The threefold division

This is a collection of quotes I have gathered regarding the ancient division between physics, ethics, and logic, whether regarded as a division of philosophy, of the sciences in general, or of anything, really. I have tried to reach as wide as I could, capturing also the use of the Latin words natural or real, moral, and rational, as well as any reference made to mathematics instead of logic or rational philosophy, and the different combinations and orderings that the division could take. As you will notice, I have usually chosen to include rather than to exclude something.

Paradox of the stone

I here record my favorite answer to the paradox involving God’s omnipotence and a stone. I saw it somewhere on the Internet before and cannot find a source for it now, so here it is as I can best remember it. It went something like...

“Can God create a stone so heavy that even he cannot lift it?”

Either God can do logically self-contradictory things, or he cannot.

If he cannot, then he cannot create such a stone, since it is incoherently described – nothing could be too heavy to be lifted by an omnipotent being.

If he can, though, then yes, he can create such a stone – but then, of course, he can also lift the stone that he cannot lift.

The use of philosophy

“I always find it strange when someone asks me what philosophy does, and what it’s for. I mean, all the problems of philosophy are self-explanatory and impose themselves as a problem.” — My friend Vitor Matias, in a Facebook post in March

When next someone asks you for the use of philosophy, I think it might be useful to give him this list of questions that William James gives in lieu of a definition of ‘metaphysics’:

What are ‘thoughts,’ and what are ‘things’? and how are they connected? —— What do we mean when we say ‘truth’? —— Is there a common stuff out of which all facts are made? —— How comes there to be a world at all? and, Might it as well not have been? —— Which is the most real kind of reality? —— What binds all things into one universe? —— Is unity or diversity more fundamental? —— Have all things one origin? or many? —— Is everything predestined, or are some things (our wills for example) free? —— Is the world infinite or finite in amount? —— Are its parts continuous, or are there vacua? —— What is God? – or the gods? —— How are mind and body joined? Do they act on each other? —— How does anything act on anything else? —— How can one thing change or grow out of another thing? —— Are space and time beings? – or what? —— In knowledge, how does the object get into the mind? — or the mind get at the object? —— We know by means of universal notions. Are these also real? Or are only particular things real? —— What is meant by a ‘thing’? —— ‘Principles of reason,’ – are they inborn or derived? —— Are ‘beauty’ and ‘good’ matters of opinion only? Or have they objective validity? And, if so, what does the phrase mean?

— Some Problems of Philosophy, §2 (p. 30 / PDF p. 46)

Faced with this collection of questions, I would find it very strange if someone could think that they are all uninteresting or unimportant, though I have seen someone dismiss them quickly with strangely simple answers. I encourage the use of the above as a copypasta.

Certainly you might think of your own questions that could merit a place in the ensemble – I would find it interesting if you can post some in the comments – but the above is valuable partly for being from a reputable author, for better or worse.

James continues:

Such are specimens of the kind of question termed metaphysical. Kant said that the three essential metaphysical questions were:—

What can I know?

What should I do?

What may I hope?

A glance at all such questions suffices to rule out such a definition of metaphysics as that of Christian Wolff, who called it ‘the science of what is possible,’ as distinguished from that of what is actual, for most of the questions relate to what is actual fact.[...]

Conditions and causes of thought (updated 2021-05-02)

In my Portuguese-language edition of Régis Jolivet’s Cours de philosophie, near the end of §138, I find (the equivalent of) this sentence.

Without a doubt, intelligence has organic conditions, which are the nerves and the brain, but conditions are not causes. (To play the violin, the artist requires a bow. But the bow is not the cause of the melody: it is only the condition.) Therefore, we must say with Aristotle, that “we think without an organ of thought” (88).

The number 88 refers to §88, which says much the same thing. (Update 2021-05-02: it would have been more useful to refer to §196; see the addendum.) This sentence and example perplexed me, though; what is he on about? What is it about the violin that makes it a condition and not a cause? Is it not a material cause, in the Aristotelian reckoning? What are conditions and causes, anyway? What is the difference? Does anyone ever explain that?

The answer to the last question is that almost no one ever explains that, for some reason. We use the words recklessly and do not care.

I surveyed some people in a philosophy forum about this, on whether (a) all conditions are causes, and whether (b) all causes are conditions. The result was dishearteningly close; some people thought (1) that both propositions are true, which would ruin Jolivet’s doctrine, by making the terms coextensive. Some people thought (2) that neither is true, which no one really explained. Some people thought (3) that conditions ⊃ causes. Thankfully, apparently no one thought (4) that causes ⊃ conditions.

If a close number of people agree with each of these possibilities, then possibility (3) is made the most plausible, since the supporters of possibility (1) agree with it about (a), and the supporters of possibility (2) agree with it about (b). Sure enough, (3) seems to be the opinion defended by Mackie, who defined causes as a particular type of conditions.

Mackie’s opinion is likely to be quite interesting, but I have no reason to think that his analysis agrees with the use of these terms in scholastic manuals such as the one I was reading. When I asked a different forum for resources on the distinction, I was linked to a paper, based on Suárez’s metaphysics, that explicitly mentioned Mackie’s analysis as unsatisfactory, for its “inability to draw a sharp metaphysical distinction between ‘real’ causes and mere background conditions.”

Whatever that paper concludes, it is much more likely to agree with the book I was reading. It is also hosted on the highly useful Jacques Maritain Center website, which gave me the idea to search that website for more information. Doing so, I found two (2) books that said something useful. So, as the result of my research, I will now end this post by quoting serially from that paper, from the two books I found in the same website, and finally twice from an interesting book I found on Google Books, which, attempting to argue a similar point, that sensation is a mere condition of reasoning, quotes several illustrations of the distinction from different authors.

[I]t is the active communication of esse to an entity that constitutes the core of efficient causality, and Suárez’s account presupposes that the production or conservation of any effect in nature involves some agent’s communicating esse of some sort to some recipient. This is true even when a patient suffers a loss or privation of esse as the result of an agent’s causal influence--as, for instance, when a living organism dies or when someone is blinded by being struck in the eye. What occurs in such cases is the introduction into the patient of a formal determination which is incompatible with the form that the patient is thus deprived of. Such examples should make us aware that even though every instance of efficient causality involves a giving of esse or perfection, this does not mean that the patient is itself more perfect absolutely speaking as a result of the agent’s influence.    

Given this background, we are now in a position to appreciate Suárez’s characterization of a per se and immediate efficient cause:    

A per se cause is a cause on which the effect directly depends with respect to that proper esse which it has insofar as it is an effect. And since this cause alone is a cause in the proper and absolute sense, almost the whole next disputation [Disputation 18] will be concerned with it alone. [—DM 18, sect. II, §2.]

More formally,

x is a per se and immediate efficient cause of y at t if and only if x, by acting, directly communicates esse to y at t. 

This, according to Suárez, is the metaphysical core of efficient causality. All the other related notions that philosophers, past and present, have used to characterize causality—e.g., constant conjunction, causal regularity, statistical correlation, causal law, the transmission of probabilities, INUS condition—must, if they have any relevance to causality at all, find their place within the framework established by this basic causal notion.  

Suárez goes on to distinguish two main types of per se causes, viz., principal and instrumental, where an instrumental cause is, in general, an agent that is employed in some way by a principal cause in effecting its own proper effect.[...]

— Alfred J. Freddoso, A Suarezian Model of Efficient Causality, §4.2¶8ff.

The requisites for the exercise of a power are called conditions; these are not properly causes, since they do not bring about an action, but only remove what might prevent action. For instance, citizenship is usually a condition required for voting, but it does not as such induce one to vote. A circumstance which is apt to induce an agent to act, though he might also act without it, is called an occasion; thus, a time of political excitement is an occasion apt to induce many to vote. If occasions influence actions they are real causes.

— Charles Coppens, S.J., Mental Philosophy, §82

“A cause is more than a condition.” This saying is of a different type from those previously explained, and leads some people to a hazy and erroneous idea, that a condition may positively do something, without being a cause. We must try to distinguish different senses.

The most pure instance of a condition is one which does nothing, but consists in the mere absence of an obstacle. Thus a window is a condition of seeing, because it does not impede the course of light; it may be a simple hole, as in more primitive buildings, or it may be glass, inasmuch as it has the negative quality of not appreciably obstructing the luminiferous waves. But the best glass gives no light of its own, as we may verify for ourselves at night, when the candles are out.

The second case of a “condition,” is one where the reality does something positive, but, as a cause, it is so comparatively inferior in rank, or so far removed from the final result as not to be reckoned among the causes. This is instanced by the oft-quoted relation of the bellows-blower to the organist. The former has positively to cause something, but his work is unskilled labour, and he is not the immediate producer of the musical sound. If we were so inclined we might also call the organist a condition; for he only opens the vents and lets the imprisoned air act on the tubes; but because it requires much skill to press the keys in the ways required, the actions are dignified with the title of principal causes. The remoteness of the organ-builders, or of the musical composer from the actual playing at the time, would lower them to “conditions,” though in point of dignity they might claim to be causes.

A third meaning of “condition” refers to a moral agent, who is not simply made to act upon the fulfilment of certain “conditions,” but chooses to act where these motives are presented. Thus, the grace of God is sometimes “conditioned” by certain acts on the part of man, though there is no obligation, not even one consequent on a promise given. If not the free acts only, at least the free acts especially, of a moral agent deserve to be styled acts dependent on conditions.

We conclude that in reference to a moral agent, so far as his action is distinctively moral, a condition furnishes a requirement without which he will not act: while in reference to physical agency as such, a condition is either a remote or a comparatively insignificant cause, or else it is the absence of a possible obstacle.

An occasion is a conjunction of causes, efficient and material. Those who speak of the evolution of our solar systems from a primitive nebula, have noticed that, not only the primitive elements of matter in such a nebula need to be accounted for, but that likewise their collocation, their arrangement, their distribution, is a distinct fact about them, of which some account should be rendered. Now an occasion answers to this collocation: it always must have a distinct cause, but in itself we regard it as an incident of causation, not as a cause. If on the occasion when a flower is ready to scatter its seeds a high wind arises, they are dispersed all the further; if on the occasion when a tile falls from a roof a man is passing just under the spot where it falls, he is injured. Our ordinary practice is, to take the conjunction of two or more causes which we regard as practically independent, to ignore the cause or causes which have brought them into conjunction, and then, to speak of their combination as occasional. In the example of a free agent, he may choose his occasions because of their special fitness to his purpose, and they may become conditions of his action.

— John Rickaby, S.J., General Metaphysics, 2.3.4e

It is admitted that apart from sensation and sense-perception there can be no true cognition. Still it is not sensible experience alone which produces consciousness. Sensible experience is the occasion (the condition), but the reason is the true cause of that knowledge we call consciousness.

First notions are not transformed but informed sensations—that is sensations illuminated and informed by rational ideas, for without ideas, sensation has no form. The ideas of the Supreme Reason are symbolized or embodied in nature, and it is the apperception of these ideas by the reason of man (made in the image of God) which enables him to translate the affections of the sensibility into consciousness and thought. All light, all comprehension, all coördination comes from the reason. Therefore, reason is the true cause of knowledge.

Note.—Between the real cause and the occasion of any phenomenon there is a clear distinction. The former implies a real, efficient, productive power; the latter, some condition or conditions under which the power is manifested. I cast a grain of wheat into the earth. The occasion of its germination and development into leaf, stem, ear, and grain, is light, warmth, moisture, etc.; but these are by no means the cause. The cause is the mysterious, organizing force which is immanent in the seed. The rest are but conditions under which or upon which the cause produces the effect.

— Benjamin Franklin Cocker, Handbook of Philosophy, Division I, p. 64 (PDF p. 133)

Reason is the real Cause, Sensation and sensible Experience are the Conditions of real Knowledge. It is admitted that apart from sensation and experience there can be no knowledge of the external world; but it is not sensation, nor a repetition of various sensations which constitutes knowledge. Sensation is merely the occasion; the true cause of knowledge is the intuitive reason with its universal and necessary ideas. Thus, without the observation of contiguous and successive change there could be no clear idea of cause; but whenever change is perceived, it presents itself at once to the reason as a manifestation of power, and refers us to a causal ground. Without the perception, by sense, of the collocation and disposition of objects or parts of objects, there could be no clear idea of design; but on such collocations and arrangements being presented, the mind intuitively regards them as being intended, or designed. The sensation or perception is not the cause of the judgment, it is simply the occasion. The idea of power is not seen by the senses, it is given by the reason. The purpose, or design, is not perceived by the material eye, it is not in the mechanism at all. The design, or purpose, exists in the mind of the maker of the machine and is perceived by the eye of reason in the arrangement of the parts of the machine, that is, the same idea is excited or occasioned in our mind which existed in the mind of the maker or the contriver of the mechanism.

“We always single out one dynamical antecedent—the power which does the work, or one rational antecedent—the purpose for which work is done, from the aggregate of material conditions under which these are manifested.” — Dr. Carpenter: “Nature,” vol. vi., p. 210.

“There is danger of confounding conditions and causes. The dilute acid in the battery will attack the zinc only on condition that you connect the zinc and platinum externally by means of a conductor; but this does not make the conductor the agent which dissolves the zinc. I build a wall behind my grape trellis and I find the ripening of the fruit accelerated ; but it is not the wall which does the work, it is still, as before, the sun. The amount of light emitted by my lamp is determined, within certain limits, by the height of the wick; but this does not render the wick the cause of the light. The varying wick is only a varying condition of a varying result of a varying activity of a constant physical force—chemical action between oil and oxygen. Similarly, the amount of thought which I can evolve is conditioned by all the affections and conditions of the brain. My poetry and my philosophy are indeed correlated to brain and blood and oxygen and beef-steak, but only in the same way as my boots are correlated to calf-skin and tan-bark and black-wax. These conditioned the exercise of the boot-maker’s skill; beefsteak conditioned the exercise of mine. It is quite true that the activity in both cases has other conditions, but it is also true that none of these conditions can be elevated to the dignity of causes. The physical scientist is sometimes hoodwinked by the exact gradation of mental activity to the condition of the brain, and commits the mistake of clothing condition with the character of cause.” — Dr. Winchell: “Thoughts on Causality,” pp. 21, 22.

“Conditions are not actively productive, but are passively permissive; they do not cause variation in any direction, but they permit and favor a tendency which already exists.” — Huxley: “Critiques,” etc., p. 273.

“To make the stimulating condition or occasion the cause of, cognition is as illogical as to make the setting of the pointer-dog, which aroused the attention of the sportsman, the cause of the killing of the game.” — McCosh: “Defence,” etc., p. 86.

— Benjamin Franklin Cocker, Handbook of Philosophy, Division I, pp. 87–88 (PDF pp. 180–181)

Update 2021-05-02: The same Cours de philosophie turns out to answer this question in a later paragraph. It did not occur to me to skip ahead, and I took a long time to get to this paragraph because I had only read this book intermittently. It is probably no harm that I did some research, and this blog post, before reading ahead; what I had read does not conflict with the book’s own answer. In §196, it says the equivalent of this:

Cause, condition, occasion.— It is necessary to distinguish carefully these three notions. The condition is that which allows the cause to produce its effect, be it positively, as an instrument or a means (so the bow is, to the violinist, the condition of the melody which he will play), – be it negatively, by removing obstacles (so, the pianist must have his piano tuned, if he is to play aright). 

The occasion is an accidental circumstance, which creates conditions favorable to the action (so, good weather is the occasion for me to decide to take a walk). Not even the most favorable condition, not even the most indispensable condition (called a condition sine qua non) can be confused with the cause properly so called, for the effect does not depend on it essentially, but accidentally.

Division of the works of Plato

I here reproduce and transcribe[1] the ancient division of the works of Plato, as given by St. George William Joseph Stock’s[2] edition of the Meno. (I wanted to have a way to link people to this division, and I know of no such page yet.)

I made this black and white version; see footnote for original colors.[3]

Plato’s works – Λόγος Πλατωνικός

1. Expository, or hyphegetic (ύφηγητικός)

1.1. Theoretical (θεωρεματικός)

1.1.1. Physical (φυσικός)

1.1.1.1. Timaeus (Τίμαιος)

1.1.2. Logical (λογικός)

1.1.2.1. Statesman, or Politicus (Πολιτικός)
1.1.2.2. Cratylus (Κρατύλος)
1.1.2.3. Parmenides (Παρμενίδης)
1.1.2.4. Sophist, or Sophistes (Σοφιστής)

1.2. Practical (πρακτικός)

1.2.1. Ethical (ήθικός)

1.2.1.1. Apology (Απολογία Σωκράτους)
1.2.1.2. Crito (Κρίτων)
1.2.1.3. Phaedo (Φαίδων)
1.2.1.4. Phaedrus (Φαίδρος)
1.2.1.5. Symposium (Συμπόσιον)
1.2.1.6. Menexenus (Μενέξενος)
1.2.1.7. Cleitophon (Κλειτοφών)
1.2.1.8. Letters (Επιστολαί)
1.2.1.9. Philebus (Φίληβος)
1.2.1.10. Hipparchus (Ἵππαρχος)
1.2.1.11. Anterastae (Ἀντερασταὶ)

1.2.2. Political (πολιτικός)

1.2.2.1. Republic (Πολιτεία)
1.2.2.2. Laws (Νόμοι)
1.2.2.3. Minos (Μίνως)
1.2.2.4. Epinomis (Επινομις)
1.2.2.5. Critias (Κριτίας)

2. Inquisitory, or zetetic (ζητητικός)

2.1. Exercitatory, or gymnastic (γυμναστικός)

2.1.1. Elicitory, or maieutic (μαιευτικός)

2.1.1.1. Alcibiades I (Αλκιβιάδης Α΄)
2.1.1.2. Alcibiades II (Αλκιβιάδης Β΄)
2.1.1.3. Theages (Θεάγης)
2.1.1.4. Lysis (Λύσις)
2.1.1.5. Laches (Λάχης)

2.1.2. Tentative, or peirastic (πειραστικός)

2.1.2.1. Euthyphro (Ευθύφρων)
2.1.2.2. Meno (Μένων)
2.1.2.3. Ion (Ίων)
2.1.2.4. Charmides (Χαρμίδης)
2.1.2.5. Theaetetus (Θεαίτητος)

2.2. Controversial, or agonistic (άγωνιστικός)

2.2.1. Probative, or endeictic (ένδεικτικός)

2.2.1.1. Protagoras (Πρωταγόρας)

2.2.2. Eversive, or anatreptic (άνατρεπτικός)

2.2.2.1. Euthydemus (Ευθύδημος)
2.2.2.2. Hippias Major, or Greater Hippias, or Hippias I (Ιππίας μείζων)
2.2.2.3. Hippias Minor, or Lesser Hippias, or Hippias II (Ιππίας ελάσσων)
2.2.2.4. Gorgias (Γοργίας)

⁂

Stock’s explanation of the division (from his Introduction, §5)

Quite apart from the division into trilogies or tetralogies, there was current also among the Ancients a subtle logical division of the works of Plato, which possesses a real philosophical value.

It is assumed, to begin with, that the works of Plato fall into two main classes, one in which there is a more or less definite conclusion present in the author’s mind, to which he wishes to guide the reader, the other in which the object is vague inquiry. This gives us the two principal ‘characters’ of the λόγος Πλατωνικός—ύφηγητικός and ζητητικός. The foregone conclusion may be of a merely speculative nature or one bearing upon life and practice. Thus we are led to a subdivision of the first of the two main classes into theoretical and practical; and these again are subdivided respectively into physical and logical, ethical and political. It is on the other side of the division that we must look for the Meno. The ‘inquisitory’ dialogues are all so many exhibitions of the art of mental wrestling, but may be distinguished into dialogues of practice and of combat (γυμναστικός and άγωνιστικός). The latter may end either in proving one’s own proposition or upsetting the adversary’s (ένδεικτικός or άνατρεπτικός); the former may assume the shape either of eliciting a conclusion from an unpractised thinker or of demolishing his successive attempts to reach one (μαιευτικός or πειραστικός). Here then are the eight infimae species which we reach in our division. Plato’s works are either — physical, logical, ethical, political, elicitory, tentative, probative[4], or eversive. Below these there is only the enumeration of the individual dialogues falling under each class, which gives scope for difference of opinion, and we find the list presented by Albinus very different from that of Diogenes Laertius. As to the tentative nature of the Meno, however, all are agreed.

Notes

[1] Special thanks to this on-line Greek keyboard and to this list of work names in Greek for speeding this up. For more good material on the dialogues and their tetralogies, I highly recommend the website plato-dialogues.org.

[2] A note on Stock’s name. He was not canonized; his first name was “St. George”, with the title included, cf. https://www.zinzin.com/observations/2012/who-was-st-george-william-joseph-stock/

[3] Here:

[4] [Stock’s footnote] It is worth noticing that Albinus has έλεγκτικός in his list (Hermann’s Plato, vol. vi. p. 148), and makes no mention of ένδεικτικός. The latter therefore may be a mistake in Diogenes Laertius, iii. §49. The Protagoras is the only dialogue referred to this head. 

Taxation is not theft

Note: This blog post has been retracted, since I no longer think of it as a good representation of how I think about its topic. I may, or may not, have written a better post about the same topic since; check the full list of posts.[4]

I used to be inclined towards libertarianism. I still really like libertarians. I don’t know whether I ever called myself a libertarian, but anyway, now I definitely don’t, and can’t.

In the United States, often libertarian is used to mean anyone who is in favor of a largely free market. I don’t mean something as general as that by the word, since I think it is not helpful to use it this way, and it is not how it is used here in Brazil. I think a libertarian is someone who believes in some form of libertarian ethics, holding to something like the non-agression principle, or self-ownership,[2] or however they slice it. This means they are almost always anarcho-capitalists, but that word approaches them more from the political than the ethical angle, which is the one intended here. There are different versions of libertarian ethics, but they are all very similar and I don’t care enough to distinguish them. All of them have in common the doctrine that taxation is theft.

I cannot believe that taxation is theft, because I am a Catholic, and such a doctrine would be against the constant teaching and practice of the Catholic Church, of her popes, and would even seem to be inconsistent with the existence of canonized royalty.

So, why is it that taxation is not theft?[1] Well, because state authority exists, of course. How does that work?

To be honest, I have no idea. I know God grants authority to governments in some way, and that He does so in such a way that most governments right now are probably legitimate,[3] since it seems that this is the general assumption of how the Church operates. But I have no sophisticated theology or philosophy of this; so, as far as I currently know, authority is very much what libertarians think it is – some magic hidden property of governments that makes taxation not be theft. That seems pretty reasonable to me.

[1] The naïve will dismiss the question, because taxation seems less grossly violent than theft, and it is at least partly used to the benefit of society. These are not serious considerations – taxation is physically the same act as theft, and its usage cannot justify it any more than the usage of the products of theft. Something like authority is necessary to change its nature from that of theft to that of a permissible act, whether it is held to exist because of a social contract or some other nonsense.

I believe that the “magic” theory is much more plausible than the “social contract” theory, though it is woefully unsophisticated in comparison, and I hope to replace it with something more philosophical someday, after I read more on the subject.

[2] Update (2022-02-10): I have come to believe in a form of self-ownership myself, though without becoming a libertarian. See my post on private property to learn more.

[3] Update (2022-02-10): Because of recent papal statements, have changed my mind on the legitimacy of states.

[4] Update (2022-05-04): Retracted the post; at this time, I would point readers to my post on human nature.

Capitalism

This blog post is not about capitalism. It is about the word “capitalism”. I believe it is often not a useful word.

Look up definitions of capitalism. A few typical ones, from my four favorite on-line dictionaries, are given at the end of this post. The only element which enters into every definition is (1) the private property of the means of production. Very often, something about (2) a free market is added. So these should be the core elements of capitalism – at least the first, and especially when joined with the second.

Yet, it seems to me that many people talk about “capitalism” without meaning either of these. They use it to mean whatever they see around them, without regard to whether it is caused by (1) or (2) or not. Generally it is the things they don’t like that some corporation does. Pollution of a river will be blamed on capitalism, even though the river is publicly owned. A company suing for patents will be blamed on capitalism, even though patents are a restriction on the market.

If you use the word to mean either (1) or (2) or both, bless you. If you use it to mean anything else, curse you. But besides this blessing and this curse, I have nothing to add to the situation. I wrote this blog post to explain why I have renounced the word. I try to avoid using the word “capitalism” at all, especially with people I don’t know. I can refer to the private property of the means of production, and to the free market, just fine without it. And you can hold me to this, I will not use the word “capitalism” in this blog in the future. Whenever it could be expected, I will link to this post to show people why.

For the sake of context, I am currently in favor of both (1) and (2). Which I thought meant I am in favor of capitalism, until I had some very unpleasant conversations.

an economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market

— Merriam-Webster

An economic and political system in which a country’s trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state.

‘an era of free-market capitalism’

— Oxford

1. (politics) A socio-economic system based on private ownership of resources or capital.
2. (economics) An economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit.
3. (politics, economic liberalism) A socio-economic system based on private property rights, including the private ownership of resources or capital, with economic decisions made largely through the operation of a market unregulated by the state.
4. (economics, economic liberalism) An economic system based on the abstraction of resources into the form of privately owned capital, with economic decisions made largely through the operation of a market unregulated by the state.

— Wiktionary (at the moment)

An economic system in which the means of production and distribution are privately or corporately owned and development occurs through the accumulation and reinvestment of profits gained in a free market.

— The Free Dictionary