New, retarded systems

The usefulness of brand-new, retarded philosophical systems is twofold.

First, in that they are retarded; the student need not take them very seriously, or consider how they might apply to the world, given how very obviously they do not. He need only consider the ideas, and their connections to each other, and trace the key mistakes. They are great abstract use cases for the science of logic, and for skills in the interpretation of arguments. It is easier to look for how it is that something is wrong, when it is obvious that it really is wrong.

Second, in that, often just insofar as they are retarded, they are brand-new; the student need not trace a very long chain of references in order to have a ‘full’ understanding of the work, that is, one including its context. The philosopher, in central and important ways, has made all this stuff up; there is no need to consult other works for his sources, since for the most part he has none. His ideas stand or fall (and they probably fall) on their own.

Thus, the student of philosophy may study such new, retarded systems sporadically, on their own, without any close connection with a larger course of study of the history of philosophy, or of philosophy itself. They are an interesting and fruitful intellectual exercise, provided he is up for it; they provide a richer picture of the history, and of philosophy itself, without demanding, for their understanding, much from the reader in return.