Note: This blog post has been retracted, since I no longer think of it as a good representation of how I think about its topic. I may, or may not, have written a better post about the same topic since; check the full list of posts.
As an aid to my own study of ethical opinions, I have decided to divide them into six types.
0. Contents
1. Fundamental distinctions
1.1. Ethics vs. non-ethics
1.2. Utility vs. abstract duty
1.3. Comprehensive vs. particular
2. Division
2.1. Particular utility
2.2. Comprehensive utility
2.3. Particular duty
2.4. Comprehensive duty
2.5. Non-ethics, self-serving
2.6. Non-ethics, cause-serving
3. Remarks on scope
1. Fundamental distinctions
The division is based on three fundamental distinctions, which does not yield eight types because the second two distinctions do not apply within one of the prongs of the first, and that prong is in turn divided into two types based on a criterion which is not very important.
1.1. Ethics vs. non-ethics
Some ethical opinions believe in ethics. Some do not; they believe in non-ethics. And yet they are ethical opinions, because they are opinions about a rule for action.
In this division, I call ethics any opinion which will lead to a rule of action which is consistent, that is, leading to similar actions in similar circumstances, abstracted from whether the actions are judged helpful or harmful to a man (that is, the actor holding the opinion) or his cause.
Non-ethics are other opinions, that is, those which may lead to very different actions in very similar circumstances, because judgment is to be based on such practical concerns, and not on a consistent rule.
1.2. Utility vs. abstract duty
Utility here is fully intended to evoke utilitarianism, but is taken much more broadly. An ethical opinion is a rule of utility when the fundamental goal of action is to increase happiness in some sense. Nothing needs to be done if it will make no one happier, whether in the short or the long run.
These opinions constitute ethics because it is held that similar actions will tend to lead to happiness in similar circumstances. There may need to be many particular considerations about the circumstances, but the action is still abstracted from helpfulness to a man or his cause, which is what excludes an opinion from ethics. Utilitarians seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number; if they sought their own greatest happiness, simply, they would be non-ethicists.
Rules of utility may even go so far as to prescribe some general rules of conduct, abstracted from certain particular circumstantial considerations, but this is always done because it is thought to lead to greater happiness; often, the rules are regarded as heuristics, to be abandoned in extreme situations where following them would clearly lead to great suffering.
Abstract duty, by contrast with utility, abstracts from considerations of happiness, as the name is meant to imply. That said, I may often write simply “duty” where I find that it will be unambiguous, such as in the next sentence. An ethical opinion is a rule of duty when the fundamental goal of action is the act’s conformity with certain rules, whencesoever they come; they must be obeyed even at the loss of all.
It will often be held by proponents of rules of duty that following one’s duty is always conducive to one’s own greater happiness. It is never held, however, that following duty will always lead to greater happiness for any man other than the individual actor; if so, what we have is a kind of rule of utility.
1.3. Comprehensive vs. particular
An ethical opinion is comprehensive when it takes into account man’s entire existence, composed of mortal body and immortal soul; a particular opinion disregards the latter.
In the case of rules of utility, being comprehensive means taking into account, for every action, men’s welfare or happiness in the afterlife as well as on this world; and it means accounting for ways to harm men’s souls that do not translate into perceptible harm to their physical or mental health.
In the case of rules of duty, being comprehensive means that the rules or duties prescribed may command or forbid actions relating to men’s souls, even if they do not perceptibly affect them physically or mentally.
Being particular, in either case, means disregarding such things, perhaps for their being held not to exist.
2. Division
The above distinctions being drawn, it is easy to sort opinions into these divisions. The order is not very important.
2.1. Particular utility
Into particular utility may be classed many opinions held by atheists, though certainly not all. Within this class I would place Epicurean hedonism, all sorts of utilitarianism, and some kinds of ethical intuitionism – that is, at least Bertrand Russell’s kind.
2.2. Comprehensive utility
The one opinion I believe can be classed into comprehensive utility at this moment is the ethics of Plato’s Gorgias. In that dialogue, pleasure is distinguished from good, but the good is to be sought primarily for its leading to abiding human happiness; which is much more emphasized at the end, when the doctrine of an afterlife is introduced. This is yet more plausible if the doctrine of the good in the Protagoras is held to be in harmony with it; in this interpretation I believe I accord with Franco Trabattoni, Platone, §2.
2.3. Particular duty
Many liberal and especially libertarian ethics may be classed into particular duty. I believe all major theories of “libertarian ethics”, of the vein of Rothbard and Hoppe, would be classed here.
2.4. Comprehensive duty
I believe most ethical opinions within the major monotheistic religions would be classed here.
2.5. Non-ethics, self-serving
This is the opinion of the proverbial selfish and cruel man who seeks nothing but to advance his own interests. Since his interests may, in different, similar situations, be best served in some ways and sometimes in others, depending for instance on whether the people involved in a situation are his friends or enemies, this is a rule of non-ethics. This opinion is almost never defended theoretically, although it seems plausible that it is somewhat often seen in practice.
2.6. Non-ethics, cause-serving
This is where all other rules of non-ethics go; if a man does all his actions to advance a particular woman’s interests, for instance, that woman may simply be regarded as being his cause for the purposes of this division.
I named this section cause-serving because I believe it is most often seen in ideologues, who seek nothing but to advance the interests of their party or class. Since these interests may, in different, similar situations, be best served in some ways and sometimes in others, depending for instance on whether the people involved in a situation are the party’s friends or enemies, to seek those interests in every action is to follow a rule of non-ethics.
3. Remarks on scope
Many things are left out of this division, which merely captures the elements which I find most interesting in ethical opinions.
It leaves out, for instance, whether an opinion is consequentialist or not. If someone creates a rule of action which favors some actions rather than others because of their consequences, and this is in no way for the reason that these consequences are associated with greater happiness in any sense, but for some other reason which is nevertheless held to be binding, this rule would be a rule of duty, not of utility. So, while I cannot think of anyone that did this, technically this division does not divide every conceivable consequentialist opinion into one particular category.
It also leaves out meta-ethical concerns. An opinion’s category says nothing about whether its holders believe moral laws to be natural, rational, positive, divine, human, &c.
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