Sorrow, as such

Thomas Aquinas wrote (S.T., I-II, 39, 1, c.):

A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man’s appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the repose of the appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil.

The text goes on to belabor the last point, so you might go read it if you don’t get it. Note that the original translated text said “response” instead of “repose”, which was almost certainly a misspelling, so I have corrected it (Latin: quies).

The problem is the first point. Sorrow is certainly good when had regarding an evil object, and certainly evil when had regarding a good object. Regarding moral good and evil, at least, we know that there is none in any of the passions in themselves; it all depends on whether they are in accordance with reason. So, regarding metaphysical evil, why does Thomas consider sorrow an evil “in itself”?

This is important because Thomas was in favor of the privation theory of evil, so he thought that evil is privation, that is, an absence of good. It is not something present; it is non-being rather than being; it is nothing. How could sorrow be like this? We all know it is something present, and besides, if it weren’t, it couldn’t be a good when had regarding a proper object.

Thomas explains that sorrow is evil “because the mere fact of a man’s appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the repose of the appetite in good”. This is a rather opaque sentence, and so it is easy to ignore it, and go on to believe that sorrow is itself a privation, which would be an error. Having thought about it, I have written an explanation of it, which should drive away this error.

Joy and sorrow

Consider joy. Joy is good when had regarding a good object, and evil when had regarding an evil object. In this respect, it is the opposite of sorrow.

But in this other respect it isn’t: some measure of joy is always appropriate, because there is always some good object present, while there is not always some evil to be regarded. The soul could always, at least, enjoy its possession of its own faculties; conversely, there is not always some evil at which its sorrowing would be appropriate.

Thomas’s point is probably that, since sorrow is able to drive away joy, it can drive away even the measure of joy which it is always appropriate for the soul to have. Since sorrow deprives us of this good, it is an evil.

Since the joy which sorrow drives away is something extrinsic to the sorrow itself – a different movement, with a different object –, sorrow is not itself a privation. It is, rather, at least when had regarding a proper object, a good which is incompatible with another good.

Why then did Thomas say that sorrow is evil when regarded in itself? Because this consideration is independent of the object of the sorrow. Sorrow, of its intrinsic nature, drives away joy, which joy is always naturally there in some measure. Regardless of whether sorrow is had at a proper or an improper object, it always deprives the soul of a good. So, while it is not intrinsically a privation, it is always privative of something extrinsic. It is evil rather consequentially than essentially; it is always evil-producing.

It may be doubted whether this is always really the case. I was discussing this with my friend Anton, and he thought that sorrow, “at least in a mentally strong person”, is compatible with the natural measure of joy. At any rate, the notion that sorrow is always consequentially evil is probably what Thomas meant.

Pleasure and pain

What was said above may apply analogously to pleasure and pain, considered as bodily analogues of joy and sorrow. I have two considerations to add regarding this application.

First, the opinion that sorrow is compatible with joy “in a mentally strong person” may be difficult to apply analogically to some cases of pleasure and pain, since it might be physically impossible, at least in some cases, for the body to feel both pleasure and pain in the same part.

Second, and more importantly, while the body is certainly also always in possession of itself, it is controversial whether it always feels pleasure in its natural state.

It seems that Speusippus thought that it does not, and pleasure would then only be a perceptible process toward the natural state. Plotinus seems to have said something similar when he defined pleasure as “the knowledge of a living being that the image of soul is again fitting itself back in the body.” (4.4.19)

While Aristotle did say something similar in the Rhetoric (1369b33–35), he argued against this opinion in the Nicomachean Ethics, (1152b25ff) where he thought that pleasure is either identified with the “unimpeded activity” of the natural state (Book 7), or supervenient upon this unimpeded activity (Book 10). See the linked paper by Robert Scott Stewart for an explanation of this difference.

Disregarding this last distinction, Aristotle’s opinion in the Nicomachean Ethics would seem to mean that there is a natural, baseline level of pleasure that the body feels when it enjoys the unimpeded use of its natural faculties, which would be most perfectly analogous to the previous considerations about joy in the soul. Pain would, then, similarly, be consequentially evil, insofar as it deprives us of this natural pleasure. But the other opinion, held by Speusippus, also seems possible.