Ancient Holy Saturday homily

It turns out that there are two versions in English of the following homily, whose author is unknown. I thought to make a comparison table, which is here.

Translation 1, from here	Translation 2, from here
What is happening? Today there is a great silence over the earth, a great silence, and stillness, a great silence because the King sleeps; the earth was in terror and was still, because God slept in the flesh and raised up those who were sleeping from the ages. God has died in the flesh, and the underworld has trembled.	Something strange is happening – there is a great silence on earth today, a great silence and stillness. The whole earth keeps silence because the King is asleep. The earth trembled and is still because God has fallen asleep in the flesh and he has raised up all who have slept ever since the world began. God has died in the flesh and hell trembles with fear.
Truly he goes to seek out our first parent like a lost sheep; he wishes to visit those who sit in darkness and in the shadow of death. He goes to free the prisoner Adam and his fellow-prisoner Eve from their pains, he who is God, and Adam’s son. The Lord goes in to them holding his victorious weapon, his cross. When Adam, the first created man, sees him, he strikes his breast in terror and calls out to all: “My Lord be with you all.” And Christ in reply says to Adam: “And with your spirit.” And grasping his hand he raises him up, saying:	He has gone to search for our first parent, as for a lost sheep. Greatly desiring to visit those who live in darkness and in the shadow of death, he has gone to free from sorrow the captives Adam and Eve, he who is both God and the son of Eve. The Lord approached them bearing the cross, the weapon that had won him the victory. At the sight of him, Adam, the first man he had created, struck his breast in terror and cried out to everyone: “My Lord be with you all.” Christ answered him: “And with your spirit.” He took him by the hand and raised him up, saying:
Awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light.	Awake, O sleeper, and rise from the dead, and Christ will give you light.
I am your God, who for your sake became your son, who for you and your descendants now speak and command with authority those in prison: Come forth, and those in darkness: Have light, and those who sleep: Rise.	I am your God, who for your sake have become your son. Out of love for you and for your descendants I now by my own authority command all who are held in bondage to come forth, all who are in darkness to be enlightened, all who are sleeping to arise.
I command you: Awake, sleeper, I have not made you to be held a prisoner in the underworld. Arise from the dead; I am the life of the dead. Arise, O man, work of my hands, arise, you who were fashioned in my image. Rise, let us go hence; for you in me and I in you, together we are one undivided person.	I order you, O sleeper, to awake. I did not create you to be held a prisoner in hell. Rise from the dead, for I am the life of the dead. Rise up, work of my hands, you who were created in my image. Rise, let us leave this place, for you are in me and I am in you; together we form only one person and we cannot be separated.
For you, I your God became your son; for you, I the Master took on your form; that of slave; for you, I who am above the heavens came on earth and under the earth; for you, man, I became as a man without help, free among the dead; for you, who left a garden, I was handed over to Jews from a garden and crucified in a garden.	For your sake I, your God, became your son; I, the Lord, took the form of a slave; I, whose home is above the heavens, descended to the earth and beneath the earth. For your sake, for the sake of man, I became like a man without help, free among the dead. For the sake of you, who left a garden, I was betrayed to the Jews in a garden, and I was crucified in a garden.
Look at the spittle on my face, which I received because of you, in order to restore you to that first divine inbreathing at creation. See the blows on my cheeks, which I accepted in order to refashion your distorted form to my own image. See the scourging of my back, which I accepted in order to disperse the load of your sins which was laid upon your back. See my hands nailed to the tree for a good purpose, for you, who stretched out your hand to the tree for an evil one.	See on my face the spittle I received in order to restore to you the life I once breathed into you. See there the marks of the blows I received in order to refashion your warped nature in my image. On my back see the marks of the scourging I endured to remove the burden of sin that weighs upon your back. See my hands, nailed firmly to a tree, for you who once wickedly stretched out your hand to a tree.
I slept on the cross and a sword pierced my side, for you, who slept in paradise and brought forth Eve from your side. My side healed the pain of your side; my sleep will release you from your sleep in Hades; my sword has checked the sword which was turned against you.	I slept on the cross and a sword pierced my side for you who slept in paradise and brought forth Eve from your side. My side has healed the pain in yours. My sleep will rouse you from your sleep in hell. The sword that pierced me has sheathed the sword that was turned against you.
But arise, let us go hence. The enemy brought you out of the land of paradise; I will reinstate you, no longer in paradise, but on the throne of heaven. I denied you the tree of life, which was a figure, but now I myself am united to you, I who am life. I posted the cherubim to guard you as they would slaves; now I make the cherubim worship you as they would God.	Rise, let us leave this place. The enemy led you out of the earthly paradise. I will not restore you to that paradise, but I will enthrone you in heaven. I forbade you the tree that was only a symbol of life, but see, I who am life itself am now one with you. I appointed cherubim to guard you as slaves are guarded, but now I make them worship you as God.
The cherubim throne has been prepared, the bearers are ready and waiting, the bridal chamber is in order, the food is provided, the everlasting houses and rooms are in readiness; the treasures of good things have been opened; the kingdom of heaven has been prepared before the ages.	The throne formed by cherubim awaits you, its bearers swift and eager. The bridal chamber is adorned, the banquet is ready, the eternal dwelling places are prepared, the treasure houses of all good things lie open. The kingdom of heaven has been prepared for you from all eternity.

It is worse to be sexist than to be wrong

When a philosopher is accused of holding sexist views, they might respond by asking whether their view remains true, regardless of the accusation. This response, however, mixes up different kinds of norms. From a scientific standpoint, there may be many interesting questions about differences between men and women. Politically, though, it is worse to be sexist than to be wrong. Even if certain sexist views turn out to be true, a philosopher who publicly endorses them is thereby a bad citizen.

One might object that, since human beings are essentially rational animals, being a good person primarily means being a good philosopher rather than a good citizen. Even someone with a different conception of goodness may, after all, admit that, if someone is a good person but a bad citizen, the blame lies more with society than with the person. This view aligns with how we judge ancient Athens, which condemned Socrates for seeking truth: we typically say Athens was a bad society, not that Socrates was a bad man.

In reply to this objection, we should distinguish the idea of being a good philosopher in general from that of being a good philosopher in public. In general, a good philosopher actively seeks and accepts all truths. A good public philosopher, however, goes further by sharing those truths openly. Such openness can make someone a bad citizen if these truths harm political life. Yet being a good philosopher does not require announcing every conclusion to everyone. Inquiry requires public discussion, sure, but one can discuss how evidence supports a conclusion without going further and defending a conclusion absolutely.

Moreover, purely philosophical norms may not be enough to sustain even a community of philosophers, in the long run. Some limits on free expression might be necessary to protect the conditions needed for genuine inquiry. For instance, if openly sexist remarks become too frequent, they could lead society to impose barriers that hinder women from participating in discussions, thereby weakening the pursuit of truth. Likewise, a philosopher might present a valid argument but do so in bad faith. This does not make the argument’s conclusion itself untrue—rejecting it for that reason alone would commit the genetic fallacy—but bad faith still exposes the philosopher as a bad citizen. Like fraud, bad faith can destabilize a community, making it too dysfunctional for serious philosophical work.

Finally, we value truth because it makes the world intelligible, allowing rational beings to understand it. When a community descends into strife through the reckless proclamation of harmful truths, it becomes less intelligible, obstructing knowledge. Thus, if someone insists on publicly stating all their conclusions in a way that disrupts civic life, they may ultimately hinder rather than serve the pursuit of truth—and thereby become, in the objector’s own sense, a bad person after all.

A formal shorthand for categorical logic

I wanted a short, symbolic way to express categorical propositions (as in Aristotelian syllogistic), and I came up with the following.

English	Shorthand	Conventional notation
All S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\in P]$
All S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
All S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
All S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
All non-S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\in P]$
All non-S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
All non-S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
All non-S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Not all S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\in P]$
Not all S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
Not all S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P]$
Not all S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\in S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Not all non-S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\in P]$
Not all non-S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
Not all non-S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P]$
Not all non-S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\forall ̸},\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\forall }x[x\notin S\to x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Some S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\in P]$
Some S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$
Some non-S is P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\in P]$
Some non-S is non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some non-S is not P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
Some non-S is not non-P	$⟨\mathrm{\exists },\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$
No S is P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\in P]$
No S is non-P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
No S is not P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P]$
No S is not non-P	$⟨\nexists ,S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\in S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$
No non-S is P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\in P]$
No non-S is non-P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\in ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
No non-S is not P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P]$
No non-S is not non-P	$⟨\nexists ,\mathrm{\neg }S,\notin ,\mathrm{\neg }P⟩$	$\mathrm{\neg }\mathrm{\exists }x[x\notin S\wedge x\notin P^{\complement }]$

It is possible to get shorter, as in $A\subseteq B$ for “All A is B”, but this hides the similarities between propositions that have the same subject, predicate, quantity, or quality. As to Fred Sommers’s “Term Functor Logic”, I found it confusing to use. The best that can be done with conventional notation is to use restricted quantifiers, as in $\mathrm{\exists }xSx:Px$ (“Some S is P”, with predicates instead of classes for extra brevity), but this repeats the useless “x” and doesn’t have an explicit copula, which is convenient for the parallel with how categorical logic is usually expressed in natural languages.

The Behaviorist Stoic Programme

This blog post has two parts. The first part, titled The Behaviorist Programme, argues that traditional psychological models invoking unobservable mental states—such as intentions, feelings, or motives—are inherently speculative and cannot be conclusively verified. Instead, it advocates for a behaviorist approach that defines emotions and other mental phenomena solely in terms of observable behaviors. By operationalizing terms like “anger” into measurable actions (e.g., yelling, clenching fists, or aggressive gestures), behaviorism eschews untestable internal attributions in favor of empirical data. Although everyday language uses mentalistic labels for convenience, this part contends that a scientifically rigorous study of behavior should rely strictly on what can be seen and measured, thereby eliminating the ambiguity created by multiple plausible psychological explanations.

The second part, titled Stoic Behaviorism, extends this empirical perspective into the realm of ethical theory by arguing that moral judgments should also be grounded in observable conduct rather than speculative internal states. It highlights the difficulty of attributing moral actions to hidden motives because actions deemed “right” might equally be explained by a rational desire to act morally or by unchecked emotions. However, when actions are morally deficient, the associated behaviors—such as a harsh tone or rash departure—can clearly be ascribed to destructive passions. This leads to an ethical stance reminiscent of Stoic thought, which views passions as inherently problematic. In short, the blog post concludes that while normative ethics ideally promotes rational conduct, a strict behaviorist methodology confirms that only behaviors linked to moral error can unambiguously be interpreted as being driven by emotion.

For my previous defense of behaviorism, see here. I already had much the same Stoic views even before I had developed any clearly behaviorist views, as seen here.

Red and blue pills

The top concern in the mind of a good person, at all times, is, “how much of a good person am I?” If a person has any concerns other than being a good person, which are not instrumental to their own being a good person, then that person is certainly not good, and is instead evil.

A problem is given us where each member of a population P must choose the item Blue or the item Red. In the event (call it a “Red win”) where more than 50% of the population P choose the item Red, then the ones choosing the item Blue will die; but, in the event (call it a “Blue win”) where more than 50% of the population P choose the item Blue, then no one dies. Either a Red win or a Blue win must happen; there is no third.

• Features of a Death Event
• Culpability of Blue-choosers
• Culpability of Red-choosers
• Final comparison of assumptions
• Appendix

Features of a Death Event

If there are any deaths, then, clearly those causing the deaths are culpable for this. The foremost concern of a good person is to be as little culpable as possible. An event where deaths happen is composed of two features:

• Red win (RW): The fact that a Red win occurs.
• Failure of Red Unanimity (FRU): The fact that not everyone chose Red. (If a Red win happens but everyone chooses Red, no one dies.)

In an event that does not have both of RW and FRU, no one dies, so no one is culpable for any outcomes, although they may be culpable for their own intentions. So we can leave those events aside. Who is culpable for the deaths?

Culpability of Blue-choosers

Clearly Blue-choosers are not culpable for RW, since they tried to prevent it. Red-choosers may, however, want to blame the Blue-choosers for the fact of FRU.

However, each Blue-chooser is only responsible for FRU to the extent that he added himself to the Blue-chooser pile. He did not contribute to any other additions to the Blue-chooser contingent, and he did not contribute to RW. Hence, each Blue-chooser is culpable at most for his own death, if for that. (At the time of first posting, I thought this argument was pretty unassailable, but shortly afterwards, a question was raised about it; see the appendix.) Some Blue-choosers may think that they are not culpable even for this, since they may find risking one’s own life to be a blameless act, or they may see themselves as attempting a heroic sacrifice and not intending a RW & FRU outcome. So it is possible that Blue-choosers are culpable for 0 deaths, and it is possible that they are culpable for 1 death, but no assumptions come to mind by which they could be culpable for any other number of deaths. So let us name these possible assumptions:

• Suicide Culpability (SC): In the event of RW & FRU, each Blue-chooser is culpable for 1 death, namely his own.
• Suicide Non-Culpability (SNC): In the event of RW & FRU, each Blue-chooser is culpable for 0 deaths.

Culpability of Red-choosers

Clearly Red-choosers are culpable for RW, although they are blameless for FRU. Since they are culpable for RW, and the event with RW & FRU is what caused all the deaths, it is plausible that they are each culpable for all deaths. Let us call this Damage-Proportional Culpability (DPC): if the number of Blue-choosers in a RW & FRU event is $B$, then each Red-chooser is culpable for $B$ deaths.

An alternative is that each Red-chooser is only partially culpable for the deaths, since all the other Red-choosers were necessary for RW. Let us call this Contribution-Proportional Culpability (CPC): if the number of Blue-choosers in a RW & FRU event is $B$, and the number of Red-choosers is $R$, then each Red-chooser is culpable only for $\frac{B}{R}$ deaths. Note that, in cases of murder conspiracies, no legal system on Earth accepts CPC, but someone may possibly think that a death event in this problem is different.

A third alternative is that, since Red-choosers are blameless for FRU, and FRU is just as necessary for a death event as RW, then Red-choosers are culpable for 0 deaths. Certainly all Red-choosers prefer this assumption, although it makes no sense at all. The idea, for them, is presumably that they could only be culpable for the deaths if their action were sufficient for the deaths, rather than merely necessary. So let us call this Sufficiency-Constrained Culpability (SCC): in a RW & FRU event, each Red-chooser is culpable for 0 deaths.

Final comparison of assumptions

The possible choices of assumptions are compared in the table below. The cells are shaded for which choice of item they advantage, assuming that it’s possible that $B>1$ in a death event, and that necessarily (due to the problem constraints) we have $\frac{B}{R}<1$ in a death event.

Culpability Type	SC (Blues culpable for 1 death)	SNC (Blues culpable for 0 deaths)
DPC (Reds culpable for $B$ deaths)	Blues culpable for 1 death; Reds culpable for $B$ deaths; Blue advantage	Blues culpable for 0 deaths; Reds culpable for $B$ deaths; Blue advantage
CPC (Reds culpable for $\frac{B}{R}$ deaths)	Blues culpable for 1 death; Reds culpable for $\frac{B}{R}$ deaths; Red advantage	Blues culpable for 0 deaths; Reds culpable for $\frac{B}{R}$ deaths; Blue advantage
SCC (Reds culpable for 0 deaths)	Blues culpable for 1 death; Reds culpable for 0 deaths; Red advantage	Blues culpable for 0 deaths; Reds culpable for 0 deaths; Red advantage

I personally accept DPC, although I’m not sure about SC versus SNC; so I think all Red-choosers are evil, whatever the Blue-choosers may be.

Appendix

Ming (@diamondminercat) pointed out a third possible assumption to me regarding Blue culpability, besides SC and SNC. This assumption, which I called Culpability for Others’ Altruism (COA), is that, in the event of RW & FRU, Blues are culpable for $B$ deaths, since all other Blues would have been at least partly motivated by their estimation of a high probability of FRU, a feature which is only possible due to the existence of Blues.

I do not accept COA because I believe Blues would have been motivated by the fact that they are good persons, and want to minimize their own culpability, regardless of the probability of a death event. But supposing someone accepts COA, it would be strange for that person to think that the Reds are not similarly culpable for the deaths that happen in a death event. So as far as I know, someone who accepts COA would think everyone in the population P is culpable for $B$ deaths, if any occur. This is still a Red advantage in the sense that Blues would have been risking their lives for no decrease in their own culpability. Due to my coherence concerns about interactions of COA with CPC or SCC, I have not added it to the table, although I thought it was worth considering here.

Culpability distribution

Suppose a symmetrical conspiracy in which, doing equal amounts of work with equal amounts of intent-to-kill, a group of $M$ murderers conspires to murder $V$ victims. Suppose someone claims that, since each of the murderers contributed only partially to the outcome (but each one contributed an equal share), then each murderer is guilty, not of $V$ counts of murder, but of $\frac{V}{M}$ murders. Let’s call this assumption Contribution-Proportional Culpability (CPC).¹

No legal system on Earth accepts Contribution-Proportional Culpability. (To see this, consider that if $M=V>1$, no legal system would charge each murderer with only 1 count of murder.) Instead, all legal systems accept Damage-Proportional Culpability (DPC): each of the $M$ murderers is culpable for $V$ counts of murder. We generally accept this “intuitively”—I certainly would blame each murderer for $V$ murders, without thinking about it. But it’s not obvious why we should accept DPC, rationally speaking—and in face of the argument that “each of the murderers contributed only partially to the outcome”, we may be led to doubt. So what’s the reasoning for DPC?

My current conjecture is that we reason like this: We may grant that each murderer is culpable for $\frac{V}{M}$ deaths, but the relevant unit of culpability is not “deaths”, but “murders”, or what one may call “culpabilities-for-deaths”. Since each member is necessary to the conspiracy, each murderer is causing all the other murderers to become murderers, and therefore, each murderer is culpable for the crime of all the other murderers as well as for his own. Hence, each murderer is culpable for $\frac{V}{M}\times M=V$ murders, as required by DPC.

This reasoning, however, may allow for CPC to be followed in a case where $M>1$ murderers are all necessary for a murder to occur, and each one contributes to the murder with intent to kill, but none of them are aware that there are any other contributors. Whether it can do so in practice, is left as an exercise to the reader.

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1. In a post to X, I referred to CPC as “Blame-Sharing”. I avoided this name in this post because the only name for the alternative would be “non-Blame-Sharing”, which isn’t very descriptive since there could be other possible assumptions about blame distribution than the two considered here.↩

How to undermine scientific authority

Benjamin Wiker is a conservative with many very particular gripes about how the Enlightenment ruined everything for civilization; in his book on the Reformation, he tells this story of how Benedict Spinoza, the famous rationalist philosopher who was also one of the pioneers of biblical philology, wanted to undermine religion:

To make sure that Scripture cannot be revived and used with the irrational, impassioned Christian multitude, Catholic or Protestant, Spinoza set forth as one of the additional tasks of the new scientific exegete, the maximizing of confusion about the real meaning of the text, by ferreting out all the possible ambiguities inherent in the original languages, and by displaying prominently all the variations that occur in the multiple manuscripts discovered since the Renaissance—and, of course, publishing the results. It’s hard for the Bible to have authority if we can’t figure out what it actually said originally. Better just to mind your own business, and embrace tolerance.

The very scholarly apparatus that both Catholics and Protestants believed would take them closer to the revealed truth, and bring about ever more accurate translations of God’s Holy Word, thereby became the vehicle Spinoza and his followers used to sow confusion and doubt, leading to the secularization of the West.

Wiker doesn’t give references to support the idea that Spinoza had this goal, but it’s an interesting thought that I have remembered even though I basically forgot the rest of the book. Undermining biblical authority by the proliferation of textual variants is something that doesn’t do any harm to the Catholic Church, which has the Pope who can simply decide for everyone else what “the Bible says” on an issue, but it does do damage to Protestantism, which has always relied on (the ridiculous idea of) there being some objective science that can determine “what the Bible says” in such a way that experts can reach consensus.

It also does work against anything else that is taken as authoritative, and for which there is no Pope. If you don’t want natural science, say, to be an authority in society, you don’t have to directly make people lose respect for its process, you just have to multiply and amplify the minority viewpoints within it, especially the ones that have gotten a foothold in academia already. The frequency of agreement between experts is a major reason why people want to trust science, but it is a contingent feature of it, and efforts to undermine it can be successful.

If you hate a certain discipline, study more variants of it than its practitioners do.