Note: This blog post has been retracted, since I no longer think of it as a good representation of how I think about its topic. I may, or may not, have written a better post about the same topic since; check the full list of posts.
What is justice?
0. Contents
- A blogger’s answer to the age-old question
- No arguments
- Scope
- Presentation of the physician theory
- Application of the physician theory to punishments
- Application of the physician theory to the distribution of goods
- Rejection of the physician theory in favor of the debt theory
- Presentation of the debt theory
- Application of the debt theory to punishments
- Application of the debt theory to the distribution of goods
- Concluding remarks
- Notes
1. A blogger’s answer to the age-old question
I cannot help having a concept of justice. It is one of those things that everyone has a concept of, I think. But whenever I explain it, it seems counter-intuitive to some people, or they seem to think I have a peculiar idea, while I would think my idea is quite run-of-the-mill – really, it is mostly what I “intuitively” have, without any large theory or argument behind it. So I thought I would lay down an explanation at once, to which I can refer later when needed.
I am just a blogger here. I am not an ethicist. I have no idea what other theories have been proposed than the ones I have considered. I have no idea why anyone would listen to me instead of someone more qualified. But I do know that I will, and I must, listen to myself; and that at the moment I cannot accept anyone else’s theory rather than mine.
2. No arguments
There will be no arguments in this blog post. I plan to present two concepts of justice as fairly as I can. Then, I will reject the one because I dislike it, and accept the other because I like it. I will try to show some cases that make my dislike for the one in favor of the other more prominent. But I will absolutely not argue for, or against, either of them; my acceptance of one concept over the other will not come as a result of any more fundamental premises. This is not because I think justice is a “basic” concept, or anything like that; I am not sophisticated enough to have any idea about whether a kind of “basicness” is applicable here. It is because I have little awareness of any arguments that can be given on either side, but yet I cannot help having a concept of justice.
3. Scope
This blog post is based on the idea that one and the same idea of justice applies to the distribution of punishments and to the distribution of goods. You may say that, since these are different domains, they may be called different “parts” of justice, and give them different names such as “penal” and “distributive”, or whichever you want. I do not care about that. The problem would be if you think the fundamental idea that applies to each domain is not the same, that there is a “social justice” that is wholly different in character from regular justice despite the name, or at worst that one of the two theories I laid out applies in one domain and the other in the other. I will not even consider that possibility; in fact, as an example of this post having no arguments, I will note here that I certainly dislike you personally if you hold that possibility to be the case.
4. Presentation of the physician theory
The first theory of justice which I am setting out to present, and later reject, is something I term the “physician theory” of justice. I call it that because Plato, in the Gorgias, constantly made analogies between the work of the judge and the work of a physician, and such analogies seem to me to be somewhat common in later presentations of the concept, though they do not appear to be as fundamental in those.
The physician theory is that justice is fundamentally about correcting a kind of evil that befalls men, and therefore he who pursues justice (and especially the judge) is best thought of in analogy to a physician, for a physician seeks primarily to correct the evil of disease.
5. Application of the physician theory to punishments
If the distribution of punishments is to be sought primarily for correcting a kind of evil that befalls men, then that evil ought to be conceived of as something relating to crime, or crime itself, since all men understand that punishments are applied most primarily to criminals.
Some would say simply that justice seeks primarily the reduction of crime itself. So, the purpose of punishment, according to justice, is to deter the criminal from doing any further wrong in the future, or to deter society from doing the same wrong that the criminal did, by virtue of their fear of suffering the same punishment.
Protagoras: [...] If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. [1]
Others would have a more complex version of the same opinion. They would emphasize that crime itself is caused by further causes, that is, the psychological conditions in the mind of the criminal. So, the purpose of punishment, according to justice, is to correct those causes specifically; to rehabilitate, or reform, the criminal. Thus we see Plato affirming that justice is the art which cures injustice in the soul; more modern versions would tend to use less morally charged terms.
Socrates: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?
Polus: Very true.
Socrates: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.
Polus: To the physicians, Socrates.
Socrates: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
Polus: To the judges, you mean.
Socrates: —Who are to punish them?
Polus: Yes.
Socrates: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
Polus: Clearly.
Socrates: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
Polus: That is evident. [2]
6. Application of the physician theory to the distribution of goods
If the distribution of goods ought to be primarily for correcting a kind of evil that befalls men, then that evil ought to be conceived of as something relating to poverty, or poverty itself, since that is the only kind of evil which goods can seem apt to correct.
Some would say simply that justice seeks primarily the reduction of poverty itself. So the distribution of goods, according to justice, would be primarily for preventing people from having too little, or too much less than their fellows – since distribution is not thought to affect the absolute quantity of goods, and poverty may be thought of in a relative sense. Thence we get some ideas about justice being concerned with income or wealth inequality.
Others would have a more complex version of the same opinion. They would emphasize that poverty itself causes pain primarily by causing further evils, such as hunger, or the want of other basic needs such as clothing and shelter. So the distribution of goods, according to justice, would be primarily for correcting those evils specifically: to prevent any in society from suffering hunger, or want of clothing and shelter, whether that is through their having more property themselves or through their having access to a public store of food, for instance.
7. Rejection of the physician theory in favor of the debt theory
I do not like the physician theory. To be honest, I do not really see any merit to it other than this one, of making clearer the true idea by way of contrast; which is why I have presented it. I think that justice is not about correcting an evil that can befall a man, that is, an evil of the soul, body, or estate.[3] Justice is its own thing. It seeks to correct an evil of the world, which is injustice – but not the injustice in the soul, that by which a man is said to be unjust. Justice, conceived as an art or a habit, seeks to achieve justice and correct injustice, conceived as a feature or a property of certain states of affairs in the world – that by which a certain situation is said to be unjust, but never a man; though a man may be called unjust in another sense, insofar as he decided to cause the situation.
8. Presentation of the debt theory
As Cicero put it, the virtue of justice is concerned “with the conservation of organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed”.[4] The fundamental idea is that of rendering to every man his due; the discharge of obligations is merely to render the dues through actions rather than payments, and the preservation of organized society is really only sought by justice insofar as it is sought through the rendering of punishments, which is the province of justice, for all agree that no punishment may be exacted except it be just.
Justice is then concerned with achieving a certain state of affairs where all men get what is due to them, under a certain conception of what is due to men, of course. Justice may be thought of as having a close relation to truth, for both involve an idea of correspondence – just as truth involves a correspondence between things and the intellect, justice involves a correspondence between what is due to men and what they actually receive.
Under this theory, I think most cases of justice are best thought of in analogy to debts, which I believe to be the basic case of an abstract duty of the kind involved here; and hence the name. I have sometimes called it the “accountant” theory, to better contrast with the “physician” one, but I will not do so here.
9. Application of the debt theory to punishments
If the distribution of punishments is to be sought primarily for giving men their due, then a conception of what is due to men must include the fact that punishment is due primarily to criminals, since all men understand that it is to criminals that punishments are most primarily applied. I will outline one such conception.
Proportionality
The punishment should fit the crime. When men commit a crime, they incur a kind of debt, so that punishment becomes due to them; to discharge that debt, they must be made to suffer in a measure proportionate to the suffering they caused. If there were no punishing authority, I figure any man could discharge this debt, that is, punish him; but as things are, it is the state who must punish a man for his crimes.
Mercy
Just as, with a monetary debt, the creditor may decide to waive his right, the punishing authority may decide to waive the criminal’s debt, in what may be called mercy, or forgiveness.
Note that I believe that there are some conditions for forgiving with prudence, which I plan to give in a future blog post.
Exchange
Similarly, just as a monetary debt may be partly or wholly negotiated, so as to be paid in different terms than was originally intended, the punishing authority may exchange part of the criminal’s debt for something that he has and may be of interest, as when a criminal is offered a reduction in punishment in exchange for information that he has, such as the location of the hidden bodies. [5]
Deterrence, reformation, etc.
Punishment may be sought in a way that deters others or reforms the criminal, if the punishing authority is so inclined. But the primary consideration is always to discharge the debt; punishment may never be applied in a measure greater than would be proportionate to the crime, on pain of injustice.
For example, if a crime has been determined to be deserving of 2 years of jail, it is likely to be unjust that the criminal be made instead to spend 10 years in a reformation facility, no matter whether that would be required to truly reform him.
Punishment may be applied in a measure smaller than is proportionate to the crime, which would then constitute forgiveness – and would be subject to the conditions for the prudence of forgiveness.
Note that applying a punishment that deters others, or reforms the criminal, may never be called more just, so long as the debt was discharged properly. It may be more charitable, or more prudent, but not more just, since the only consideration that pertains to justice (in measuring punishment) is whether the punishment fits the crime.
It does pertain to justice, however, to ensure that the victim receive due compensation in certain cases; all would understand that such compensation is due in justice to the victim.
10. Application of the debt theory to the distribution of goods
If the distribution of goods ought to be primarily for giving men their due, then a conception of what is due to men must include the fact that every man’s property is due to himself, for this is how all men understand property. Similarly, a debt is due to the creditor, as that is what a debt means – and this is the very case after which I named the theory, for its being so basic and useful.
I believe that that is sufficient. No good that is not a property or an obligation is due in justice to anyone.
Supposing that there are some goods which are not yet the property of any man, and are to be distributed by some authority among a group of men, it is not possible to do so unjustly, for the goods are not due in justice to any of them. There is certainly no reason why the distribution ought, in justice, to be equal. It may be more prudent to seek an equal distribution, so as to reduce strife which could be caused by envy, but it may also be more prudent to give more to one man than to another, such as if that man can make a better use of the good – for instance, a tool should be given to the more skilled laborer. These are prudential considerations, and not considerations of justice; any choice that the authority made in this case would be just, for there is no duty involved.
11. Concluding remarks
I hope that this explanation has been sufficient. The debt theory represents my own personal concept of justice, and I have presented the other theory by way of contrast, as I said. I am much more congenial to the debt theory; I vibe with it. I believe the examples in its application section should give perceptive readers an idea why.
If, after reading this, you prefer the physician theory, I would suspect you of being a certain kind of person.
12. Notes
[1] Plato, Protagoras, 324a–b
[2] Plato, Gorgias, 477e–478a
[3] cf. Plato, Gorgias, 477c
[4] Cicero, On Duties, §15
[5] Certain facts about the physician theory were meant to be conveyed by way of contrast with these sections. The physician theory has, in my view, no room for proportionality, for mercy (as here conceived of) or for exchange, and this is of course. Imagine that a physician would, when deciding on the treatment, mainly consider how bad the symptoms of a disease are and attempt to give a proportionally painful treatment, rather than seeking to cure it; or that he would accept not to treat the patient under certain conditions; or that he would exchange some of the treatment for his receiving information that the patient has. This is unthinkable, and these features of modern justice systems ought to be wholly ousted if the earlier, physician theory of justice is correct. I think it isn’t, and therefore they shouldn’t, but again – I give no arguments here. This note was added mainly because a friend pointed out that the second theory seemed to be more developed than the earlier one due to its having more sections in the post, but this was because I had intended the contrast I just mentioned.
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