Three pure worldviews

As I see it, there are three pure worldviews, regarded as fundamental orientations for your philosophical arguments. They are as follows.

1. Current science. The idea is that, no matter how your philosophical arguments turn out, they must support what is held in current science, or the views that seem to motivate the research programs of current scientists even if they are not officially part of scientific theories. This is sometimes defended by an appeal to the “demonstrated success” of science in providing understanding of the world and predictions about it, but as I see it, this is the same worldview that goes back to the Epicurean and Democritean atomists, who had similarly “scientific empiricist” views long before any success of that research program was evident to everyone. These are people who think empirical inquiry into the efficient, spatiotemporal causes of things is the ultimate way to understand them, and whatever our deep philosophical theories say about things, it must support this sort of inquiry and the most intuitive conclusions from it. “We must be able to explain empirical science in light of our theories, with as little revision as possible.”
2. Historical tradition. These are people who see an intellectual tradition spanning all of history, of which they are the heirs—often including the most famous historical thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz and Kant, etc. They believe philosophy must be, if not a priori, at least mostly not dependent upon the development of scientific instruments and paradigms, so that, if clearly intelligent people in the distant past believed something, there must be some deep truth in their analyses. It is important to them that, however their philosophical arguments turn out, they must be able to understand how Plato’s and Aristotle’s and others’s ideas can be reinterpreted in light of what they are now saying, keeping their essential core of truth. They want their perspective to be in respectful conversation with the great thinkers of all ages, not just recent academics or scientists. “We must be able to explain historical tradition in light of our theories, with as little revision as possible.”
3. Intuition. These are people who view the two above ideas with suspicion, because they seem to subject philosophical inquiry to an external authority, as if you are first looking at science or tradition and then rationalizing a view which is similar to them. They think that, since the argument from authority has no place in philosophy, the philosopher must build his views only from what seems plausible to him, without trying to square it with anything current or previous. This idea of seeking to believe only what seems plausible to oneself, in a rather informal and unspecified sense, is what is now known in academia as intuition. These people, being quite ready to point out mistakes in both current science and the great thinkers of historical tradition, are the most characteristic endorsers of such a view as panpsychism, which is neither favored by scientific materialists nor by traditional religions, but which vindicates both the intuitions about consciousness seeming fundamental and the intuitions about consciousness seeming reducible. “We must be able to explain our intuitions in light of our theories, with as little revision as possible.”

The fact that the above three pure worldviews seemed to roughly correspond (in a vague analogy) to the Aristotelian material cause, efficient cause, and formal cause, respectively, made me think of whether there might not be a worldview corresponding to the final cause. This would be a focus not on vindicating the empirical contents of our thoughts, nor their historical origins, nor their formal constitution, but on their ultimate goal or purpose. It is conceivable to me that you could seek to formulate your philosophy with the goal that it should match what will be thought by people in the future, and this would be a unique worldview which is different from the ones above. The reason why I think this is not a pure worldview is that no one can predict the future without drawing on materials from the present, and those materials will ultimately be from one of the other three. So the hypothetical future-oriented worldview is necessarily composite.