacher or master, what more full of rash pride, than, in the case of books of divine mysteries, both to be unwilling to learn from such as interpret them, and to wish to condemn them unlearned? (§35)

Wherefore, if either our reasoning or our discourse has in any way moved you, and if you have, as I believe, a true care for yourself, I would you would listen to me, and with pious faith, lively hope, and simple charity, entrust yourself to good teachers of Catholic Christianity; and cease not to pray unto God Himself, by Whose goodness alone we were created, and suffer punishment by His justice, and are set free by His mercy. (§36)

8. Transposed comments (passim)

[1] An instance of the first kind is, as if any one, for example, should say and believe that Rhadamanthus hears and judges the causes of the dead in the realms below, because he has so read in the strain of Maro. [cf. Virgil, Aeneid, 6.566-569.] For this one errs in two ways: both in that he believes a thing not to be believed, and also in that the author, whom he reads, is not to be thought to have believed it.

The second kind may be thus noticed: if one, because Lucretius writes that the soul is formed of atoms, and that after death it is dissolved into the same atoms and perishes, were to think this to be true and what he ought to believe. For this one also is not less wretched, if, in a matter of so great moment, he has persuaded himself of that which is false, as certain; although Lucretius, by whose books he has been deceived, held this opinion. For what does it profit this one to be assured of the meaning of the author, whereas he has chosen him to himself, not so as through him to escape error, but so as with him to err?

An instance suited to the third kind is, if one, after having read in the books of Epicurus some place wherein he praises continence, were to assert that he had made the chief good to consist in virtue, and that therefore he is not to be blamed. This man is not injured by the error of Epicurus, even though Epicurus believes that bodily pleasure is the chief good of man; for he has not surrendered up himself to so base and hurtful an opinion, and is pleased with Epicurus for no other reason, than that he thinks him not to have held sentiments which ought not to be holden. (§10)

[2] For who ever thought that the hidden and dark books of Aristotle were to be expounded to him by one who was the enemy of Aristotle; to speak of these systems of teaching, wherein a reader may perhaps err without sacrilege?

Who, in fine, willed to read or learn the geometrical writings of Archimedes, under Epicurus as a master; against which Epicurus used to argue with great obstinacy, so far as I judge, understanding them not at all?

What are those Scriptures of the law most plain, against which, as though set forth in public, these men make their attack in vain and to no purpose? And they seem to me to be like that weak woman, whom these same men are wont to mock at, who enraged at the sun being extolled to her, and refcommended as an object of worship by a certain female Manichee, being as she was simple-minded and of a religious spirit, leaped up in haste, and often striking with her foot that spot on which the sun through the window cast light, began to cry out, Lo, I trample on the sun and your God: altogether after a foolish and womanish manner; Who denies it? (§13)

[3] No one doubts of him who seeks true religion, either that he already believes that there is an immortal soul for that religion to profit, or that he also wishes to find that very thing in this same religion. For howsoever the nature of the body may be, it causes no care or anxiety, especially after death, to him, whose soul possesses that whereby it is blessed. (§14)

[4] I am not, am I, sending you to fables? I am not, am I, forcing you to believe rashly? I say that our soul entangled and sunk in error and folly seeks the way of truth, if there be any such. If this be not your case, pardon me, I pray, and share with me your wisdom; but if you recognize in yourself what I say, let us, I entreat, together seek the truth. (§14)

[5] Without having received any instruction in poetry, you would not dare to essay to read Terentianus Maurus without a master: Asper, Cornutus, Donatus, and others without number are needed, that any poet whatever may be understood, whose strains seem to court even the applause of the theatre; do you in the case of those books, which, however they may be, yet by the confession of nearly the whole human race are commonly reported to be sacred and full of divine things, rush upon them without a guide, and dare to deliver an opinion on them without a teacher; and, if there meet you any matters, which seem absurd, do not accuse rather your own dullness, and mind decayed by the corruption of this world, such as is that of all that are foolish, than those books which haply cannot be understood by such persons! You should seek some one at once pious and learned, or who by consent of many was said to be such, that you might be both bettered by his advice, and instructed by his learning. Was he not easy to find? He should be searched out with pains. Was there no one in the country in which you lived? What cause could more profitably force to travel? Was he quite hidden, or did he not exist on the continent? One should cross the sea. If across the sea he was not found in any place near to us, you should proceed even as far as those lands, in which the things related in those books are said to have taken place. What, Honoratus, have we done of this kind? And yet a religion perhaps the most holy, (for as yet I am speaking as though it were matter of doubt,) the opinion whereof has by this time taken possession of the whole world, we wretched boys condemned at our own discretion and sentence. (§17)

[6] Perceive you not how the Catamite of the Bucolics, for whom the rough shepherd gushed forth into tears, men essay to interpret, and affirm that the boy Alexis, on whom Plato also is said to have composed a love strain, has some great meaning or other, but escapes the judgment of the unlearned; whereas without any sacrilege a poet however rich may seem to have published wanton songs? (§17)

[7] But, that no one may suppose that it is to be made matter of over garrulous or unnecessary discussion, this is at any rate one, in which human laws themselves also are in a certain way Christian. I do not wish any prejudgment to be formed from this fact, but I account it a most favorable commencement for enquiry. For we are not to fear lest the true worship of God; resting on no strength of its own, seem to need to be supported by them whom it ought to support: but, at any rate, it is perfect happiness, if the truth may be there found, where it is most safe both to search for it and to hold it: in case it cannot, then at length, at whatever risk, we must go and search some other where. (§17)

[8] For I ask, if what is not known must not be believed, in what way may children do service to their parents, and love with mutual affection those whom they believe not to be their parents? For it cannot, by any means, be known by reason. But the authority of the mother comes in, that it be believed of the father; but of the mother it is usually not the mother that is believed, but midwives, nurses, servants. For she, from whom a son may be stolen and another put in his place, may she not being deceived deceive? Yet we believe, and believe without any doubt, what we confess we cannot know. For who but must see, that unless it be so, filial affection, the most sacred bond of the human race, is violated by extreme pride of wickedness? For what madman even would think him to be blamed who discharged the duties that were due to those whom he believed to be his parents, although they were not so? Who, on the other hand, would not judge him to deserve banishment, who failed to love those who were perhaps his true parents, through fear lest he should love pretended. Many things may be alleged, whereby to show that nothing at all of human society remains safe, if we shall determine to believe nothing, which we cannot grasp by full apprehension. (§26)

[9] And this only in matters which pertain unto any system of teaching. For in the other business of life, I am utterly ignorant by what means a man can believe nothing. Although in the case of those also they who say that in practical matters they follow probabilities, would seem rather to be unable to know than unable to believe. For who believes not what he approves? or how is what they follow probable, if it be not approved? Wherefore there may be two kinds of such as oppose the truth: one of those who assail knowledge alone, not faith; the other of those who condemn both: and yet again, I am ignorant whether these can be found in matters of human life. (§25)

[10] And since, as has been said, it is not easy to understand this one by reason, it behooved that certain miracles be brought near to the very eyes, which fools use with much greater readiness than the mind, that, men being moved by authority, their life and habits might first be cleansed, and they thus rendered capable of receiving reason. Whereas, therefore, it needed both that man be imitated, and that our hope be not set in man, what could be done on the part of God more full of kindness and grace, than that the very pure, eternal, unchangeable Wisdom of God, unto Whom it behooves us to cleave, should deign to take upon Him (the nature of) man? That not only He might do what should invite us to follow God, but also might suffer what used to deter us from following God. For, whereas no one can attain unto the most sure and chief good, unless he shall fully and perfectly love it; which will by no means take place, so long as the evils of the body and of fortune are dreaded; He by being born after a miraculous manner and working caused Himself to be loved; and by dying and rising again shut out fear. And, further, in all other matters, which it were long to go through, He showed Himself such, as that we might perceive unto what the clemency of God could be reached forth, and unto what the weakness of man be lifted up. (§33)

[11] For what I ask do we with so great endeavor desire to search out? What do we wish to attain unto? Whither do we long to arrive? Is it at that which we believe not exists or pertains to us? Nothing is more perverse than such a state of mind. Then, when you would not dare to ask of me a kindness, or at any rate would be shameless in daring, come you to demand the discovery of religion, when you think that God neither exists, nor, if He exist, has any care for us? What, if it be so great a matter, as that it cannot be found out, unless it be sought carefully and with all our might? What, if the very extreme difficulty of discovery be an exercise for the mind of the inquirer, in order to receive what shall be discovered? For what more pleasant and familiar to our eyes than this light? And yet men are unable after long darkness to hear and endure it. What more suited to the body exhausted by sickness than meat and drink? And yet we see that persons who are recovering are restrained and checked, lest they dare to commit themselves to the fullness of persons in health, and so bring to pass by means of their very food their return to that disease which used to reject it. I speak of persons who are recovering. What, the very sick, do we not urge them to take something? Wherein assuredly they would not with so great discomfort obey us, if they believed not that they would recover from that disease. When then will you give yourself up to a search very full of pains and labor? When will you have the heart to impose upon yourself so great care and trouble as the matter deserves, when you believe not in the existence of that which you are in search of? (§29)

[12] This is, believe me, a most wholesome authority, this a lifting up first of our mind from dwelling on the earth, this a turning from the love of this world unto the True God. It is authority alone which moves fools to hasten unto wisdom. So long as we cannot understand pure (truths), it is indeed wretched to be deceived by authority, but surely more wretched not to be moved. For, if the Providence of God preside not over human affairs, we have no need to busy ourselves about religion. But if both the outward form of all things, which we must believe assuredly flows from some fountain of truest beauty, and some, I know not what, inward conscience exhorts, as it were, in public and in private, all the better order of minds to seek God, and to serve God; we must not give up all hope that the same God Himself has appointed some authority, whereon, resting as on a sure step, we may be lifted up unto God. But this, setting aside reason, which (as we have often said) it is very hard for fools to understand pure, moves us two ways; in part by miracles, in part by multitude of followers. (§34)

[13] What, that all heretics exhort us to believe in Christ? Can they possibly be more opposed to themselves? And in this matter they are to be pressed in a twofold way. In the first place we must ask of them, where is the reason which they used to promise, where the reproof of rashness, where the assumption of knowledge? For, if it be disgraceful to believe any without reason, what do you wait for, what are you busied about, that I believe some one without reason, in order that I may the more easily be led by your reason? What, will your reason raise any firm superstructure on the foundation of rashness? I speak after their manner, whom we displease by believing. For I not only judge it most healthful to believe before reason, when you are not qualified to receive reason, and by the very act of faith thoroughly to cultivate the mind to receive the seeds of truth, but altogether a thing of such sort as that without it health cannot return to sick souls. And in that this seems to them matter for mockery and full of rashness, surely they are shameless in making it their business that we believe in Christ. (§31)

[14] Therefore He bringing to us a medicine such as should heal our utterly corrupt manners, by miracles procured to Himself authority, by authority obtained Himself belief, by belief drew together a multitude, by a multitude possessed antiquity, by antiquity strengthened religion: so that not only the utterly foolish novelty of heretics dealing deceitfully, but also the inveterate error of the nations opposing with violence, should be unable on any side to rend it asunder. (§32)

[15] But I call that a miracle, whatever appears that is difficult or unusual above the hope or power of them who wonder. Of which kind there is nothing more suited for the people, and in general for foolish men, than what is brought near to the senses. But these, again, are divided into two kinds; for there are certain, which cause only wonder, but certain others procure also great favor and good-will. For, if one were to see a man flying, inasmuch as that matter brings no advantage to the spectator, beside the spectacle itself, he only wonders. But if any affected with grievous and hopeless disease were to recover straightway, upon being bidden, his affection for him who heals, will go beyond even his wonder at his healing. Such were done at that time at which God in True Man appeared unto men, as much as was enough. The sick were healed, the lepers were cleansed; walking was restored to the lame, sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf. The men of that time saw water turned into wine, five thousand filled with five loaves, seas passed on foot, dead rising again: thus certain provided for the good of the body by more open benefit, certain again for the good of the soul by more hidden sign, and all for the good of men by their witness to Majesty: thus, at that time, was the divine authority moving towards Itself the wandering souls of mortal men. Why, say you, do not those things take place now? Because they would not move, unless they were wonderful, and, if they were usual, they would not be wonderful. For the interchanges of day and night, and the settled order of things in Heaven, the revolution of years divided into four parts, the fall and return of leaves to trees, the boundless power of seeds, the beauty of light, the varieties of colors, sounds, tastes, and scents, let there be some one who shall see and perceive them for the first time, and yet such an one as we may converse with; he is stupified and overwhelmed with miracles: but we contemn all these, not because they are easy to understand, (for what more obscure than the causes of these?) but surely because they constantly meet our senses. Therefore they were done at a very suitable time, in order that, by these a multitude of believers having been gathered together and spread abroad, authority might be turned with effect upon habits. (§34)