The Epicurean personality

Note: This blog post has been retracted, since I no longer think of it as a good representation of how I think about its topic. I may, or may not, have written a better post about the same topic since; check the full list of posts.

This is a work in folk psychology, but it may be held to be more serious by some. The thesis is that one personality type unites Epicurus to many liberals and atheists throughout history, up to the present day. I have called it the Epicurean personality, after his famous example, although an earlier one may have been Democritus, and Lucretius left more writings. People of this personality are called Epicureans here, although this is not the original sense of the word.

0. Contents

1. Atoms
2. Hedons
3. Friendship
4. Examples

1. Atoms

The Epicurean seeks to explain all things through the relations of things inferior to them. This tendency had its first expression in ancient Greek atomism, and was later formulated in early modern mechanicism. Today, quantum physics is so confusing that Epicureans can no longer refer to anything as simple as atoms and void, or masses in motion, but they will make some vague reference to ‘the entities known by science’ or to ‘physical principles’ and leave the precise formulation to their fellow Epicureans in the field of physics.

The Epicurean would be an atomist. If he cannot, he would be a materialist. If he finds that insufficient, for matter must be supplemented with energy or other principles, he will be a physicalist. If all of this seems to him insufficient to explain mind, he will be a Russellian monist – only with much effort will he be a dualist. And then, he would rather ascribe as few faculties to the soul as possible, leaving most of them to the brain. If he can believe that the soul is mortal, he will.

There is no God for him, of course. If he must admit one, he would rather be a deist, or whatever kind of theist lets him most easily ignore the shameful admission of a creator – maybe a kind of pantheist. These days it is popular that he be an agnostic.

2. Hedons

For the Epicurean, what is good is what feels good – not necessarily as basely as bodily pleasure, but at least emotionally. This finds expression in many different doctrines; the classical Epicurean hedonism was most clear in expressing this tendency, but not clear enough in giving a thoroughgoing ethical account. Therefore, many others have been devised.

The most direct descendant would probably be utilitarianism. The relation between ‘utility’ and pleasure is quite clear. The Epicurean will usually try to avoid any version of utilitarianism that has the permissibility of most kinds of human sacrifice as a consequence, however, for reasons discussed in the next part. Other kinds of consequentialism have been devised which are, though less clearly, also expressions of the Epicurean tendency – though not all kinds of consequentialism are necessarily such expressions.

Emotivism, as usually held,[1] would also be a clear expression. Not only is what is good identical to what feels good, indeed a thing’s goodness is reduced entirely to its being emotionally pleasing. Sometimes, while denying emotivism – perhaps because it does not feel good to reduce goodness in that way – the Epicurean will maintain that, while we do know what is good through our ‘moral emotions’, those in turn are caused by ‘moral intuitions’, and he will be an intuitionist.

There may be less clear expressions in moral opinions that are based on some ‘rational’ rule or collection of rules, such as perhaps some kinds of libertarianism (not all). Certainly, if he believes in something as abstract as the “non-aggression principle” or the “categorical imperative”, he does so because it seems to him to be a fitting expression of his feelings – only rarely would he try to change his feelings to fit his rule.

The Epicurean does not believe, or at least not very strongly, in the ethics of the major religions, nor in Aristotelian natural law. Homosexual acts feel good, and do not usually have painful consequences – what could be so wrong with them?

Let no one think that they disregard consequences, either. The Epicurean does not care only for his immediate gratification. The ideal of a pleasurable life is certainly not that of a Puritan, but equally certainly not that of a gluttonous libertine, for such a life tends to collapse, and painfully so. A careful balance must be observed, and mostly is.

3. Friendship

The Epicurean feels immense compassion for his fellow men. Given the second principle just outlined, he is likely to also feel that such compassion is an imperative. He is more offended at being called self-centered than at being called dishonest.

This leads him to strongly altruistic injunctions in ethics, and to strongly collectivist positions in politics. Not necessarily statist, for he may find State violence to be oppressive – it is not compassionate, and it does not feel good. Indeed, most anarchists – here excepted most anarcho-capitalists – have been Epicureans. The Epicurean generally belongs to the libertarian left. Some have been more right wing, but not Rothbardians or Objectivists. Some have been more authoritarian, but not Stalinists or fascists. They generally hate fascists, as being the opposite of what they are.

It is easier for anyone to be compassionate toward a visible person than toward a small, practically invisible fetus. The Epicurean is usually pro-choice.

Often, the Epicurean’s compassion is shown through an emphasis on tolerance, though not for what seems uncompassionate. He will support free speech, but often exclude hate speech from it.

4. Examples

I believe, of course, that Epicurus was an example. His antecedents and descendants very likely were, too – Democritus, Lucretius.

Many, though not all, liberals have been examples. Certainly Bentham was one, and probably Mill. Not Mises, not Hayek. Rawls was one, Nozick was not. Isaiah Berlin certainly was one, his pluralism being a strong foundation for the Epicurean tolerance.

Bertrand Russell was an example.

[1] Qualification added because a friend explained to me that emotivism is primarily a thesis about language, so that, at least conceivably, an emotivist could also be a moral realist. In any event, that is not how the view is commonly explained; the main purpose in saying that moral judgments express emotion-like states seems to usually be to deny that they refer to extramental reality. So I think the text did not do terribly at representing the usual emotivist; I do not know of another word to use to distinguish him.