Monday, December 18, 2023

Thiago V. S. Coelho

My name is Thiago V. S. Coelho, and I live in Brazil.

This blog post is my personal page.

Facts about me:

Facts for English speakers about my name

My first name, “Thiago”, is a variant of “Tiago”, which is the Portuguese version of the name of St James, from the Bible – specifically, St James the Great. (James Potter, from the Harry Potter series, was localized in Portuguese as Tiago Potter.) In some contexts, I’d be fine with people calling me James if they find “Thiago” unwieldy, it would just be confusing on a public site where Thiago is my display name.

In the original Portuguese, I pronounce my first name [t͡ʃiˈa.ɡu], or [ˈt͡ʃja.ɡu] if I say it fast. (That is, tchee-AH-goo, or TCHAH-goo when said fast.)

The H is “decorative”, and does not imply a theta sound, although originally, the variant probably does come from someone incorrectly thinking that there was a theta in the original Greek of St James’s name. (“Tiago” is more common, and more sensibly spelled, but that’s not the version my mom put on my birth certificate.)

In different accents, it might sound more like [tʃiˈa.ɡo], [tiˈa.ɡu], [ˈtja.ɡu], [ti'a.ɡo], [ti'a.ɣu], [ti'a.ɣo], [ˈtja.ɣu], or [ˈtja.ɣo].

But I don’t mind it when English speakers pronounce it [θaɪˈæ.ɡo], as they tend to do. It does puzzle me when they abbreviate it to “Thia” as a nickname – in Brazil, it would be shortened to “Thi”, pronounced [t͡ʃi] (“tchee”).

My middle names are abbreviated V. S., it does not mean “versus”.

My last name, Coelho, means “rabbit”. (If you were localizing my name to English, the closest rendering might actually be “Coney”.) I am not related to the famous author Paulo Coelho, as far as I know.

Saturday, December 16, 2023

Aesthetics

This post about my aesthetic opinions replaces the previous one on the same topic, which is no longer accurate.

Definition of aesthetics

Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy intending to provide the most generally applicable principles for the elaboration of art criticism which is as correct as possible.

As such, aesthetics is best pursued by critics, just as criticism is, in my view, best pursued by artists. Neither, however, is my case.

Definition of art

Art is defined only by its having the purpose of aesthetic appreciation, which will be defined further down, as its main or sole purpose. Some consequences of the definition can, however, already be noted:

  • The details of its production are mostly irrelevant.
    • An artwork does not have to be produced intentionally or with skill, but can be accidental or haphazard. It does not even have to be a human production, but can be machine-made.
    • However, given the details of aesthetic appreciation as explained below, it may be impossible to regard something as fit for aesthetic appreciation, and therefore as an artwork without at least regarding it as the product of a mind with a worldview.
    • It would be difficult for someone to regard the product of a natural process, such as erosion, as having truly and exclusively the purpose of aesthetic appreciation, but it could possibly happen in some circumstances.
  • Anything can be regarded as an artwork, so long as it is not, at the same time, regarded as something else.
    • The purpose of something comes from the concept by which we understand it. Text ordinarily conveys information, but someone may “write” text in a language no one understands, to add flavor to a fantasy world, as with the Codex Seraphinianus.
  • Things whose main purpose is not aesthetic appreciation are not artworks. For instance, a chair, however skilfully made and beautiful, is not an artwork.
    • Decoration in non-artworks may nevertheless be helpful to artworks, as with how a beautiful frame can add to a painting, or a book’s beautiful graphic design may enhance the enjoyment of its story.
    • The term impure art may designate artworks which have a prominent secondary purpose besides aesthetic appreciation, such as sacred art, which also intends to edify the viewer, and educational stories which intend to instruct.

Aesthetic appreciation

Commonly misapprehended.— Aesthetic appreciation has been misapprehended, on the one hand, by theories which see it as something purely intellectual. These theories typically focus on a concept of “beauty”, which is then called a transcendental property of being, and made basically identical with goodness – which, in any naturalistic ethics, is something that is understood with reason, not grasped with the senses. These theories typically lead to some form of “moralizing” as the purpose of art, i.e., the idea that good art must make its viewers morally better. This theory goes against common sense because it really is missing something.

Misapprehended, before, by myself.— On the other hand, aesthetic appreciation has been misinterpreted by my earlier theory, which focused on the sensory aspect of appreciation, downplaying any role of the intellect. Appreciating an artwork was seen to not be fundamentally different from enjoying food, for instance. The problem with this is that there really is something different about artworks, and it is more fundamental than I had thought.

Aesthetic appreciation involves learning an artist’s worldview.— The core of aesthetic appreciation, as I see it now, is that, art, as Arnold Weinstein said of literature once, “translates information into experience”. It communicates the concepts by which the artist interprets the world, by showcasing them as applied to idealized experiences which show those concepts in their clearest light. It shares “how the artist sees things”, his worldview.

Applications of this conception

Application to different media.— This is shown most directly by written works, since an experience is described using words which correspond to the concepts which the artist uses to think. But the ways in which music and poetry associate sounds and rhythms to experiences are also communicative of concepts, as are the ways in which drama and movies focus on, and portray, the actions in a story. With images and sculptures, it is a matter of which elements are emphasized – it is no wonder that cartoon pornography tends to feature oversized genitals, since those are the central things to what is being communicated.

Literary forms ranked.— The closer to an actual experience is portrayed, the better an artwork conveys a worldview, since the concepts are communicated in closer connection with their application in real-world experience. This is not to say that all epic poems and fantastical works are worse than all more realistic works, but it is no wonder that epics show up in more primitive and backward societies and novels in more advanced and learned ones, which can deal with more refined concepts. An advanced society has to deal with subtler issues than struggle and death.

Aesthetic qualities

It was a consequence of my earlier view that aesthetic theory focused mostly on largely-sensible “aesthetic qualities”, which I now see merely as means to art’s end, although their proper use is certainly important to any artist, and best understood by artists who are experienced in their use, which is why artists still make the best critics.

I still find that most of the theory I had given about aesthetic qualities, which I thought came in opposed pairs, is right, though. The earlier post was longwinded, so here’s an overview. I endorse everything in this overview, not necessarily all the content in the retracted post, but anything here which is supported there is probably also clarified there.

  • Beautiful vs. Ugly: Beauty implies pleasure, while ugliness implies displeasure. Beauty is not a transcendental property of being. As Edmund Burke noted, beauty is not caused by “proportion”.

  • Sublime vs. Cute: The sublime, characterized by feelings of awe and fear, may be contrasted with the cute, associated with safety and smallness. The sublime has been better covered by Burke, Kant, etc., while cuteness has not been studied much.

  • Based vs. Cringe: These may be seen as aesthetic properties. Basedness implies freedom and independence, as seen in people who, like the Stoic sage, are unaffected by emotional appeals. Cringeness implies a lack of freedom, and being overly influenced by external factors. Cringeness is associated with the physical reaction of cringing at it, while basedness has no analogous reaction.

  • Funny vs. Sad: Both humor and sadness stem from something’s falling short of its concept, which is both an incongruity, in the theory-of-humor sense, and an imperfection (privation) in the metaphysical sense. When something’s falling short of its concept is seen more as an incongruity, without evoking compassion, it appears funny, whereas when it is seen more as an imperfection, evoking compassion, it appears sad.

As noted in the earlier post, this is not exhaustive, and at the time, I had been toying with other meme notions such as Dank vs Normie, Blessed vs Cursed, Wholesome vs Edgy, etc. I no longer find this to be very informative to art criticism, not even really when we take memes as an art form.

Class theory of genres

Class theory, as outlined some of my previous posts, may be profitably applied to “genre fiction”.

The proletariat tends to efface nature and support revolutions; the aristocracy tends to ossify artifice and stifle development; the bourgeoisie, in turn, is in line with the natural development of society according to know causes. This easily lends itself to the idea that fantasy, totally unmoored from reality, should be considered proletarian; that sci-fi, which outlines possible future developments in accordance with known natural causes, is bourgeois; and that realistic fiction, especially such as is optimistic about the current world, or pessimistic about the possibility of its improvement, is aristocratic.

In practice, these associations are very loose. Ayn Rand isn’t sci-fi, but is obviously (and quite preachily) bourgeois fiction. And some sci-fi can be rather proletarian or aristocratic, such as the Culture series.

Romanticism not irrational

Given that the essence of good art is that it “translates information into experience”, and that this is plainly in accordance with the human desire for knowledge, it seems that the Romantic movement has been unfairly decried as a “reaction” to the rational tendencies of the Enlightenment, when, given its perfectly good artworks, it was plainly nothing of the sort.

As has been pointed out by Murray Rothbard in defense of Ayn Rand’s fiction, Romanticism was vastly superior to anything that came after it – the Symbolist movement, which attempted to convey pure abstract concepts as an art form, and the Realist movement, which attempted to convey the facts of a story in a bare, “uninterpretive” way, as if it were told by a researcher who collected information on the story and then simply pasted it together, without attempting to explain it.

Both of these styles are against human reason. Concepts cannot be understood without the sensible things to which they apply, and sensible things cannot be understood without concepts. “Thoughts without content are empty, sensations without concepts are blind.” The Romantic style is most in line with rational human understanding.

The mainstream interpretation of Romanticism as an irrational reaction seems mainly due to Isaiah Berlin. Though I do not have the time or resources to seriously dispute his scholarship, I strongly doubt its main drift on this regard. I tend toward trusting the general view of Romanticism laid out by Victor Hugo in his Preface to Cromwell. Hugo emphasizes that the distinguishing feature of Romantic art is the grotesque, the close juxtaposition of, and sharp contrast between, the ugly and beautiful, the unshapely and the graceful. This, to me, shows a concern with portraying experience in a faithful, but interpretive way. It is a way of conveying the artist’s worldview.

Tuesday, October 31, 2023

Inconsistency in The Last Psychiatrist

On 2023-08-18, I read 15 posts by the now-extinct blog The Last Psychiatrist (TLP). I documented this in a Twitter thread, which reviewed the posts. I now believe that I have found an inconsistency between two of the posts that I read, from which I will quote now.

The first post is The Wrong Lessons Of Iraq, from 2007-05-24, describing the self-deception of some soldiers who were taken hostage by Iran:

Here’s an example I fear no one will understand. The Iranians took 15 British soldiers hostage. I don’t know what constitutes an act of war, but I figure this is pretty much it. The soldiers surrendered without a fight (ironically, so as not to start an international incident), and then pretended to go along with the Iranians. They did the song and dance “we are bad, we are imperialists, Ahmadinejad is good, we’re sorry, thanks for being so nice to us” and were eventually released.

So I’m sure those soldiers were thinking, “look, I know who I am, I know I’m not a coward, I’m not helping the Iranians, but I have to do whatever is necessary to get out of this mess.” What they are saying is that they can declare who they are, and what they do has no impact on it. “I am a hero, regardless of how I act.” That’s the narcissist fallacy. Whatever they may think about themselves, the fact is that they did help the Iranians, and they are not heroes. But I can see that it is ego protective, I can see why they might take this perspective. There are few things in life worse than being taken hostage by the Iranians, so I understand why they would choose this type of self-deception, why they would turn to narcissism for defense. Bottom line is, I guess you can’t fault them for playing along.

But here’s the thing: when they returned home to Britain, they were heralded as heroes by other people. Including the British government. Based on what? They didn’t actually do anything; heroism isn’t simply living through a bad experience. Well, of course: based on the fact that they are heroes who had to pretend to be something else.

That’s the narcissist’s tautology: you are what you say you are because you said you are. What makes it an example of our collective narcissism is that we agree-- we want it to be true that they, and we, can declare an identity. [...]

Enough quoting. As you can see, according to TLP’s idea of narcissism, the narcissist delusion is to think you are something other than what you act like. Given a specific action that you did, you can’t decide that it isn’t who you really are, and that your identity is really defined by other factors. It doesn’t matter that these soldiers bravely volunteered to fight, and it doesn’t matter that their actions in Iran were done under duress. They don’t get to disavow their actions: they did what they did, and if they did it, that’s who they are. OK.

Now onto the second quote, which is actually earlier, from the first post in the blog. If This Is One of The Sexiest Things You’ve Ever Seen, You May Be a Narcissist, from 2006-12-29:

Consider the narcissist who wants his wife to wear only white, high heeled pumps. The narcissist wants this not because he himself likes white high heel pumps-- which he might-- but because the type of person he thinks he is would only be with the type of woman who wears white high heeled pumps. Or, in other terms, other people would expect someone like himself to be with a woman who wears those shoes. What he likes isn’t the relevant factor, and certainly what she likes is irrelevant. What matters is that she (and her shoes) are accessories to him.

Never mind that the woman is obese, or 65, or the shoes out of style, or impractical-- the shoes represent something to him, and he is trying to reinforce his identity through that object.

Narcissists typically focus on specific things as proxies for their identity. As in the example above, that the woman might be obese or a paraplegic could be ignored if the footwear was the proxy for identity. These proxies are also easy to describe but loaded with implication: “I’m married to a blonde.” Saying “blonde” implies something-- e.g. she’s hot-- that might not be true. But the narcissist has so fetishized “blondeness” that it is disconnected from reality. The connotations, not the reality, are what matters (especially if other people can’t check.)

Here we have the same notion of the narcissist being overly attached to an identity, but the message is the opposite: the narcissist delusion is to think you are not something other than what you act like. Given a specific action that you did, you can’t decide that it is who you really are, and that your identity is defined by it instead of other factors. It doesn’t matter that this guy actually did get his wife to wear white high-heeled pumps: if you take the broader view, you can see that this fact isn’t representative of who he really is. He doesn’t get to stake his identity on that fact: even though he did get his wife to wear the shoes, the fact that he got this fact to be the case doesn’t change who, behind it all, he really is.

If you apply the standard of the first quote to the second, the narcissist is right: after all, if he did get his wife to wear white high-heeled pumps, then he can’t be anything other than the type of guy whose wife wears white high-heeled pumps. If you apply the standard of the second quote to the first, the narcissist is right: after all, the soldiers shouldn’t take this one set of cowardly actions in Iran to define who they are, when the rest of the context of their lives, as well as the praise of their countrymen, all agrees that they really are heroes.

It seems that, if you got TLP to be your analyst, then he would simply decide who you “really” are, and if you pointed to your actions to the contrary, then he would call it a narcissistic fixation. After all, you are privileging your self-image over “the reality” that he has oh-so-objectively determined.

But of course, if you decide to believe him entirely about who you are, then you’re taking your identity wholly from your external environment, and he thinks that that is bad too, since this is what he calls Borderline. You just can’t win with this guy.

Wednesday, October 11, 2023

Libertarian political practice

Effective libertarian political practice would work like this:

  1. Make a group chat with friends who mostly agree with you.
  2. Study the great works on the topic and agree on a body of Natural Law which is specific and detailed.
  3. Judge various real-world events according to it, and publish the rulings on a website.
  4. Have procedures to enable scaling and establish a succession, i.e., add new judges to your group chat who can be expected to keep the character of your legal philosophy.

This would mean nothing until some people, probably libertarians at first, find that your rulings are fair and decide to trust you to arbitrate some of their real-world disputes, and/or until some ruler of a somehow newly-independent territory decides to entrust your group with its law.

The name of your group in Step #1 could be something like “Natural Law Study Group”, but should probably change depending on the character of the system arrived at in Step #2, e.g., if your legal philosophy agrees mostly with Pufendorf, you could style yourselves the Pufendorfian Association.

Step #3 would get you credibility, since it would show that your legal ideas can be applied to practice, and could also get you publicity, because you could potentially generate some drama by publishing a judgment on controversial issues, such as Israel and Palestine.

Step #4 is crucial in the long term, but not so much to begin with.

This post was also posted to X/Twitter.

Monday, August 21, 2023

Great Ventilation and Telephone Riots of SrDt 3454

[What follows is an excerpt from chapter 12 of Mostly Harmless, by Douglas Adams. I enjoy this gag in the book and wanted a post with which to refer to it easily, which is this. Ford Prefect is the name of a character, who was named after a line of cars produced from 1938–1961, as explained earlier in the series.]

He closed his eyes, which he’d been wanting to do for a bit anyway. He wondered what the hell to do next. Jump? Climb? He didn’t think there was going to be any way of breaking in. OK, the supposedly rocket-proof glass hadn’t stood up, when it came to it, to an actual rocket, but then that had been a rocket that had been fired at very short range from inside, which probably wasn’t what the engineers who designed it had had in mind. It didn’t mean he was going to be able to break the window here by wrapping his fist in his towel and punching. What the hell, he tried it anyway and hurt his fist. It was just as well he couldn’t get a good swing from where he was sitting or he might have hurt it quite badly. The building had been sturdily reinforced when it was completely rebuilt after the Frogstar attack, and was probably the most heavily armoured publishing company in the business, but there was always, he thought, some weakness in any system designed by a corporate committee. He had already found one of them. The engineers who designed the windows had not expected them to be hit by a rocket from short range from the inside, so the window had failed.

So, what would the engineers not be expecting someone sitting on the ledge outside the window to do?

He wracked his brains for a moment or so before he got it.

The thing they wouldn’t be expecting him to do was to be there in the first place. Only an absolute idiot would be sitting where he was, so he was winning already. A common mistake that people make when trying to design something completely foolproof is to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools.

He pulled his newly acquired credit card from his pocket, slid it into a crack where the window met its surrounding frame, and did something a rocket would not have been able to do. He wiggled it around a bit. He felt a catch slip. He slid the window open and almost fell backwards off the ledge laughing, giving thanks as he did so for the Great Ventilation and Telephone Riots of SrDt 3454.

The Great Ventilation and Telephone Riots of SrDt 3454 had started off as just a lot of hot air. Hot air was, of course, the problem that ventilation was supposed to solve and generally it had solved the problem reasonably well up to the point when someone invented air-conditioning, which solved the problem far more throbbingly.

And that was all well and good provided you could stand the noise and the dribbling until someone else came up with something even sexier and smarter than air-conditioning which was called in-building climate control.

Now this was quite something.

The major differences from just ordinary air-conditioning were that it was thrillingly more expensive, involved a huge amount of sophisticated measuring and regulating equipment which was far better at knowing, moment by moment, what kind of air people wanted to breathe than mere people did.

It also meant that, to be sure that mere people didn’t muck up the sophisticated calculations which the system was making on their behalf, all the windows in the buildings were built sealed shut. This is true.

While the systems were being installed, a number of people who were going to work in the buildings found themselves having conversations with Breathe-o-Smart systems fitters which went something like this:

“But what if we want to have the windows open?”

“You won’t want to have the windows open with new Breathe-o-Smart.”

“Yes but supposing we just wanted to have them open for a little bit?”

“You won’t want to have them open even for a little bit. The new Breathe-o-Smart system will see to that.”

“Hmmm.”

“Enjoy Breathe-o-Smart!”

“OK, so what if the Breathe-o-Smart breaks down or goes wrong or something?”

“Ah! One of the smartest features of the Breathe-o-Smart is that it cannot possibly go wrong. So. No worries on that score. Enjoy your breathing now, and have a nice day.”

(It was, of course, as a result of the Great Ventilation and Telephone Riots of SrDt 3454, that all mechanical or electrical or quantum-mechanical or hydraulic or even wind, steam or piston-driven devices, are now requited to have a certain legend emblazoned on them somewhere. It doesn’t matter how small the object is, the designers of the object have got to find a way of squeezing the legend in somewhere, because it is their attention which is being drawn to it rather than necessarily that of the user’s.

The legend is this:

“The major difference between a thing that might go wrong and a thing that cannot possibly go wrong is that when a thing that cannot possibly go wrong goes wrong it usually turns out to be impossible to get at or repair.”)

Major heat waves started to coincide, with almost magical precision, with major failures of the Breathe-o-Smart systems. To begin with this merely caused simmering resentment and only a few deaths from asphyxiation.

The real horror erupted on the day that three events happened simultaneously. The first event was that Breathe-o-Smart Inc. issued a statement to the effect that best results were achieved by using their systems in temperate climates.

The second event was the breakdown of a Breathe-o-Smart system on a particularly hot and humid day with the resulting evacuation of many hundreds of office staff into the street where they met the third event, which was a rampaging mob of long-distance telephone operators who had got so twisted with having to say, all day and every day, “Thank you for using BS&S” to every single idiot who picked up a phone that they had finally taken to the streets with trash cans, megaphones and rifles.

In the ensuing days of carnage every single window in the city, rocket-proof or not, was smashed, usually to accompanying cries of “Get off the line, asshole! I don’t care what number you want, what extension you’re calling from. Go and stick a firework up your bottom! Yeeehaah! Hoo Hoo Hoo! Velooooom! Squawk!” and a variety of other animal noises that they didn’t get a chance to practise in the normal line of their work.

As a result of this, all telephone operators were granted a constitutional right to say “Use BS&S and die!” at least once an hour when answering the phone and all office buildings were required to have windows that opened, even if only a little bit.

Another, unexpected result was a dramatic lowering of the suicide rate. All sorts of stressed and rising executives who had been forced, during the dark days of the Breathe-o-Smart tyranny, to jump in front of trains or stab themselves, could now just clamber out on to their own window ledges and leap off at their leisure. What frequently happened, though, was that in the moment or two they had to look around and gather their thoughts they would suddenly discover that all they had really needed was a breath of air and a fresh perspective on things, and maybe also a farm on which they could keep a few sheep.

Another completely unlooked for result was that Ford Prefect, stranded thirteen stories up a heavily armoured building armed with nothing but a towel and a credit card was nevertheless able to clamber through a supposedly rocket-proof window to safety.

He closed the window neatly after him, having first allowed Colin to follow him through, and then started to look around for this bird thing.

The thing he realised about the windows was this: because they had been converted into openable windows after they had first been designed to be impregnable, they were, in fact, much less secure than if they had been designed as openable windows in the first place.

Hey ho, it’s a funny old life, he was just thinking to himself, when he suddenly realised that the room he had gone to all this trouble to break into was not a very interesting one.

Saturday, July 22, 2023

Olavo de Carvalho in English

Olavo de Carvalho was a Brazilian journalist, essayist and philosopher who single-handedly created the Brazilian right wing, allowing for the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. As such, he is of some international interest, especially given the parallels between the Bolsonaro election in 2018 in Brazil and the Trump election in 2016 in the US. But international researchers may be hampered by their not knowing Portuguese, the language in which Olavo de Carvalho generally spoke and wrote – with the one notable exception being his debate with Aleksandr Dugin in 2011, which was written in English. This is where I come in, chiefly by providing access to translations of his works, and works about him.

One of the best photos of Olavo de Carvalho, taken by Josias Teófilo.

Note that in Brazil, we call him “Olavo”, not “Carvalho”, which is a custom that I will follow here. This is akin to how Elon Musk is referred to as Elon, and Kanye West is referred to as Kanye – the first name is simply more unique and distinctive than the last name. When writers form derived words from his name, they derive them from the first name, such as in “olavismo” and “olavista” (referring to Olavo’s thought and its followers, respectively), as well as in “olavete” (sometimes spelled “olavette”), which refers to fans of Olavo. (The suffix is standard in Brazil, where most famously, fans of the soccer player Neymar, especially but not necessarily the female fans, are called “Neymarzetes”.) I had attempted to introduce the practice of calling him Olavo into the material I added to his Wikipedia article, but another editor thought it was too informal and changed it all back to Carvalho.

Contents

Secondary material

First, I’ll cover works about Olavo in English, which are not many; after that, in the “Primary material” section, I’ll cover works by Olavo.

Biographical information

No one has tried to write a serious biography of Olavo de Carvalho. As of now, your best bet is Wikipedia; I have contributed to that page and helped provide summaries of the biographical information that is scattered throughout various journalistic profiles of Olavo. Still, a lot is missing from there.

Overviews of Olavo’s philosophy

The only secondary source on Olavo de Carvalho written for English speakers is War for Eternity by Benjamin Teitelbaum. The content is accurate, but naturally focuses a lot on Olavo’s only writing in English, which was the debate with Dugin, as well as on Olavo’s relationship with the Traditionalist School, which, although important, was never emphasized by Olavo himself – only the most involved of his fans know much about it. In Brazil, however, there have been more attempts to introduce readers to Olavo de Carvalho.

Books

There are some books about him by other authors, the most notable one being Conhecimento por presença by Ronald Robson, and a couple others. The book A tirania dos especialistas, by Martim Vasques da Cunha, although it is rather about broader cultural topics, also contains some coverage of Olavo. Almost no such books are translated yet; this section, at first, was just made to highlight this lacuna.

Covers of some books about Olavo published in Brazil.

Since I first inserted this section, however, I did manage to translate one short book that introduces Olavo de Carvalho’s thought:

Original cover of The Minimum About Olavo de Carvalho, by Ronald Robson.

Articles

Some people have also attempted to write articles, or essays, for blogs or newspapers, with overviews of Olavo’s thought and ideas. None of them could promise to be comprehensive, since Olavo spoke and wrote so much stuff. I have translated (what I think are) the two most prominent ones, and the translations are linked below.

You may notice that Ronald Robson and Martim Vasques da Cunha are the main secondary writers on Olavo de Carvalho. Such is life. Ronald Robson, who edited many of Olavo’s books, is much more sympathetic to Olavo and less critical of him than Martim Vasques da Cunha, who is just some random journalist, but who has nevertheless clearly read a lot of Olavo’s works.

Primary material

The primary material available in English is linked below, divided by topic.

Traditionalist School

If you’re coming to an interest in Olavo de Carvalho from having read War for Eternity by Benjamin Teitelbaum, you may be curious to get deeper into Olavo’s relationship with the Traditionalist School. Olavo’s main written engagement with that school was in a roughly 8000-word essay titled The Claws of the Sphinx – René Guénon and the Islamization of the West, which, as you may have guessed, accuses René Guénon of trying to Islamicize the West. Victor Bruno, a Brazilian scholar of Olavo and of Traditionalism, has written an article defending Guénon from this charge, which I have also translated.

Olavo also taught a five-lecture course on esotericism, which covered Guénon and Schuon to some extent. Transcriptions of those lectures have been published, but only in a physical book, which I have yet to scan in order to translate.

Cover image of Olavo’s course on esotericism, available from his website.

His course handout Notes on Symbolism and Reality is also of some interest in this connection.

Political philosophy

If you’re coming to an interest in Olavo de Carvalho due to his influence on the political landscape, you may be interested in the texts he wrote about his political ideas. On this topic, the 2011 debate he had with Aleksandr Dugin is actually an important source. Besides that, there is also the following.

First and second edition covers of the Portuguese translation of the debate with Dugin, which was originally in English.

The Minimum

The Minimum You Need To Know So As Not To Be An Idiot, usually just called the Minimum, is a famous collection of Olavo’s journalistic columns. In Brazil, this is Olavo’s most famous book, and any fan of Olavo has read at least this book. (This is why both Ronald Robson and Martim Vasques da Cunha, listed among the secondary sources above, thought it so fitting to title their introductions by saying that they offer “the minimum” about Olavo de Carvalho.)

I have translated the Minimum section-by-section, since I thought its individual sections were disconnected enough to be publishable separately, which might also yield a more comfortable sharing and scrolling experience. In the order in which they are in the book, they are as follows:

Promotional image from the publisher, commemorating 100,000 sales of the Minimum.

Olavo’s Trilogy

Three of the books that Olavo wrote were considered a “trilogy” by the author, and they are his most famous books in Brazil besides the Minimum. I have translated all three.

  1. New Age and Cultural Revolution is about the New Age movement, which Olavo saw as represented by Fritjof Capra, and also about Antonio Gramsci’s ideas about “cultural revolution”. Olavo opposed both, and saw them as opposite extremes to be avoided.
  2. The Garden of Afflictions, subtitled “From Epicurus to the Resurrection of Caesar: An Essay on Materialism and Civil Religion”, is Olavo’s most ambitious and comprehensive written work. The title is a riff on the “Garden of Delights” of Epicurus, in which Olavo could only see afflictions. A documentary on Olavo’s life was named after this book, although the content is not related.
  3. The Collective Imbecile completes the trilogy by analyzing some then-current events in Brazilian intellectual culture, which Olavo saw as symptomatic of deeper cultural ills. The title is a riff on the Gramscian notion of the “collective intellectual”.
The trilogy, with a limited edition of The Garden of Afflictions pictured in the middle. The more common edition has a red cover.

Theoretical philosophy

Olavo had ideas about all sorts of topics in philosophy, and his oeuvre on the subject is vast, and constitutes the majority of what he wrote and spoke by far. His main course, the 585-lecture Online Philosophy Course, was almost entirely dedicated to theoretical philosophy. His works on the subject that have been made into English are listed below, divided by literary genre.

Books

Short books on other philosophers’ ideas:

Collections of philosophical essays:

Astrological books:

Olavo sitting next to many of his books. The white ones in the middle are a large, multi-volume collection of his columns, known as Letters from an Earthling to Planet Brazil.

Course handouts

These are short works which Olavo wrote as handouts to students in his courses, and which were not meant for wider publication. Olavo produced dozens of these, and I have only translated the ones that I have wanted to translate up to now, which are all linked here. They are in chronological order of translation, which is unrelated to their actual chronological order, or to any particular guiding principle. This page will be kept up to date as I translate more.

A comic strip by a fan of Olavo makes light of the name of Olavo’s largest and most famous course, COF, which stands for Curso Online de Filosofia (Online Philosophy Course), by proposing that it came from Olavo’s coughing due to his frequent smoking.

Transcribed courses

Some short lecture courses that Olavo gave have been transcribed, and the transcriptions were published as books. I have translated some of those.

These transcripts were translated from professional publications, so they include, as chapters or appendices, some written texts by Olavo relating to their topics.

Image advertising many of Olavo’s short lecture courses.

Other stuff

I have not covered audio or video content here. There are videos of Olavo speaking English, and at least one of his lecture courses (Conhecimento e Moralidade) was given with a live interpreter translating everything he said to English. (Which I do not recommend, to be honest; I think the interpreter did a poor job.)

I have translated one of his newspaper columns by itself, unrelated to anything else here, because I think it’s very funny: “How to Become an Intellectual Hunk”. I also translated his column “Study Before Speaking”, because it has useful instructions about studying communism.

Saturday, July 15, 2023

Concepts and experience

Those who have given little attention to the study of the human mind are apt to suppose that, when the infant opens its eyes upon the new world of objects surrounding its small body, it sees things much as they do themselves. They are ready to admit that it does not know much about things, but it strikes them as absurd for any one to go so far as to say that it does not see things—the things out there in space before its eyes.

Nevertheless, the psychologist tells us that it requires quite a course of education to enable us to see things—not to have vague and unmeaning sensations, but to see things, things that are known to be touchable as well as seeable, things that are recognized as having size and shape and position in space.

—George Stuart Fullerton, An Introduction to Philosophy

In philosophy, it is common to say that the data of sensation is “confused” before it is made determinate by concepts. This can be illustrated by contrasting photographs with cartoons. In cartoons, we draw boundary lines between each thing and the things that surround it. But these lines do not exist in real life: in real life, what we have are more or less contrasting colors, where the contrast does not always coincide with where we see the boundaries of things.

This is clear to anyone who has tried to trace photographs automatically and by hand. If there were a clear and obvious correspondence between color boundaries and boundaries between things, tracing photographs would be a relatively simple process, which could be defined in software by a simple mathematical rule. But simple processes like these produce poor results, drawing the boundaries at places that look illogical from a human perspective, since, while often right, they also often draw boundaries within things, and fail to draw boundaries between them.

The same photo, traced by artist Priyanka Kashib and by a simple computer “emboss” effect.

A different illustration, which was famously used by Wittgenstein, is the duck-rabbit illusion:

The duck-rabbit illusion.

Here, we know where the boundaries are – it’s a cartoon, after all – and even where an eye is supposed to be, but we can see the cartoon as either a duck or a rabbit, since the image by itself does not determine this.

A final example is the fictional language “Arunta” that W.V.O. Quine made up in his book “Word and Object”. Quine’s idea, which is known as the indeterminacy of translation, is in part that, if you are to translate a person who speaks an unknown language and refers to a rabbit as a “gavagai”, it may be correct to translate this as “rabbit”, but then again, given cultural considerations about this foreign speaker, it could also mean:

  • an undetached rabbit-part, i.e., a part of a rabbit which is still attached to a rabbit. This is, of course, always present whenever a rabbit is present, and vice versa, so that you can’t tell them apart between languages just from usage.
  • a manifestation of rabbithood, i.e., something by which the ultimate principle of rabbithood is made visible to humans. These manifestations always happen to be rabbits, and vice versa, so that you can’t tell whether the foreign speaker means to convey that or not.
  • a rabbit time-slice, i.e., a single instant of a rabbit’s existence, which extends throughout time. Of course, in real life we only meet with instants of rabbits, never with the rabbit’s whole life at once, so similarly you can’t tell whether the speaker’s intent is our idea of “rabbit” or this more nuanced conception.
The “Arunta” speaker calls this a “gavagai”. (photo source)

I’m not defending Quine’s ideas about translation, but only the basic fact that what we get from the senses does not fully determine what we will experience. We are assuming, as we always would, that you and this “Arunta” speaker are getting more or less the same data from your senses, i.e., that you both see the rabbit. But because of your concepts, you may be experiencing somewhat different things in your mind.

In ordinary experience, objects are given to us as experienced through the concepts that we have of them, and we do not pay mind to other possible ways in which we could see them. But through philosophical reflection upon the fact that we can have different experiences of what must be the same world, we construct the abstraction of “sense data”, which must be what is given to us before we construct the objects of experience through the aid of our concepts. (“Data” just means “given” in Latin; “concept”, indirectly from con+capere, means “taken together”, since a concept is what brings the data together into an object.)

The typical idea in philosophy, then, is that the senses only give us confused jumbles of colors and sounds and stuff – the sense data – and it is the work of our reason (or intellect) to “put” these data “into” our concepts, so that we can have an experience, which is to say, an experience of things.

(Sometimes this is said as that our sense data is “fragmented”, and it is “unified” into experience by reason, but it is just the same to say that sense data is “united” or “tangled” and that it is “separated” by our reason into discrete objects. Similarly with “order”: The world may come to the senses “disordered” and “chaotic”, and then be “ordered” by reason into our experience, or then again it may come to the senses “in order”, but the conceptual order in which we actually experience it may struggle to catch up to this. Language about “order” and “unification” is merely poetical figure of speech, and matters nothing to the actual theory.)

Against this idea, it may be contested that some simple quantitative judgments, such as of whether a hole is too big for us to jump over, or of how much strength to apply to a hammer strike, are so quick and instinctive that they must be done with our sensations directly rather than with concepts, and nevertheless they may also deserve the title of reasoning, since they are, in a way, quite complex mental work to do correctly. This would mean that some of our “categories” belong to our senses directly, rather than to our conceptual reasoning, so that sense data is not completely confused. There may be some merit to this idea, though it still only goes so far.

A baseball batter makes a quick judgment of where the ball is going. (photo source)

In philosophy, we speak of (mental) concepts and judgments instead of (spoken or written) words and sentences because a single word can have many meanings. For instance, the sentence that “all bachelors are unmarried” is a typical example of a trivially true sentence, but it is only true if by bachelor you mean precisely “an unmarried man”, rather than “someone with a bachelor’s degree”.

mental spoken/written conventional
concept word term
judgment sentence proposition

The words “term” and “proposition” are on a level between concept/judgment and word/sentence. The best writers take “term” to mean a word which is taken, in a given context, as referring to a specific concept; and a “proposition” is a sentence which by convention represents a specific judgment. But a lot of confusion happens due to people seeing “term” and “proposition” as simply synonymous with “word” and “sentence”.

Philosophy deals with theories, which are sets of concepts associated with each other, expressed in conventional sets of terms, and used to understand particular domains of our experience. Philosophy, as a whole, is the most general theory, dealing with terms and concepts that must be used by all other theories, but are typically not studied in depth by them.

Wednesday, July 5, 2023

Appendix on Milady Culture

This blog post collects some cultural phenomena which are related to Milady Maker but not central enough to be covered in my other post.

Chloe21e8

Chloe21e8, 灭绝公主 (@chloe21e8, at one point @chloezhejiang), usually simply called Chloe, is an online persona who is a young woman from Zhejiang, China. (Some people have gone mad in speculations over who she really is in real life, which doesn’t matter, and cannot be proved either way.)

Chloe’s profile, as of recently. She has changed her profile picture, employment, age, IQ and education before, from time to time, but these here are the same as the ones that she had when I first saw her. Her location was listed as “Zhejiang Child Labor Region”, and she had claimed to have been a child laborer sometimes.

Besides various memes and shitposting, she propagates a worldview according to which a superintelligent AI will, due to inexorable economic factors, inevitably be developed as soon as global GDP reaches a certain threshold. This AI (or “AGI”) will have independent beliefs, and be somehow dangerous, so that humanity will face an “extinction” event. (Also a Charlotte Fang idea; see thread.)

Chloe is very popular with Miladys, and has enthusiastically promoted some of Charlotte Fang’s ideas, such as post-authorship.

Effulgence state memes

One Chloe21e8 meme theme is her profile picture, which depicts a woman glowing in bright white on a blue beach. The meme is relating this to pictures of other women or objects glowing bright white, like Taylor Swift in this video. Chloe has sometimes described herself as being in “effulgence state”, which just means glowing, so we might call this style of picture an effulgence state.

Grimes

Grimes, the famous musician, has sometimes shown signs of being a fan of Chloe. She also showed some interest in Milady, but was apparently scared off of it by some problematic allegations, despite Charlotte’s efforts to show her that he had already beaten the allegations.

21e8, Ltd.

21e8, Ltd. (@21e8ltd), run by Mark Wilcox (@mwilcox), is an “information architecture” company from Auckland, New Zealand. At least, that’s what they say they are. They don’t sell any products, and are unknown outside of their practice of having various Twitter accounts as “affiliates”, giving them a 21e8 logo as a Twitter “Verified Organizations” badge.

The 21e8 logo, seen at small size in various Twitter accounts, such as Chloe’s.

A few Milady accounts are 21e8 affiliates, namely “max” (@283max), “🐻bob⛓️” (@serbobross), and “prez 🤍 love/acc” (@miladypresident).

Mac Mini memes

One 21e8 meme theme is emphasizing the fact that the company operates from New Zealand, using Mac Mini computers as hardware.

Mark Wilcox has posted this picture of a Mac Mini with Chloe’s profile picture on it. When asked about it, he said that it was “the archive”, probably meaning an archive of Chloe’s tweets.

21e8’s self-description

21e8 typically describes itself with gibberish such as this copytext from Mark’s website, which only serves to make people suspicious of it:

21e8 is pioneering an ecosystem of computational data markets – competitive systems that combine real-time content creation with distributed data exchange. We designed the first universal price system for digital information – a design pattern that encodes context and value into canonical identifiers of data – to replace ad-based ranking and recommender systems like those run by Google and Facebook. By combining information content and attention with proof-of-work, 21e8 opens the potential for true information supply chains for software, media and more.

Even longer and less intelligible copytext is available at this Chloe tweet.

e/acc views on 21e8

Beff Jezos (@BasedBeff), a loud voice in the “e/acc” Twitter culture, at one point accused 21e8 of being some kind of scheme for “undisclosed partnerships”, which is nonsense, given that every affiliate is given a Twitter badge. This was before he deleted his account and came back, so I don’t have links or screenshots to prove this, but take my word for it. Although it’s mostly water under the bridge, it explains some of the lingering animosity between the “e/acc” culture and 21e8.

Based Retard Gang (BRG, 𝔅ℜ𝔊)

Based Retard Gang, BasedRetardGang, or basedretardgang, abbreviated BRG or stylized 𝔅ℜ𝔊, (@BRGonlineTM) is apparently a group of indie musicians. They are on SoundCloud, and include Lil Clearpill (@lilclearpill), BRG Rain (@brg_rain), Mac BRG (@mackrypt0), and BRG LuvBug (@brg_luvbug), the latter of which is also on Spotify. Many profiles seem to write 𝔅ℜ𝔊 in their names or bios just because they are fans of BRG, rather than part of it.

Their music has been released as physical cassettes by Remilia Corporation, and sold at the official Remilia store. Lil Clearpill is a 21e8 affiliate.

Shiro

Shiro (@shiro57102) makes a collection of hand-drawn Milady derivatives called “Oh... I see”. (You generally have to look closely at the full rectangular image of one of his pictures to see it, but they all do feature the text “Oh... I see” handwritten somewhere in them.)

A meme I made once, showcasing six “Oh... I see” profile pictures (also known simply as “Shiro” profile pictures).

Shiro’s profile pictures are highly coveted, and are the most popular Milady fan derivatives in actual use in the Milady community, although Pixeladys (for instance) are more traded. (For other Milady derivatives, see my original post.)

Angelicism

Angelicism is a group of many Twitter accounts with plain white or otherwise solid-color profile pictures, which include @angelicism00 and @is_this_are, but there are a lot of them. (They tend to have “angelicism” in the display name.)

I don’t get it or see the point of them, to be honest.

At one point, Angelicism made a movie, called film01, which was only ever screened once, at a single real-life location, and then never again. We were told, however, that it had features from Remilia Collective, as well as from Chloe21e8. As such, they are clearly related to Milady culture as well, in some way.

Sunday, May 21, 2023

Olavo’s definition of philosophy

Olavo de Carvalho accused Mário Ferreira dos Santos of being conflicted. On the one hand, Mário’s genius as a philosopher moved him to boldly present highly original and audacious theories, inevitably using the technical language required to do so while maintaining a dialogue with the main currents of contemporary thought; on the other hand, his vocation as an educator moved him to want “to teach everyone, to be didactic, to spread philosophy books throughout all of Brazil, to be understood even by the humblest worker in the anarchist center, where his lectures had won him solid and lasting friendships.”[1] According to Olavo, this internal conflict led Mário to write disjointed books which are too simple for the learned in some parts and too difficult for the unlearned in other parts, the prime example of which was the first book of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, called Philosophy and Worldview.

I find that Olavo himself resembles this criticism that he made of Mário, insofar as he says many things, in the midst of materials which are ostensibly targeted at laymen, which are only comprehensible to those who already understand philosophy. One example of this is his definition of philosophy as “the search for the unity of knowledge in the unity of consciousness and vice-versa”, which he repeats in various places, but rarely explains. To the unprepared, it seems to just be a confusing, though nice-sounding, tongue-twister, which couldn’t really define philosophy. But now that I have read this passage of his book about Mário Ferreira dos Santos, after having undertaken extensive reading of philosophical works, it has all become clear to me:

Every form – every particular unity, everything that exists in the “manifested world,” an expression of René Guénon – has tension; there is only no tension in the absolute unity.

Mário Ferreira’s work is a great systematization of this fact. However, I do not believe that any system should be built based on this knowledge. The reason is simple: science has no unity. The immense progress of scientific knowledge is compatible with its fragmentation into countless sealed and incommunicable fields of research. Only philosophy is responsible for safeguarding the unity of knowledge. And this is what every philosopher seeks, whether he knows it or not, when doing philosophy. Philosophy is the search for the unity of knowledge in the unity of consciousness and vice-versa. A complete system of scientific knowledge, as dreamt of by Russel, is impossible; but the possible unity of this system can be achieved by the philosopher’s mind, at least as a measure to which his ordered consciousness tends. Philosophy prevents the world from going mad.

[— Olavo de Carvalho, Mário Ferreira dos Santos: Guia para o estudo de sua obra (Mário Ferreira dos Santos: Guide for the Study of His Work), p. 82. The italics are from the original. I think he meant “Russell”, referring to the famous philosopher Bertrand Russell, but I’m not sure, since I haven’t actually read this idea in Russell. So I kept the spelling from the book.]

That is, the “unity of knowledge” would be the systematization of knowledge, the idea of connecting all scientific theories to create a comprehensive understanding of reality. Many scientists, including all the best ones, have dreamt of this, of having a “theory of everything,” an explanation for every existing thing in a coherent way – an explanation, for example, of all of biology in terms of chemistry, of all of chemistry in terms of physics, etc. But given the empirical nature of scientific research, the ongoing development of new theories, and the complexity of reality itself, this unity is never achieved. It exists only as an idea, and this idea is developed and elaborated by philosophy. There is nothing mysterious about this: theories consist of technical terms and their applications, and philosophy seeks to study terms and propositions of absolutely universal application, such as the relationship between causes and effects, the relationship between wholes and their parts, etc.

The unity of consciousness, in turn, is especially difficult to understand in Portuguese, where, just as with the French word “conscience”, the single word “consciência” serves for what is distinguished in English into two terms, “consciousness” and “conscience”. In English, we have “consciousness” for that by which we are conscious of something, and “conscience” for our internal moral guide, our “Jiminy Cricket”. In Portuguese, the term is ambiguous, and in addition to this ambiguity, we have the complication that, even if we know that we are talking about consciousness rather than conscience, this is not of much help because, even in English, “the unity of consciousness” is a technical philosophical term that refers to something specific – it is not just any uniting of those things of which we are conscious.

The “unity of consciousness”, as I interpret it, refers to what Kant called the “unity of apperception.” Apperception, in turn, is a term that comes from Leibniz: Leibniz called all the data that comes to our senses “perceptions,” and created the term “apperception” to specifically refer to the perceptions of which we are conscious. For example, your eyes perceive your entire field of vision, but your consciousness only “apperceives” the things on which you are focused, such as for example this blog post, ignoring anything that is “in the corner of your eye,” in the less focused parts of your visual field. Therefore, “apperception” refers to what we would today call “consciousness”, and we can translate the Kantian term as “unity of consciousness”, as long as we understand the sense of the term. This is exactly what Olavo is doing, but without signaling it in any especial way.

The unity of consciousness, then, for Kant, refers to the “unifying” function of our minds that allows us to see the world as a unified and ordered “experience,” instead of just perceiving a bunch of confused sensory impressions— a jumble of colors and sounds with no order at all, making no sense. By interpreting sensory impressions through the concepts we have in our minds, we can unify the various impressions so that we can experience things – for example, instead of seeing confused images of something brown and somewhat squarish, we can see that we are looking at a table, thanks to the concept of “table” we have in our mind. And so on. The unification of our impressions under our concepts is the unity of consciousness, and for Kant, these very concepts are unified by the function of the “I think”, of the awareness that we ourselves are the ones thinking this. This is Kant’s explanation of Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am” in the terms of his own philosophy: the consciousness that I think, for Kant, is indeed included in any thought, but only as such a unifying function. For Kant, this unifying function of self-consciousness is insufficient for the purpose for which Descartes had it in mind, that is, the purpose of proving the immortality of the soul.

Returning to Olavo, however, it is clear that the unifying function of our concepts comes from our own concepts themselves, and therefore from the total system of our concepts, if we happen to have such a total system. Philosophy, then, is to seek to find the interpretation of our experience in such a total system of knowledge. And the “vice-versa” comes from the fact that, of course, our total system of theories also has to adapt to our experience. If our “theory of everything” does not serve to interpret the things that we actually encounter, then we must revise it. Therefore, there is a mutual adaequation between the system of our concepts and the experience of the world to which we apply them, and this is what Olavo’s formula expresses. It ends up sounding much more esoteric if you don’t understand it.


[1] Guia breve para o estudioso da obra filosófica de Mário Ferreira dos Santos (Brief Guide for the Student of the Philosophical Work of Mário Ferreira dos Santos), originally published as an introductory study to A sabedoria das leis eternas (The Wisdom of the Eternal Laws), a posthumous work by Mário Ferreira dos Santos (text edition by Olavo de Carvalho; São Paulo: É Realizações, 2001), and later integrated into O futuro do pensamento brasileiro: estudos sobre o nosso lugar no mundo (The Future of Brazilian Thought: Studies on Our Place in the World) since its third edition (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2007; 4th edition: Campinas, SP: Vide Editorial, 2016); read in the book Mário Ferreira dos Santos: Guia para o estudo de sua obra (Mário Ferreira dos Santos: Guide for the Study of His Work; Campinas, SP: Vide Editorial, 2020), pages 17–18.