Explicit structure

“Explicit is better than implicit.”
— The Zen of Python

Some works are highly systematic, and they make their structure explicit. They may have intricately divided subheadings like Kant’s works, or they may try to emphatically set apart the definitions and axioms like Spinoza, or they may use an apparatus like medieval disputation or symbolic logic.

Other works leave that implicit. Hobbes’s Leviathan is rightly recognized as a highly understandable and systematic and rigorous work, even if it’s mistaken about things— but it’s relatively “low-tech”, with the running text apparently divided into chapters just to break up the reading and make lookups easier. The case is similar with Murray Rothbard’s ethics and economics, regardless of their other merits.

Implicit structure seems to make for more pleasant reading, but it can also make the structure harder to pick out. Some people may not notice that, besides his famous self-ownership, Rothbard introduces an entirely new fundamental axiom when he starts to talk about punishment and proportionality, since he doesn’t set it apart very emphatically.

It seems easier to simply dismiss an implicitly structured work, since there is no simple way to pick out the parts of its analysis that you reject or would want changed. If you disagree with Hobbes, then I guess you just disagree, and that’s that. If you reject a proposition of Spinoza, on the other hand, you can easily be called upon to criticize either the demonstration or the definitions and axioms which it explicitly evokes.

Sometimes, a lack of explicit structure can allow for a real lack of structure. Hume’s Treatise seems to have a lot of “filler” chapters, which I’m not sure why he even included them. It probably made sense at the time. Maybe.

I think that, in the end, explicit structure is simply better, it’s just not used more because it’s harder to accomplish. Some great work has been done with merely implicit structure, but it could benefit from more explicit formulation— as Spinoza did to Descartes, in his geometrical exposition of the Principles.

Damages

The payment of damages must be distinguished both from the restitution of stolen goods and from punishment. It is like the former in some ways and like the latter in others.

• Distinction as to definition
• Distinction as to source of moral obligation
• Distinction as to peacefulness and extent

Distinction as to definition

The restitution of stolen goods is the return of the specific objects that were stolen, without any attempt to compensate for the fact that they must have suffered wear and use and possibly have been damaged. The payment of damages is the attempt to compensate for all of these things; it includes use and wear, since these are damages done to the good in a broad sense.

Punishment is an act of direct or indirect interference upon a criminal’s body or property¹ with the intention to correct moral vices that he is thought to have. It may be materially the same with an act of restitution or payment of damages, but not formally the same, since it is only punishment insofar as it is understood through this definition. An act of punishment, insofar as it is neither restitution nor payment of damages, may be called “pure punishment”.

Distinction as to source of moral obligation

The moral obligation of a criminal to give restitution is the same as the criminal’s obligation to respect property rights. The moral obligation of a criminal to pay damages follows from a similar, but not identical, source. The moral obligation of a criminal to seek his own punishment follows from a significantly different reasoning.

The obligation of a human being to respect property rights follows from the fact that a legitimate owner of property must be expected to have purposes to fulfill with it, so that usage of the property without his consent must be interfering with his purposes, therefore creating an action conflict, which is violent and irrational.

The obligation of a criminal to pay damages follows from the fact that a legitimate owner of property must be expected to have had purposes to fulfill with it, so that, when his property was damaged, his ability to fulfill those purposes was to that extent permanently impeded. So, assuming his purposes to have been rational, it is irrational not to desire that he regain his power to fulfill them, since otherwise he must be understood to have desires that he cannot satisfy, which makes him less understandable as a rational being to that extent.

The moral obligation of a criminal to seek his own punishment follows to a certain extent from his obligation to be virtuous, supposing that there do exist punishments available which he knows to be efficacious for correcting his vices; additionally, goodwill for his community obliges him to seek the deterrence of further crimes in it, as his punishment might provide.

Distinction as to peacefulness and extent

Payment of damages, like punishment, may be exacted either coercively or uncoercively. Like punishment, it is also always uncertain as to what precise extent is proper. Coercive payment of damages, like coercive punishment, may only be exacted by a legitimate state.

Restitution of stolen goods, on the other hand, is always of a precise extent, which is the return of whatever currently remains of the good. Regardless of whether it is exacted voluntarily or involuntarily, its exaction does not constitute coercion, since the property rights have remained with the legitimate owner throughout.

While a state may exercise mercy and refuse to punish, a state may not exercise mercy on behalf of the victim by refusing to exact just damages. However, the state need not agree with the victim as to what extent of damages is just.

Notes

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1. In the beginning of the post on punishment, I only mentioned the criminal’s body. But the broad definition stated at that point was clearly including both direct and indirect interference, since I moved on to distinguish coercive from uncoercive punishments. This is because I believe interference with a person’s property, whether direct or indirect, to be a kind of indirect interference with their body.↩