Ancient Holy Saturday homily

It turns out that there are two versions in English of the following homily, whose author is unknown. I thought to make a comparison table, which is here.

Translation 1, from here	Translation 2, from here
What is happening? Today there is a great silence over the earth, a great silence, and stillness, a great silence because the King sleeps; the earth was in terror and was still, because God slept in the flesh and raised up those who were sleeping from the ages. God has died in the flesh, and the underworld has trembled.	Something strange is happening – there is a great silence on earth today, a great silence and stillness. The whole earth keeps silence because the King is asleep. The earth trembled and is still because God has fallen asleep in the flesh and he has raised up all who have slept ever since the world began. God has died in the flesh and hell trembles with fear.
Truly he goes to seek out our first parent like a lost sheep; he wishes to visit those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death. He goes to free the prisoner Adam and his fellow-prisoner Eve from their pains, he who is God, and Adam’s son. The Lord goes in to them holding his victorious weapon, his cross. When Adam, the first created man, sees him, he strikes his breast in terror and calls out to all: “My Lord be with you all.” And Christ in reply says to Adam: “And with your spirit.” And grasping his hand he raises him up, saying:	He has gone to search for our first parent, as for a lost sheep. Greatly desiring to visit those who live in darkness and in the shadow of death, he has gone to free from sorrow the captives Adam and Eve, he who is both God and the son of Eve. The Lord approached them bearing the cross, the weapon that had won him the victory. At the sight of him, Adam, the first man he had created, struck his breast in terror and cried out to everyone: “My Lord be with you all.” Christ answered him: “And with your spirit.” He took him by the hand and raised him up, saying:
Awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light.	Awake, O sleeper, and rise from the dead, and Christ will give you light.
I am your God, who for your sake became your son, who for you and your descendants now speak and command with authority those in prison: Come forth, and those in darkness: Have light, and those who sleep: Rise.	I am your God, who for your sake have become your son. Out of love for you and for your descendants I now by my own authority command all who are held in bondage to come forth, all who are in darkness to be enlightened, all who are sleeping to arise.
I command you: Awake, sleeper, I have not made you to be held a prisoner in the underworld. Arise from the dead; I am the life of the dead. Arise, O man, work of my hands, arise, you who were fashioned in my image. Rise, let us go hence; for you in me and I in you, together we are one undivided person.	I order you, O sleeper, to awake. I did not create you to be held a prisoner in hell. Rise from the dead, for I am the life of the dead. Rise up, work of my hands, you who were created in my image. Rise, let us leave this place, for you are in me and I am in you; together we form only one person and we cannot be separated.
For you, I your God became your son; for you, I the Master took on your form; that of slave; for you, I who am above the heavens came on earth and under the earth; for you, man, I became as a man without help, free among the dead; for you, who left a garden, I was handed over to Jews from a garden and crucified in a garden.	For your sake I, your God, became your son; I, the Lord, took the form of a slave; I, whose home is above the heavens, descended to the earth and beneath the earth. For your sake, for the sake of man, I became like a man without help, free among the dead. For the sake of you, who left a garden, I was betrayed to the Jews in a garden, and I was crucified in a garden.
Look at the spittle on my face, which I received because of you, in order to restore you to that first divine inbreathing at creation. See the blows on my cheeks, which I accepted in order to refashion your distorted form to my own image. See the scourging of my back, which I accepted in order to disperse the load of your sins which was laid upon your back. See my hands nailed to the tree for a good purpose, for you, who stretched out your hand to the tree for an evil one.	See on my face the spittle I received in order to restore to you the life I once breathed into you. See there the marks of the blows I received in order to refashion your warped nature in my image. On my back see the marks of the scourging I endured to remove the burden of sin that weighs upon your back. See my hands, nailed firmly to a tree, for you who once wickedly stretched out your hand to a tree.
I slept on the cross and a sword pierced my side, for you, who slept in paradise and brought forth Eve from your side. My side healed the pain of your side; my sleep will release you from your sleep in Hades; my sword has checked the sword which was turned against you.	I slept on the cross and a sword pierced my side for you who slept in paradise and brought forth Eve from your side. My side has healed the pain in yours. My sleep will rouse you from your sleep in hell. The sword that pierced me has sheathed the sword that was turned against you.
But arise, let us go hence. The enemy brought you out of the land of paradise; I will reinstate you, no longer in paradise, but on the throne of heaven. I denied you the tree of life, which was a figure, but now I myself am united to you, I who am life. I posted the cherubim to guard you as they would slaves; now I make the cherubim worship you as they would God.	Rise, let us leave this place. The enemy led you out of the earthly paradise. I will not restore you to that paradise, but I will enthrone you in heaven. I forbade you the tree that was only a symbol of life, but see, I who am life itself am now one with you. I appointed cherubim to guard you as slaves are guarded, but now I make them worship you as God.
The cherubim throne has been prepared, the bearers are ready and waiting, the bridal chamber is in order, the food is provided, the everlasting houses and rooms are in readiness; the treasures of good things have been opened; the kingdom of heaven has been prepared before the ages.	The throne formed by cherubim awaits you, its bearers swift and eager. The bridal chamber is adorned, the banquet is ready, the eternal dwelling places are prepared, the treasure houses of all good things lie open. The kingdom of heaven has been prepared for you from all eternity.

It is worse to be sexist than to be wrong

When a philosopher is accused of holding sexist views, they might respond by asking whether their view remains true, regardless of the accusation. This response, however, mixes up different kinds of norms. From a scientific standpoint, there may be many interesting questions about differences between men and women. Politically, though, it is worse to be sexist than to be wrong. Even if certain sexist views turn out to be true, a philosopher who publicly endorses them is thereby a bad citizen.

One might object that, since human beings are essentially rational animals, being a good person primarily means being a good philosopher rather than a good citizen. Even someone with a different conception of goodness may, after all, admit that, if someone is a good person but a bad citizen, the blame lies more with society than with the person. This view aligns with how we judge ancient Athens, which condemned Socrates for seeking truth: we typically say Athens was a bad society, not that Socrates was a bad man.

In reply to this objection, we should distinguish the idea of being a good philosopher in general from that of being a good philosopher in public. In general, a good philosopher actively seeks and accepts all truths. A good public philosopher, however, goes further by sharing those truths openly. Such openness can make someone a bad citizen if these truths harm political life. Yet being a good philosopher does not require announcing every conclusion to everyone. Inquiry requires public discussion, sure, but one can discuss how evidence supports a conclusion without going further and defending a conclusion absolutely.

Moreover, purely philosophical norms may not be enough to sustain even a community of philosophers, in the long run. Some limits on free expression might be necessary to protect the conditions needed for genuine inquiry. For instance, if openly sexist remarks become too frequent, they could lead society to impose barriers that hinder women from participating in discussions, thereby weakening the pursuit of truth. Likewise, a philosopher might present a valid argument but do so in bad faith. This does not make the argument’s conclusion itself untrue—rejecting it for that reason alone would commit the genetic fallacy—but bad faith still exposes the philosopher as a bad citizen. Like fraud, bad faith can destabilize a community, making it too dysfunctional for serious philosophical work.

Finally, we value truth because it makes the world intelligible, allowing rational beings to understand it. When a community descends into strife through the reckless proclamation of harmful truths, it becomes less intelligible, obstructing knowledge. Thus, if someone insists on publicly stating all their conclusions in a way that disrupts civic life, they may ultimately hinder rather than serve the pursuit of truth—and thereby become, in the objector’s own sense, a bad person after all.

A formal shorthand for categorical logic

I wanted a short, symbolic way to express categorical propositions (as in Aristotelian syllogistic), and I came up with the following.

English	Shorthand	Conventional notation
All S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\in P]$
All S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
All S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
All S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
All non-S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\in P]$
All non-S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
All non-S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
All non-S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Not all S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\in P]$
Not all S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
Not all S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
Not all S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Not all non-S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\in P]$
Not all non-S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
Not all non-S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
Not all non-S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Some S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\in P]$
Some S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Some non-S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\in P]$
Some non-S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some non-S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some non-S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$
No S is P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\in P]$
No S is non-P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
No S is not P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
No S is not non-P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$
No non-S is P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\in P]$
No non-S is non-P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
No non-S is not P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
No non-S is not non-P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$

It is possible to get shorter, as in $A\subseteq B$ for “All A is B”, but this hides the similarities between propositions that have the same subject, predicate, quantity, or quality. As to Fred Sommers’s “Term Functor Logic”, I found it confusing to use. The best that can be done with conventional notation is to use restricted quantifiers, as in $\mathrm{\exists }xSx:Px$ (“Some S is P”, with predicates instead of classes for extra brevity), but this repeats the useless “x” and doesn’t have an explicit copula, which is convenient for the parallel with how categorical logic is usually expressed in natural languages.

The Behaviorist Stoic Programme

This blog post has two parts. The first part, titled The Behaviorist Programme, argues that traditional psychological models invoking unobservable mental states—such as intentions, feelings, or motives—are inherently speculative and cannot be conclusively verified. Instead, it advocates for a behaviorist approach that defines emotions and other mental phenomena solely in terms of observable behaviors. By operationalizing terms like “anger” into measurable actions (e.g., yelling, clenching fists, or aggressive gestures), behaviorism eschews untestable internal attributions in favor of empirical data. Although everyday language uses mentalistic labels for convenience, this part contends that a scientifically rigorous study of behavior should rely strictly on what can be seen and measured, thereby eliminating the ambiguity created by multiple plausible psychological explanations.

The second part, titled Stoic Behaviorism, extends this empirical perspective into the realm of ethical theory by arguing that moral judgments should also be grounded in observable conduct rather than speculative internal states. It highlights the difficulty of attributing moral actions to hidden motives because actions deemed “right” might equally be explained by a rational desire to act morally or by unchecked emotions. However, when actions are morally deficient, the associated behaviors—such as a harsh tone or rash departure—can clearly be ascribed to destructive passions. This leads to an ethical stance reminiscent of Stoic thought, which views passions as inherently problematic. In short, the blog post concludes that while normative ethics ideally promotes rational conduct, a strict behaviorist methodology confirms that only behaviors linked to moral error can unambiguously be interpreted as being driven by emotion.

For my previous defense of behaviorism, see here. I already had much the same Stoic views even before I had developed any clearly behaviorist views, as seen here.