Aspiration summary

This is a summary of the book Aspiration, by Agnes Callard. It divides the book into numbered claims, where the major numbers come from the chapter numbers and the minor numbers are my own. As a result, since the book has six numbered chapters, the numbers headed with 0 come from the unnumbered introduction section, and the numbers headed with 7 come from the unnumbered conclusion section. Each claim is given commentary derived from the book, but written more concisely than the book puts it.

I made this largely because I found the book difficult to read, and found that this was mostly because it was insufficiently divided into subsections, and within each subsection, each paragraph was very large, often having more than 200 words.

I am happy to note that Agnes herself appreciated this summary!

Contents

• Introduction
  • 0. Aspiration is the form of agency directed at the acquisition of values. It is different from ambition, which is the pursuit of external rewards like money or social status, rather than seeking to acquire new values.
    • 0.1. Alcibiades, from Plato’s Symposium, shows us how the process of aspiration works, and how conflicting it can be.
    • 0.2. Alcibiades’ trouble understanding his new values may give us doubts about the theory of aspiration, but rather than give in to those doubts, we should revise our other philosophical theories.
    • 0.3. Alcibiades’ failure to commit to his new values shows us how the theory of aspiration can be applied even to complicated situations, and gives us a new kind of responsibility for our character.
    • 0.4. To acquire new values is to become a new kind of person.
• Rationality
  • 1. Aspiration is a unique kind of rational agency, and requires a unique theoretical approach; it cannot be understood in terms of decision theory.
    • 1.1. Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s 2006 paper, “Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting,” and Laurie Paul’s 2014 book, “Transformative Experience”, show us that decision theory cannot help us rationally navigate situations where we change our values.
    • 1.2. An appeal to second-order preferences cannot rescue a decision-theoretic approach to the problem.
    • 1.3. Besides Ullmann-Margalit and Paul, an independent analysis of decision theory shows it to be inadequate to understand self-transformation.
    • 1.4. Since aspiration should not be understood as a single decision, such climactic decisions as to propose, board a boat, etc, should be seen as merely one part of a broader self-transformation process.
  • 2. “Proleptic reasons” are practical reasons unique to aspirants. These reasons are directed at generating wants, rather than satisfying them.
    • 2.1. Proleptic reasons are characterized by their provisional nature, reflecting the agent’s limited knowledge and development.
    • 2.2. We must believe in proleptic reasons because other kinds of reasons are insufficient, by themselves, to give an account of large-scale self-transformative pursuits, which involve substantial changes in one’s values and require years of sustained effort, as rational exercises of human agency.
• Moral Psychology
  • 3. A specific form of psychological conflict called “intrinsic conflict” is unique to aspiration. Aspirants feel torn between their current values and the values they aim to acquire, which makes coming to love or appreciate something difficult.
    • 3.1. Intrinsic conflicts happen when an agent’s desires directly oppose one another. They may be contrasted with extrinsic conflicts, where an agent’s desires pull her toward incompatible actions, but do not directly oppose one another.
    • 3.2. Valuing cannot be simply identified with believing or desiring. Instead, it is a hybrid process with four components: cognitive, affective, motivational, and self-monitoring.
    • 3.3. The “bitter wife”, invented by Harry Frankfurt, illustrates how intrinsic conflict involves experiencing two values at the same time.
    • 3.4. Intrinsic conflicts cannot be resolved by deliberation, and unlike dilemmas, they are not even available to deliberation.
    • 3.5. McDowell, Williams, and Sobel have told us about intrinsic conflicts, but have not told us how to resolve them.
    • 3.6. Frankfurt has told us how to solve intrinsic conflicts, but his idea is not good.
    • 3.7. Intrinsic conflicts are actually resolved by a lengthy, gradual aspirational process.
  • 4. Akrasia is an instance of intrinsic conflict. Akrasia results from the imperfect grasp of values and the need to make decisions based on our current understanding.
    • 4.1. Akrasia should not be understood through the Davidsonian inclusivist theory.
    • 4.2. Akratic actions should be understood, in the context of aspiration, as actions moved by an aspirant’s subordinate evaluative perspective.
    • 4.3. Akratic actions are free.
    • 4.4. The intrinsic conflict analysis covers all real cases of akrasia.
    • 4.5. Akrasia, understood as intrinsic conflict, can happen in three ways, according to how much of the subordinate evaluative perspective ought to be retained.
    • 4.6. Aspirants, insofar as they act as such, aim to resolve their intrinsic conflicts. This distinguishes them from akratic persons, as well as from “enkratic” persons, who act correctly but also do not try to resolve their conflicts.
• Responsibility
  • 5. Aspiration must be framed as a process in which we are guided by the values of the self which we aspire to be, rather than our current values. This framing avoids a dilemma where, as Abbé Sieyès might have put it, “if the new values agree with the old, the change is superfluous; if they disagree, the change cannot come from our rational agency.”
    • 5.1. A process of “self-endorsement” cannot lead to a change of values.
    • 5.2. Self-change cannot be understood by “self-cultivation” theories, because those theories are subject to Strawson’s dilemma, where the new values must be either continuous with the old values (and therefore there is no significant change) or discontinuous with them (and therefore the change is not agential).
    • 5.3. The difference between aspiration and self-cultivation may be illustrated by a parallel with the metaphor of Neurath’s boat, and by contrast with Hampton’s example of an investment banker who decides to become a clown.
    • 5.4. Aspiration must be framed as a process in which we are guided by the values of the self which we aspire to be, rather than our current values.
    • 5.5. Adopting an approach where the aspirant is guided by the target value, rather than the future self, would not make a theoretical difference.
    • 5.6. Davidson’s and Anscombe’s theories do not allow us to understand aspiration as a form of rational agency.
    • 5.7. We may revise theories of rational agency to include aspirational agency by acknowledging the possibility of proleptic rationality.
  • 6. Individuals are praiseworthy for the good valuational condition they attain through aspiration, while they are blameworthy for the culpable failure to aspire to a better condition.
    • 6.1. Aspiration is different from Talbot Brewer’s concept of “dialectical activity”.
    • 6.2. Aspiration is different from ambition. The former attempts to change poorly-understood values, while the latter attempts to change well-understood material conditions.
    • 6.3. Individuals are praiseworthy for the good valuational condition they attain through aspiration, while they are blameworthy for the culpable failure to aspire to a better condition.
    • 6.4. There is no such thing as aspiring to be evil.
• Conclusion
  • 7. The theory of aspiration helps us understand situations of motherhood and infertility, for example, better than other theories that have so far been invented.
    • 7.1. Aspiration provides a good explanation of cases of aspiring parents.
    • 7.2. Callous attitudes towards infertile people often come from a failure to recognize proleptic reasons.
    • 7.3. Proleptic rationality allows an understanding of the desire for parenthood as rational.

Introduction

0. Aspiration is the form of agency directed at the acquisition of values. It is different from ambition, which is the pursuit of external rewards like money or social status, rather than seeking to acquire new values.

0.1. Alcibiades, from Plato’s Symposium, shows us how the process of aspiration works, and how conflicting it can be.

Alcibiades, from Plato’s Symposium, is an example of aspiration. Alcibiades, a young and influential Athenian, is torn between his conventional values of honor and power and the Socratic values of wisdom and self-improvement. He finds himself experiencing both perspectives, but cannot fully embrace either, due to their conflicting nature.

Alcibiades’ struggle is an example of aspiration because he is actively trying to acquire the Socratic values, even though he still clings to his traditional values. This shows how the aspirational process involves a person being in the middle of an exclusive dichotomy, that is, between their old values, and the new values that they are trying to acquire. Aspiration requires one to navigate this space, gradually seeing new reasons, values, and points of view as they develop and grow.

Aspiration, thus, is not a simple and straightforward process, but rather a challenging and often uncomfortable journey. It is a complex and nuanced process, situated between our existing values and beliefs, which we must confront, and the new ones which we must pursue.

0.2. Alcibiades’ trouble understanding his new values may give us doubts about the theory of aspiration, but rather than give in to those doubts, we should revise our other philosophical theories.

A rational agent typically acts for the sake of some envisioned end, but aspirants like Alcibiades have trouble doing so because they don’t fully understand the value they’re pursuing. This makes it difficult for them to engage in activities characteristic of practical rationality, such as comparing values or figuring out the best means to achieve a goal.

This difficulty should not lead us to doubt that they are really seeking to acquire new, different values. Aspiration should not be seen as “secondary desire-acquisition” – a form of self-cultivation, where desires are acquired through reasoning based on existing desires. Nor should this difficulty lead us to doubt that the process is a kind of practical rationality at all, and see it as a kind of non-agential transformation, where desires and values are acquired through external influences or innate factors.

Rather, as will be argued in the next part, aspiration is a distinctive form of rationality that pertains to the genesis of desire, which involves reasoning toward desire rather than from it. Aspirants like Alcibiades are not merely trying to manage their existing desires but are instead attempting to acquire new ones by recognizing the value of something they don’t fully understand yet.

0.3. Alcibiades’ failure to commit to his new values shows us how the theory of aspiration can be applied even to complicated situations, and gives us a new kind of responsibility for our character.

Alcibiades is not a model aspirant, but rather an example of irrational aspiration. Alcibiades is heavily dependent on Socrates for his aspirations, but when Socrates is not present, he actively opposes them. Alcibiades’ irrational behavior is highlighted through his attempts to both pursue and resist the values he aspires to have.

Socrates responds to Alcibiades’ speech by accusing him of trying not to love Socrates. “Loving Socrates” is synonymous with striving for virtue and wisdom, and Alcibiades’ unwillingness to seek the value he aspires to have makes his aspiration irrational. His aspiration is discontinuous, incoherent, and ultimately fruitless. His failure to fully commit to his aspirations and his eventual downfall serve as a cautionary tale, and reveal that the distinction between rationality and irrationality can be applied even in complicated situations.

The concept of aspiration highlights the importance of individuals taking responsibility for their own aspirations and moral development. Socrates could not make Alcibiades virtuous, since virtue cannot be taught. The aspirant, rather than their parents, teachers, or mentors, must take responsibility for the kind of person they become. The theorist of aspiration can thus argue that individuals are morally responsible for themselves and their development, as they must actively engage in the work of appreciating and pursuing the values they aspire to have.

0.4. To acquire new values is to become a new kind of person.

Values are essential in defining a person’s character, and when someone changes their values, they make profound changes to themselves. As people acquire new values, they become different persons in an ethical sense (putting aside any metaphysical sense that the term may have). This is evident in our everyday speech when we say, “I’m not that person anymore,” or when we promise to change our behavior and the values underlying it.

Values are “a nexus of [a] person’s various agential functions”, which means that when we know a person’s values, we know what objects in the world they care about. Aspiration is associated with the self, as it is the process of acquiring new values that eventually redefine the person’s character.

Aspirants are engaged in a kind of self-making or self-shaping. While the object of aspiration may be the valuable object itself (e.g., helping people as a doctor), the process of aspiration inevitably involves the aspirant learning and changing their values, leading to a change in who they are. This change in values is part of the aspirational process and shapes the person’s ethical identity.

Rationality

1. Aspiration is a unique kind of rational agency, and requires a unique theoretical approach; it cannot be understood in terms of decision theory.

1.1. Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s 2006 paper, “Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting,” and Laurie Paul’s 2014 book, “Transformative Experience”, show us that decision theory cannot help us rationally navigate situations where we change our values.

According to Ullmann-Margalit, big decisions, such as attending college or having children, involve transformative experiences that can result in a shift of core beliefs and desires, making it difficult to assess the rationality of the decision. These transformative experiences can lead to discontinuous personalities with different rationality bases, and assessing the rationality of such decisions requires adopting either the value perspective of the “Old Person” (prior to the decision) or the “New Person” (after the decision). Since the decision-making process is complicated by the lack of a single, stable set of preferences that could inform the decision, the traditional tools of decision theory may not be sufficient to guide an individual in making rational choices.

Using the example of becoming a vampire, Laurie Paul demonstrates that one cannot make an informed choice in the traditional way, as they cannot know what it is like to be a vampire until after they have undergone the transformation. Paul argues that, in transformative experiences, individuals cannot rely solely on empirical data or impersonal reasoning to make decisions about their personal goals, hopes, projects, and dreams. Instead, they must consult their own personal preferences and consider what their future lives will be like as part of assigning values to outcomes. However, in cases of big decisions or aspiration, it is difficult to answer these questions because of the significant change in preferences and values that may result from the transformative experience.

The puzzles raised by Paul and Ullmann-Margalit do not apply to all life-changing decisions, and not even to all life-changing decisions that involve self-change. For instance, they do not apply to what we may call “self-cultivation” cases, where the current values and interests of the agents straightforwardly allow them to appreciate and value the person they are making themselves into. Examples of self-cultivation include joining a gym to develop an inclination for exercise, taking a speed-reading class to develop an inclination for reading, or entering psychotherapy to develop a less anxiety-grounded preference-structure. In these instances, the change in preferences is foreseen and approved by the individual – the question arises, rather, about “self-transformation” cases, where the new preferences threaten, rather than support, one’s basic antecedent preference-structure. How can someone ground their preference-changing decision in such self-transformation cases?

1.2. An appeal to second-order preferences cannot rescue a decision-theoretic approach to the problem.

Laurie Paul attempted to rescue a decision-theoretic approach by suggesting that the mere knowledge that the value-experience in question will be new can form the basis for a rational transformative choice. She proposed that decisions can be grounded on whether someone wants things to change or stay the same. However, there are several problems with her approach.

First, it only applies to a subset of big decisions (opting yes, no) and does not offer guidance in cases where both options are transformative (opting A, B). (Paul acknowledges this limitation, suggesting that in some cases, people may be unable to choose rationally.) Second, it is doubtful whether the opting (yes, no) cases offer the prospect of stasis, as even deciding against change can be transformative; the stasis Paul’s approach seeks might not be available to subjects of big decisions. Third, it is questionable whether people should apply the second-order preference solution even if they could – Paul’s solution is one-size-fits-all, and cannot rationally differentiate between different transformative experiences. People usually seek transformation because they want the new set of preferences, not merely for the sake of change.

As a result of the failure of this theory, we are left in the same position as with Ullmann-Margalit’s critique, i.e., believing that decision theory cannot help with analyzing decisions involving significant value changes; which is why we should use aspiration theory instead.

1.3. Besides Ullmann-Margalit and Paul, an independent analysis of decision theory shows it to be inadequate to understand self-transformation.

The decision model divides agency into three stages: (1) deliberation and investigation from a detached perspective, (2) decision or commitment, and (3) enacting the transformation. This model separates between the rational activity of coming to value being in the transformed condition (stage 1) and the rational activity of coming to be in it (stage 3); as a result, it exaggerates the ignorance of the agent in stage 1 and their passivity in stage 3, making the transformation as a whole difficult to understand.

The transformative process must already be underway for the transformative options to have an impact on us – the agent evaluating the options does not stand fully outside of what she evaluates. The process of becoming a mother, for example, is not adequately captured by the decision model. Instead, we should think of aspiration as a slow, continuous process, in which the person’s agency is manifested through gradual changes in preference, rather than a single decision. “Unlike becoming a vampire, becoming a parent is neither something that just happens to you nor something you decide to have happen to you. It is something you do. And it is not something you can do in a moment: we spend a long time becoming mothers and fathers.”

1.4. Since aspiration should not be understood as a single decision, such climactic decisions as to propose, board a boat, etc, should be seen as merely one part of a broader self-transformation process.

The big decisions that we agonize over, such as “whether or not to board the boat, throw away the birth control pills, accept an admissions offer to grad school, or propose marriage”, are not what cause transformative change, and are rather “best understood as climactic moments embedded in a longer transformative journey, marking neither its beginning nor its end.”

They do not mark its beginning because, before the person has any agential control over their relationship to the values to which they’ll aspire, the aspirational process is initiated through exposure to the value of different activities via family, friends, teachers, and other influences, which happens before the aspirant consciously decides to engage, possibly even while she is too young to do so.

They do not mark its end because they do not instantly change a person’s values, preferences, or beliefs. Instead, the decision to commit to an aspiration often leads to the question of whether to pursue it resurfacing over time. Transformative decisions can be reversed, albeit at increasing costs as one progresses through the transformative process.

In such a climactic choice, one must decide whether the sacrifices associated with pursuing an aspiration are worthwhile before fully understanding the value of the aspiration itself. The aspirant must base their decision on both their current preferences and those they seek to acquire, which requires a type of rationality called “proleptic”, which is covered in the next chapter.

We should accept this as a kind of rationality because it will allow us to better understand and respect the emotions and experiences of those undergoing transformative processes. If we deny that self-transformation can be rational, this may lead to a lack of empathy and respect for those who face challenges in their aspirational journeys, such as those who learn they cannot become mothers and have reason to grieve.

2. “Proleptic reasons” are practical reasons unique to aspirants. These reasons are directed at generating wants, rather than satisfying them.

2.1. Proleptic reasons are characterized by their provisional nature, reflecting the agent’s limited knowledge and development.

Take the case of a music appreciation class, where the teacher is frustrated with students who join the class for the wrong reasons. The teacher believes that students should appreciate music for its intrinsic value, but this poses a paradox: those who already appreciate music for its intrinsic value don’t need the class, and those who join the class for extra-musical reasons (e.g., for a good grade) are considered “bad students” by the teacher.

This is solved if we believe that there is a third type of student, the “good student,” who combines extra-musical and intra-musical reasoning. This student is genuinely oriented towards the intrinsic value of music but uses extra-musical reasons (e.g., grades, rewards) to motivate themselves to engage with music. The good student acknowledges that these reasons are imperfect, but they are essential for their growth and progress.

Proleptic reasons allow people to act rationally even when their reasons aren’t exactly the right ones. For example, the good music appreciation student listens to the symphony both because of the intrinsic value of music and because they want a good grade. The reason that motivates them has two faces: a proximate face that appeals to their current self and a distal face that reflects the person they are trying to become.

The concept of proleptic reasons is crucial in understanding the process of value acquisition and moral psychology. It challenges the currently dominant moral psychological thesis that practical reasons depend on desires, arguing that the existence of proleptic reasons cannot be accommodated by such “internalism.” Instead, proleptic reasons allow individuals to be rational even when they know their reasons aren’t precisely the right ones, thus enabling the process of personal growth and value acquisition. They are most generally characterized as follows:

A proleptic reason is an acknowledgedly immature variant of a standard reason. A proleptic reasoner is moved to φ by some consideration that, taken by itself, would (in her view) provide an inadequate reason for φ-ing. But she is not moved by that consideration taken by itself; rather, she is moved by that consideration (be it competitive, testimonial, approximating, etc.) as a stand-in for another one. The proleptic reasoner uses the only valuational resources she has at her disposal, namely her current desires, attachments, etc., both to mark the inadequacy of those very resources and to move herself toward a better valuational condition.

2.2. We must believe in proleptic reasons because other kinds of reasons are insufficient, by themselves, to give an account of large-scale self-transformative pursuits, which involve substantial changes in one’s values and require years of sustained effort, as rational exercises of human agency.

That is, unless they are combined with proleptic reasons, so that instead of vague reasons we have “proleptically vague” reasons, instead of self-management reasons we have “proleptically self-management” reasons, and so on. This may be seen by reviewing some candidates of reasons that could possibly justify large-scale self-transformative pursuits, and showing that they could not do so by themselves.

Vague Reasons: vague reasons might explain how an aspirant has a general idea of the value they want to pursue, but are insufficient to motivate them to put in the required effort for large-scale transformative pursuits. Proleptically vague reasons, however, address this issue by incorporating the aspirant’s awareness of the need to sharpen their understanding of the value they are pursuing.

Self-management Reasons: Such strategies to motivate oneself to perform a desired action or behavior can be divided into two categories: those directed at behavior on specific occasions and those directed at long-term value changes. Proleptically self-management reasons belong to the second category, as they aim to change the agent’s values and dispositions over time through aspirational practice.

Testimonial Reasons: While mentors and role models often play a role in transformative pursuits, the aspirant’s goal is to independently see the value for themselves. Testimonial reasons in aspiration are unique because they anticipate the mentor’s influence fading over time.

Reasons of Competition: There are two kinds of competitiveness. The first is characterized by the desire to showcase existing excellence, while the second is proleptic competitiveness, where one competes in order to become excellent without a clear understanding of the value they’re seeking.

Reasons of Pretense: Pretending to satisfy ideals can sometimes lead to personal change. However, in aspirational cases, the failure to shed the pretense is connected to the fact that it is not mere pretense. Aspirants are not pretending to already be something but rather trying to see the world as they believe it should be seen.

Second-Order Reasons: These reasons are based on second-order desires, i.e., desires to desire something. They come in two kinds. One kind is where the second-order desire is limited by a first-order desire that fuels it, such as if someone only wants to desire to listen to music to get a good grade in a class, or to appear cultured – this kind cannot motivate large-scale transformative pursuits. The other kind is where the second-order reason is not so limited, as in desiring to desire music for its own sake – this kind is proleptic, as the person doesn’t fully understand the value they’re seeking.

Approximating Reasons: The idea of “approximating reasons” suggests that the value under which the pursuit is conducted is close or identical to the value of the end. These reasons involve a gradual shift in value, like a spectrum of colors, where one might not be able to tell where one color ends and the other begins. However, this approach fails to provide sufficient reasons for transformative pursuits in two ways:

First, if the shift in value is subtle, it results in a series of rationally disconnected activities, like the “go for the exercise, stay for the movie” scenario. While it may be difficult to pinpoint the exact transition between values, it doesn’t mean there is no difference between them. Therefore, this series of disconnected activities doesn’t provide a coherent rationale for pursuing a transformative goal.

Second, if the shift represents a progressive clarification of value, where the agent senses a target value being approximated (like an image gradually coming into focus), this is actually an example of a proleptic reason. A proleptic reason is an immature variant of a standard reason, where the agent is moved by a consideration (such as competitive, testimonial, or approximating) as a stand-in for another one.

So, approximating reasons alone don’t provide a unified rationale for transformative pursuits. Proleptic reasons are necessary to rationalize these pursuits, as they allow the agent to use their current values, desires, and attachments as stand-ins for the ultimate goal, thus driving the transformative process.

Moral Psychology

3. A specific form of psychological conflict called “intrinsic conflict” is unique to aspiration. Aspirants feel torn between their current values and the values they aim to acquire, which makes coming to love or appreciate something difficult.

3.1. Intrinsic conflicts happen when an agent’s desires directly oppose one another. They may be contrasted with extrinsic conflicts, where an agent’s desires pull her toward incompatible actions, but do not directly oppose one another.

In what I will call an “extrinsic” conflict of desire, an agent’s desires pull her toward incompatible actions. Such an agent’s problem is that, as a matter of contingent fact, nothing she does will get her everything she wants. There is, however, another kind of desire-conflict, in which the agent’s desires pull directly against one other. For instance, generously hoping for someone’s happiness gets in the way of resentfully wishing to see him suffer. In a loving but spiteful moment, I might be torn between those desires.

Intrinsic conflicts occur at the level of value and involve the agent’s evaluative point of view. In order to fully comprehend the appeal of one desire, the agent must step out of the point of view that makes the other desire attractive. This might be difficult to understand, so we have to explain how valuing works.

3.2. Valuing cannot be simply identified with believing or desiring. Instead, it is a hybrid process with four components: cognitive, affective, motivational, and self-monitoring.

Valuing has a cognitive component because it involves evaluating something as good or worth caring about.

Valuing has an affective component because it entails having an emotional connection to the valued object and being vulnerable to forces that threaten it or threaten to separate you from it.

Valuing has a motivational component because it includes being motivationally engaged with the object, responding to it in ways that protect, preserve, and engage with it.

Finally, valuing has a self-monitoring component because it requires reacting to one’s own responses to the valued object, experiencing them as merited or appropriate.

3.3. The “bitter wife”, invented by Harry Frankfurt, illustrates how intrinsic conflict involves experiencing two values at the same time.

The “bitter wife” goes as follows:

A woman wants to mail her husband’s letter, as a favor to him. But they have a complicated relationship. She loves him, and she knows it will make him a lot happier if the letter is mailed—unmailed letters are one of his pet peeves. But she is also intensely bitter and angry at him for his many small cruelties toward her, his intense irritability (so many pet peeves!), his lack of romantic initiative. Next to the mailbox she sees a garbage can, and it occurs to her to spitefully throw his letter in the garbage instead of mailing it. Suppose that, in the end, love prevails over spite, and she reaches for the handle of the mailbox—but finds it locked. Frankfurt notes, “This would not naturally lead h[er] to see if [s]he could salvage the satisfaction of h[er] other desire . . . the alternative of injuring [her husband] is not second to the person’s first choice of [doing him a favor]” (Identification and Externality, 1976, p. 249).

Intrinsic conflict occurs when two attitudes are part of a larger unit in the agent’s psychology (a value), and that larger unit calls for the agent to regard the other attitude as inappropriate. The wife is an example of this, because she values her relationship with her husband but also experiences spite and hostility towards him. This creates an intrinsic conflict because her desires directly oppose one another, each of them is part of a value that calls for her to regard the other attitude as inappropriate.

Intrinsic conflict divides the agent’s evaluative point of view against itself, making it difficult for them to reconcile the conflicting desires. The presence of one value can affect the quality of the other, leading to a mixed state where both evaluative perspectives exist within the person to varying degrees. Since we can have each value in some degree, we can experience both values at the same time. For example, the wife’s love for her husband might be affected by her spiteful feelings, making it a love that fights against hate. Similarly, her spite might be influenced by her love for him, which could lead to a sense of guilt or hesitation.

This has parallels with cases of divided attention. In these situations, people may attempt to silence one desire while amplifying the other. The wife might try to focus on the love she feels for her husband by thinking about positive moments and avoiding reminders of negative experiences, while at other times she may engage in activities that encourage her spite.

3.4. Intrinsic conflicts cannot be resolved by deliberation, and unlike dilemmas, they are not even available to deliberation.

Deliberation involves comparing the anticipated value of one option with that of another. However, in intrinsic conflicts, this comparison is not possible because accepting the deliberative relevance of one option entails denying that of the other. This creates deliberative irresolvability. Intrinsic conflicts are thus deliberatively unavailable, meaning that one cannot step back far enough from them to even get the deliberative question in view.

Intrinsic conflicts are different from dilemmas, which involve being able to see both options as valuable but being unable to choose between them – such as having to choose between two beloved children, or between one’s country and one’s family. Intrinsic conflicts “are characterized by an inability to see both values at once”, while dilemmas involve “an inability to do anything but see both values at once”. In dilemmas, “the problem lies in figuring out which is more valuable. If there is value-incommensurability, this question might be unanswerable; but that is not the same thing as saying that the question cannot be asked.”

3.5. McDowell, Williams, and Sobel have told us about intrinsic conflicts, but have not told us how to resolve them.

John McDowell, Bernard Williams, and David Sobel have explored the idea of intrinsic conflict in their criticisms of Aristotelian, Kantian, and consequentialist theories respectively.

McDowell, in his essay “Virtue and Reason” from the book Mind, Value, and Reality (1979; 1998), argues that a virtuous person does not weigh reasons for and against acting well or badly. Instead, the virtuous person simply does not see the reasons to act badly as relevant or pressing. This highlights a potential intrinsic conflict between the perspectives of the virtuous and non-virtuous person.

Williams, in his essay “Persons, Character and Morality” from the book Moral Luck (1976; 1981), discusses the conflict between partial and impartial values, using the example of a husband deciding who to save from drowning. He argues that the natural response would be for the husband to prioritize his wife, but Kantian ethics would require considering the value of everyone involved. Williams believes that love, in some cases, intrinsically conflicts with Kantian morality.

Sobel, in his article “Full Information Accounts of Well-Being” for the journal Ethics (1994), critiques consequentialism by arguing that it is impossible for an agent to be fully informed about all possible values and points of view, as some of these perspectives are intrinsically conflicting. Thus, the idea of an ideally informed agent is a “chimera.”

None of these philosophers denies the possibility of psychologically real intrinsic conflicts, but they do not discuss how such conflicts might be resolved.

3.6. Frankfurt has told us how to solve intrinsic conflicts, but his idea is not good.

According to Harry Frankfurt’s essay “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in his book The Importance of What We Care About (1988), an intrinsically conflicted agent “decides” to cut off one of the two desires, “identifies” with the other, and thus “constitutes himself” as wholehearted. After this decision, the person no longer holds himself apart from the desire he has committed to and ceases to be uncertain about what he really wants.

This suggestion fails to resolve intrinsic conflicts effectively. Intrinsic conflicts are characteristically asymmetrical, and the agent cannot step back and get both options in view. Agents who are intrinsically conflicted are not uncertain about which side of the conflict they are on. Instead, they actively try to silence one demand and accentuate the other, favoring either one side or the other.

Frankfurt’s method of identification may not eliminate the conflict or even reduce its severity. Identification does not necessarily resolve the agent’s feeling of conflictedness or insulate them from future vacillation. Agents can experience their intrinsic conflict without occupying a third, more reflective perspective that encompasses both conflicting values. Instead, they can only deliberate from within the dominant value, recognizing the presence of the nondominant value as an inability to fully inhabit the dominant one.

3.7. Intrinsic conflicts are actually resolved by a lengthy, gradual aspirational process.

Aspiration is a diachronic (occurring over time) process where an agent aims to change their own ethical point of view. Aspirants work to improve their desires, feelings, ethical evaluations, and overall capacity for responding to reasons. They aim to appreciate one set of values more fully while becoming immune or insensitive to values that intrinsically conflict with the first set. Aspiring individuals are not merely changing their character but actively directing their attention and efforts to become a different, better person.

The resolution of intrinsic conflict does not happen in a moment, but through aspiration, which is a form of ethical movement that takes place over time. Aspirants work to change their valuational outlook by focusing on the desired values and redirecting their attention away from the conflicting values. This process of redirection and focus is essential for effecting long-term change.

4. Akrasia is an instance of intrinsic conflict. Akrasia results from the imperfect grasp of values and the need to make decisions based on our current understanding.

Akrasia is the classical philosophical term for the phenomenon in which an individual intentionally acts against their better judgment, finding themselves engaging in activities they believe they should not be doing. For most of human history, this was understood as a conflict of reason against passion, but then Donald Davidson wrote a paper in 1970 called “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?”, in which he challenged this, and for some reason, some people decided to listen to him.

4.1. Akrasia should not be understood through the Davidsonian inclusivist theory.

According to the inclusivist approach, introduced by Donald Davidson, akratic actions occur when a person acts on a weaker reason while acknowledging that there is a stronger reason not to do so. The all-things-considered judgment takes into account both reasons, and akrasia arises when an individual acts on the weaker reason. This account of akrasia is problematic, as it leads to the “double-counting problem”: if one has already discounted the rational force of one consideration in favor of another, it cannot be counted again, independently, as a reason to act.

For example, suppose that J chooses $100 over $200, despite recognizing that $200 is the better choice. The value of the weaker reason has already been accounted for in the decision-making process. Therefore, acting on the weaker reason would amount to double-counting. It is impossible to act on a weaker reason, as it has already been considered and discounted in the decision-making process. This problem undermines the inclusivist account of akrasia and raises questions about its explanatory power.

The inclusivist approach to akrasia also fails to explain why we can distinguish between ordinary cases of akrasia and cases involving irrationality or extreme consequences, such as choosing a poisoned cookie. For example, if someone eats a cookie knowing it contains lethal poison, it would be strange to say they were acting on their weaker reason (taste) when the stronger reason (preserving their life) clearly outweighs it. Inclusivism cannot explain why we are inclined to reinterpret such high-stakes cases as non-akratic.

4.2. Akratic actions should be understood, in the context of aspiration, as actions moved by an aspirant’s subordinate evaluative perspective.

Akratic actions result from a conflict between a dominant and a subordinate evaluative perspective, each of which presents the agent with different reasons for action. A dominant perspective is the one from which the agent deliberates, while the subordinate perspective represents a conflicting value. Akratic individuals act from their subordinate evaluative perspective, which is excluded from their deliberation, instead of their dominant evaluative perspective, which represents their better judgment. In akrasia, the conflict between the individual’s reason to act and their reason not to act is deliberatively unavailable.

The character Zafar, from Zia Haider Rahman’s novel In the Light of What We Know, serves as an example. Zafar, born in Bangladesh but raised in London, is sent back to Bangladesh to learn about his origins. Upon his arrival, he feels a sense of kinship with the people around him, even though he considers himself an outsider. This conflict between his rational judgment (that he doesn’t belong) and the emotional pull of kinship (feeling connected to people who look like him) exemplifies intrinsic conflict. Akratics are moved by a reason that, from a certain viewpoint, appears to be no reason at all.

Another example is someone on a diet who is tempted by a cookie. Two different rational considerations arise from the tastiness of the cookie. On one hand, the person considers the pleasure the cookie will bring as part of their life overall; on the other hand, they crave the immediate pleasure of eating the cookie. While their dominant evaluative perspective (commitment to the diet) should lead them to reject the cookie, their subordinate evaluative perspective (craving immediate pleasure) moves them to indulge. The akratic person’s intrinsic conflict prevents these two reasons from being in conversation with one another.

4.3. Akratic actions are free.

Akratic actions can be considered free, as they are intentional actions resulting from the agent acting on reasons. These reasons are derived from the subordinate evaluative perspective, which cannot be assimilated to an outside force acting on the agent. Instead, it presents the agent with considerations in favor of acting a certain way, and thus it is rational enough to count as internal. The agent’s identity is not restricted to the subset of values that cohere with one another or the subset from which they deliberate; they also include the parts of themselves they would (at times) rather be without.

Akrasia is different from compulsion because akratic agents act on reasons, while compulsive actions are forced and not up to the agent’s evaluation of what is good or bad. In compulsive actions, the explanation is not a rationalizing one, but a merely causal account of the interplay between the agent’s brain chemistry and their environment. In contrast, akratic actions are intentional because they result from the agent acting on reasons, even if they conflict with their dominant evaluative perspective.

4.4. The intrinsic conflict analysis covers all real cases of akrasia.

This analysis might seem limited to cases involving the traditional reason/passion framework, but it can actually accommodate cases that do not fit it, such as Davidson’s toothbrusher.

Davidson’s paper gave the example of a person who finds themselves in bed after a long day and realizes they haven’t brushed their teeth. They consider the reasons for and against getting up to brush their teeth. On one hand, their teeth are strong and skipping brushing once won’t cause significant harm. On the other hand, getting up might disturb their relaxation and potentially cause a bad night’s sleep. They ultimately judge it would be better to stay in bed. However, the feeling that they should brush their teeth is too strong, and they get up to brush their teeth akratically (i.e., against their better judgment).

In this case, the toothbrusher is moved by an evaluative perspective which may be called the force of habit. Habit, distinct from an unthinking tendency, is an ethical point of view that presents something as “to be done” or “a good thing to do” because one usually does it. This means that the value of habitual behavior is left out of the evaluative perspective, which focuses on the specific occasion. In this case, the toothbrusher’s decision-making process is essentially nonhabitual, but their feeling that they should brush their teeth is too strong to ignore, leading to akratic action.

We may also analyse the case of Joe, who is hurrying to the bank to deposit a check before it closes; if he doesn’t make it in time, he’ll lose $500. Along the way, he sees a $1 bill being blown by the wind. Even though he reasons that chasing the $1 bill is not worth the risk of arriving late at the bank, he finds himself drawn to chase it anyway. In this case, Joe’s actions are influenced by two different evaluative perspectives: one that prioritizes getting to the bank on time, and another that values the excitement of chasing the bill or the delight of finding money on the street. If we remove these elements from the story, it becomes more plausible that Joe’s actions are driven by ignorance or compulsion rather than akrasia.

Even if this analysis only works for some cases of akrasia, it still has important implications for understanding the relationship between akrasia and aspiration. If you are not convinced that the intrinsic conflict analysis applies to all cases, you should simply interpret the following uses of term “akrasia” as referring only to the cases for which the analysis works.

4.5. Akrasia, understood as intrinsic conflict, can happen in three ways, according to how much of the subordinate evaluative perspective ought to be retained.

The first way is when one’s subordinate evaluative perspective represents a bad way of thinking that they have mostly shed. An example is a reformed racist who still occasionally has inappropriate emotional reactions. In such cases, the individual may aspire to eliminate the corrupt evaluative perspective and resolve their intrinsic conflict.

The second way is when the subordinate perspective is less toxic and complete resolution doesn’t necessarily mean its extinction. An example is a chocolate “addict” adopting a healthy lifestyle who eventually learns to moderate their dessert intake. In these cases, the transformation might be marked by a reintegration of the previously rejected goods, and the fault lines may shrink over time.

The third way is when the dominant evaluative perspective is the one that needs to go. An example is Huck Finn, who feels inclined to protect a runaway slave but believes he has a duty to turn the slave in. The ideal resolution in this case would be to abandon the dominant evaluative perspective in favor of the subordinate one, which would become rationally articulated.

Akrasia is frustrating in the short term, but it also indicates our potential for growth in value-apprehension. The fact that we can be akratically insensitive to our dominant evaluative perspective also means that we can be sensitive to evaluative content that doesn’t fit into that perspective. Thus, the possibility of akrasia is connected to the possibility of aspiration, as both phenomena are related to our ability to grow and change our values.

4.6. Aspirants, insofar as they act as such, aim to resolve their intrinsic conflicts. This distinguishes them from akratic persons, as well as from “enkratic” persons, who act correctly but also do not try to resolve their conflicts.

Aspirants aim to resolve their intrinsic conflicts by trying to better understand the target value and approach the “paragon,” an idealized version of themselves that fully embodies the target value, and who, therefore, easily and confidently makes decisions based on their values without being swayed by temptation or conflicting desires.

Akratic persons, on the other hand, try to act in spite of their intrinsic conflicts. They do not aim to better understand the target value but rather deliberate as if they were the paragon, acting on the reasons they already have. Since they do not fully understand their target values, this leads them to create an exaggerated, restrictive version of the paragon, which might not align with the actual paragon of a particular value. In attempting to emulate the paragon, the akratic person overestimates their ability to resist temptation, and makes poor decisions as a result.

The same conflict is experienced, in a similar way, by “enkratic” persons, who face the same temptation as akratic persons, but successfully act in accordance with their better judgment. Although enkratics manage to act in accordance with their better judgment, they similarly do not engage in reasoning that aims to inhabit it more perfectly.

Aspirants, insofar as they think in an aspirational way concerning the target value, focus on the reasons they are in the process of acquiring, acting toward a better grasp of the target value. Since they do not always think in this way, however, they sometimes make decisions based on their current, albeit partial, grasp of the target value, which means they are also subject to akrasia (and enkrateia).

Responsibility

5. Aspiration must be framed as a process in which we are guided by the values of the self which we aspire to be, rather than our current values. This framing avoids a dilemma where, as Abbé Sieyès might have put it, “if the new values agree with the old, the change is superfluous; if they disagree, the change cannot come from our rational agency.”

5.1. A process of “self-endorsement” cannot lead to a change of values.

“Self-endorsement” refers to the process where an agent evaluates and attaches positive or negative evaluations to aspects of themselves. Since it relies on pre-existing values to appraise aspects of oneself, it cannot serve as a means of self-creation, which involves the creation of new values.

When evaluating a value (V1, for example) within the context of other values (V2 and V3), an individual may conclude that they should or shouldn’t value V1. However, such a conclusion does not actually change their values; it merely changes their judgment about what they should or should not value. This separation between what values one has and what values one should have prevents self-endorsement from leading to self-creation.

“Coherentist self-policing”, the process of assessing oneself for coherence – alignment among one’s values, or between one’s values and one’s judgments about those values – also fails to result in self-creation. When an individual evaluates their values for coherence, they may recognize that they should value something differently, but this recognition, even though it could potentially motivate value change, cannot create a change in their actual values by itself. Self-endorsement, therefore, is limited to altering the agent’s judgment about what they ought to value, rather than what they actually value.

5.2. Self-change cannot be understood by “self-cultivation” theories, because those theories are subject to Strawson’s dilemma, where the new values must be either continuous with the old values (and therefore there is no significant change) or discontinuous with them (and therefore the change is not agential).

Many philosophers have written theories of “self-cultivation”, describing a process by which a person can act to determine their future self. For instance:

• Jean Hampton describes “self-authorship” as a process where individuals choose who they will be by developing traits, interests, and projects that are consistent with their objective human needs and desires. She contrasts this authentic form of self-determination with one in which a person is shaped by social or environmental pressures.
• Michael Smith imagines self-cultivation as a reflective process, in which one moves toward greater consistency among one’s desires through systematic reasoning. This creates new desires and destroys old ones, resulting in a more rational and coherent set of values.
• Michael Bratman develops Frankfurt’s higher-order model in a diachronic direction, and suggests that adopting “higher-order self-governing policies” can resolve the problem of “underdetermination by value judgment” when faced with a choice between multiple equally valuable pursuits.
• Richard Holton defends the possibility of “rational non-reconsideration,” in which a person adheres to earlier resolutions as to what they should do and does not reopen the matter for deliberation.
• Joseph Raz describes the agent at the output of the process of cultivation as doing something akin to keeping promises made by their past self.

Those theories cannot help us understand self-creation because they are subject to Strawson’s dilemma, which was invented by Galen Strawson in his 1994 paper “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”. In this dilemma, if the new values are continuous with the old ones, they are entailed by them, and therefore, no genuine change occurs in the individual’s values – the process is merely an extension or development of the individual’s existing values, rather than a true self-creation. On the other hand, if the new values are discontinuous, they contradict or come at a tangent to the old values. In this case, the new values arise accidentally or through external influence, rather than through the individual’s own agency. Consequently, the person changes, but they do not change themselves. The new self is not the result of their own actions or decisions, but rather a product of chance or external factors.

This dilemma recurs whenever we try to trace the origins of one’s values back in time. At each point, the individual faces the same choice: either the new value follows rationally from their previous values, or it is unrelated to them. In the first case, there is no true self-creation, while in the second case, the new self is not the product of the individual’s own agency. This leads to a vicious regress, where the source of self-cultivation is pushed further and further back in time, ultimately leaving no room for self-creation.

5.3. The difference between aspiration and self-cultivation may be illustrated by a parallel with the metaphor of Neurath’s boat, and by contrast with Hampton’s example of an investment banker who decides to become a clown.

Neurath’s boat is a metaphor that represents the idea of self-creation and personal development. The boat must be rebuilt while it sails, meaning that one cannot fully detach from their character, values, and judgments in order to fashion a new self. Instead, the process of self-creation happens from within, as one gradually transforms their values, character, and judgments. This metaphor emphasizes that even though we can’t step outside ourselves, we can still work towards adopting new perspectives and values to eventually arrive at a vantage point outside our current character.

Hampton’s example, on the other hand, illustrates the concept of self-cultivation and autonomy. The investment banker who decides to become a clown does not need to learn or develop new values. Instead, he merely has to resist social pressures and align his choices with his true desires, which he had since he was a teenager. This story highlights the role of autonomy in shaping one’s life, but does not necessarily involve the process of aspiration.

Aspiration differs from self-cultivation in that it involves a more active process of seeking new values, goals, and perspectives, whereas self-cultivation focuses on aligning choices with one’s existing values and desires. The aspirant may not yet know what they truly want or value, and so they reach out to others for help and guidance, relying on mentors, teachers, or supportive figures to assist them in their journey of self-discovery. This process of aspiration requires a delicate interplay between the individual and others, as the aspirant gradually internalizes the new values and perspectives they encounter.

5.4. Aspiration must be framed as a process in which we are guided by the values of the self which we aspire to be, rather than our current values.

Strawson’s dilemma assumes that the creator self (S1) must be the source of the created self’s (S2) values. To avoid it, we must believe instead that the creator self should look forward, aspiring to become the person she hopes to be, rather than looking backward and having the future self beholden to the past self. It is helpful to understand this in terms of the idea of normative dependence.

There is a normative dependence relation between two items when norms apply to the one item in virtue of the fact that, in the first instance, they apply to the other. When two things stand in this relation, the one inherits its normativity from the other. For instance, a Kantian might believe that actions have a normative dependence upon intentions, whereas an Aristotelian might believe the opposite.

This allows us to reframe Strawson’s dilemma in terms of two requirements: the Continuity Requirement and the Novelty Requirement. The Continuity Requirement posits that there must be a normative dependence relation between S1 and S2, while the Novelty Requirement demands that S2 contains a value or values not dependent on the values of S1. These requirements only contradict each other if we assume that S1’s values are the source of S2’s values. Instead, we should believe that the creator self relates to the self she creates aspirationally.

The creator self (S1), then, is not the source of normative authority, but rather borrows it from the created self (S2). It is not S1’s place to create goals, reasons, or duties for S2, as S1 is not evaluatively as she should be. Instead, S1 should look forward and aspire to become the person she hopes to be (S2), i.e., relate to S2 aspirationally.

This avoids Strawson’s dilemma, allowing for a process of value-acquisition that progresses toward its own source of normativity. This approach satisfies both the Continuity Requirement and the Novelty Requirement, enabling significant agential change without requiring values to be either entirely continuous or discontinuous with the old values.

5.5. Adopting an approach where the aspirant is guided by the target value, rather than the future self, would not make a theoretical difference.

Someone may question why an aspirant should be thought of as being guided by their future self, rather than being guided by the value itself to which their future self is more responsive. This alternative proposal aims to avoid teleology, as the value would pre-exist the agent’s aspirational goal, and thus the source of normativity wouldn’t have to follow that which it is the source of.

This “value gambit” doesn’t succeed in avoiding teleology, however. The aspirant is, indeed, guided by the value, but in a non-paradigmatic way, in which the actions taken by the aspirant in response to the value only become intelligible as a response to the value when situated in a developmental process that leads to the proper (paradigmatic) response to the value, which the aspirant doesn’t fully grasp yet.

Characterizing the aspirant as guided by their future self might appear egoistic, but as mentioned in §0.4, our theory takes self to be defined by value. As such, whether we choose to use the language of the self or the value, the aspirant is depicted as more self-oriented than they should be. This is a feature of the theory, not a flaw: aspirants are indeed more self-oriented than they should be, as they are not yet fully developed in their appreciation of the value they are pursuing.

At any rate, the future self (S2) is a normative source for the present self (S1), which is not the same as the future self causing the present self to come into existence – causal or temporal priority fails to track normative priority, since the agent acts on a proleptic reason, that comes from their future self. Setting aside metaphysical worries about whether this is possible, there is still the issue of whether this may be understood as a form of rational agency.

5.6. Davidson’s and Anscombe’s theories do not allow us to understand aspiration as a form of rational agency.

Christine Korsgaard’s “guidance condition” on rational agency states that a person acts rationally only when their action is an expression of their mental activity. The aspirant (the agent undergoing the process of aspiration) might not satisfy this guidance condition, as they lack a clear or determinate conception of their target until they arrive at it. Other theories of rational agency are similarly unhelpful.

Davidson’s causal theory of action suggests that some behavior counts as an example of agency because it is caused by a belief and desire that rationalize it. In this view, rational guidance is a causal matter. However, aspiration cannot qualify as rationally guided in this framework because the aspirant fails to grasp the full normative grounding of her project until it is completed. If the reason is fully available to the agent only at the conclusion of the aspiration, it cannot efficiently cause the behavior that constitutes her aspiration.

Anscombe’s practical knowledge theory, on the other hand, posits that some behavior counts as an action because, throughout the course of the action, the agent has a distinctive practical knowledge of what she is doing. The agent’s reason for action must be the object of her practical knowledge. However, this account is also unhelpful for understanding aspiration because the aspirant does not fully grasp her reason for action in advance. She cannot confidently and authoritatively assess her own actions, which differentiates her from agents with a schematic grasp of their end.

Both Davidson’s and Anscombe’s theories assume that the agent has access to the normative standards governing their own action, but the aspirant lacks this access. As a result, neither theory adequately accounts for the aspirant’s progress as something she does, given that she lacks a clear or determinate conception of her target until she arrives at it.

We cannot ground the normativity of aspiration in antecedent representation without running in a circle. In order to understand aspiration as a form of rational agency, we must adopt a framework that accounts for the aspirant’s partial grasp of the value she is pursuing, and her dependence on the assessments of others.

5.7. We may revise theories of rational agency to include aspirational agency by acknowledging the possibility of proleptic rationality.

“Aspirational agency” may be contrasted with “self-standing action,” as described by philosophers like Anscombe and Davidson. The latter focuses on clear-eyed agents who act from practical knowledge, whereas the actions taken from aspirational agency cannot be understood without reference to a larger stretch of agency of which they are part. The aspirant’s agency is not self-standing, and the aspirational whole is not a single action.

Korsgaard’s guidance condition and claims that there are two ways of grasping a norm or being guided by reason: one is the manner of the agent of a self-standing action, and the other is proleptically. In the case of proleptic rationality, the agent’s grasp of the norm guides aspirational activity without serving as its normative bedrock, as it is an attenuated version of the grasp of value she will have once she reaches her aspirational endpoint.

Aspirational agents are not knowers, but learners. They engage in practical reasoning to improve their conception of the good that drives their reasoning. Aspirational agency is teleological, meaning it is done for the sake of some subsequent end. What makes it special and puzzling is that the agent’s sense of where she is going is also, in the relevant sense, going somewhere. In other words, the aspirant is not only moving toward a particular end but also refining their understanding of that end in the process.

6. Individuals are praiseworthy for the good valuational condition they attain through aspiration, while they are blameworthy for the culpable failure to aspire to a better condition.

6.1. Aspiration is different from Talbot Brewer’s concept of “dialectical activity”.

Dialectical activity is a concept described by Talbot Brewer in his book The Retrieval of Ethics. According to Brewer, dialectical activities are those that progressively unveil their internal goods, allowing the practitioner to gain a clearer understanding of the activity itself through continuous engagement. Examples of dialectical activities include parenting, having a conversation, being in love, and appreciating music.

The main difference between aspiration and dialectical activity lies in the grasp of value. In the context of dialectical activity, the agent’s grasp of value is considered imperfect, while in aspiration, the agent’s grasp is inadequate. Imperfection refers to a situation where an entity does not completely satisfy or instantiate a norm, while inadequacy implies that the entity is not good enough and requires a remedy.

Brewer’s dialectical activities apply to both novice and expert practitioners, and their grasp of the value can be considered imperfect but still adequate. In contrast, an aspirant is aware of the inadequacy of their grasp of value, which leads them to aspire to change themselves to have a better grasp. As a result, aspirational activities are not performed for their own sake, but rather as a means of self-change.

While dialectical desires cannot be expressed in the form of a proposition describing a state of affairs to be brought about, aspirants’ desires can. For example, an aspirant may desire to bring about a state in which they can appreciate music. This desire is what unifies the aspirational project, distinguishing it from dialectical activity, which does not involve self-creation. Therefore, aspiration and dialectical activity serve different purposes and should not be conflated.

6.2. Aspiration is different from ambition. The former attempts to change poorly-understood values, while the latter attempts to change well-understood material conditions.

Aspiration is a pursuit that is large in scale and directed at change in oneself, while ambition is also large in scale but not directed at producing a change in the self. Ambitious pursuits are more about achieving some form of success, the value of which can be fully grasped in advance. Ambition often involves pursuing goods like wealth, power, and fame, which can be well appreciated even by those who do not possess them.

Ambition can be beneficial, but also carries the danger of trapping an individual in an impoverished appreciation of value. It is possible for someone to be both ambitious and aspirational, but it is also possible to criticize someone for having too much ambition and too little aspiration. An example of two graduate students illustrates this point. The first student selects courses with the conscious aim of shaping herself into a successful academic, while the second student allows interest and passion to determine her choices. The “heavy-handed” student is more ambitious, focusing on achieving success rather than learning to want something new; the second student is more aspirational, as she allows interest and passion to guide her choices, being open to new values and learning experiences.

Aspiration is a process of trying to acquire new values, which involves openness to value and a willingness to learn, change, and grow. There is no such thing as generalized openness to value that does not take the form of some concrete pursuit of value. Aspirants cannot aspire without some grasp of the value they are trying to acquire, and often need guidance and assistance from others to help them grasp their goals. Aspiration can also involve aspiring to be free from a certain value, as in the case of changing attitudes towards homosexuality.

Ambition, on the other hand, focuses on achieving specific outcomes or forms of success that can be well-appreciated in advance, and are already well-understood. Ambitious people usually have a clear understanding of why they want to achieve their goals, even if they don’t know how to achieve them yet.

6.3. Individuals are praiseworthy for the good valuational condition they attain through aspiration, while they are blameworthy for the culpable failure to aspire to a better condition.

We are responsible for the values we acquire aspirationally. Aspiration essentially involves the contribution of one’s environment, which makes responsibility a matter of degree. It may be understood by the example of two children who learn to play a musical piece, one with natural talent and support from a piano-teacher mother, while the other is mostly self-taught and has to find time to practice amid other responsibilities. The second child deserves more credit for their achievement because their aspiration played a more significant role in their development.

However, this account only describes a sufficient condition for being responsible for one’s good character, while a different account is needed for responsibility for bad or blameworthy character traits. A person can be held responsible for their bad character if they have culpably failed to aspire to be better, as opposed to aspiring to be bad. Environmental factors can be used to distinguish between more culpable and less culpable failures to aspire.

The idea of “omissive culpability” can explain the responsibility for bad character traits, which is an error of omission. The evil person did not aspire to become a good person, though they could have, and they are responsible for being the kind of person who would commit harmful actions due to their culpable omission to aspire to be a better kind of person.

6.4. There is no such thing as aspiring to be evil.

If you doubt this, consider the example of a gangster in training, who might seem to aspire to be an even more criminal gangster. In this case, it helps to notice that we cannot imagine two young gangsters who are distinguished by the question of whether they aspire or merely have the ambition to become gangsters. Instead, we can only differentiate between gangsters based on their values or motivations, such as aspiring to help their family or gain respect. To further illustrate this point, consider this speech by Henry Hill, the protagonist of the film Goodfellas:

As far back as I can remember, I always wanted to be a gangster. To me, being a gangster was better than being President of the United States. Even before I first wandered into the cabstand for an after-school job, I knew I wanted to be a part of them. It was there that I knew that I belonged. To me, it meant being somebody in a neighborhood that was full of nobodies. They weren’t like anybody else. I mean, they did whatever they wanted. They double-parked in front of a hydrant and nobody ever gave them a ticket. In the summer when they played cards all night, nobody ever called the cops.

Contrast it with this imagined speech that might have been given by a reminiscing writer, such as Stephen King:

As far back as I can remember, I always wanted to be a writer. To me, being a writer was better than being President of the United States. Even before I first wandered into the newspaper office for an after-school job, I knew I wanted to be a part of them. It was there that I knew that I belonged. To me, it meant being somebody in a neighborhood that was full of nobodies. They weren’t like anybody else. I mean, they did whatever they wanted. They didn’t own TVs or care what other people thought about them. They read during meals and ignored social conventions; they were rude and they paid no penalty for it.

While both use aspirational language to describe their desires, Stephen’s aspirations involve pursuing a value that goes beyond himself, whereas Henry’s desires remain trapped in a fantasy without genuine value-advance.

There is a connection between this argument and Augustine’s argument about the impossibility of learning to sin. Augustine posits that learning entails understanding, and understanding is always good; therefore, there is no bad form of learning. Similarly, there is an internal connection between aspiration and genuine value-advance. In other words, aspiration is a form of practical learning that involves ethical significance.

Conclusion

7. The theory of aspiration helps us understand situations of motherhood and infertility, for example, better than other theories that have so far been invented.

7.1. Aspiration provides a good explanation of cases of aspiring parents.

Aspiration can be applied to situations of motherhood and infertility by highlighting the significance of support systems in the process of becoming a parent. Aspiring mothers, whether they face infertility issues or not, rely on the guidance, empathy, and material assistance from their loved ones and healthcare professionals. This support network helps them navigate the challenges of motherhood and grow into their new roles as parents.

Additionally, the theory of aspiration emphasizes the ethical responsibility that individuals have when interacting with aspirants, which can be applied to the relationships between aspiring mothers and their support systems. Just as teachers, coaches, and advisors have a responsibility to guide aspirants with care, sensitivity, and empathy, those who support aspiring mothers should approach their roles with the same level of commitment and ethical consideration. This understanding of aspiration and the support networks involved can provide insight into the importance of a nurturing and compassionate environment for aspiring mothers, especially those facing the challenges of infertility.

The views of Ullmann-Margalit and Paul on life-changing decisions, such as having children, fail to address the emotional and ethical aspects of these decisions. The aspirational approach improves upon them by acknowledging that aspiring parents or those facing infertility have proleptic reasons to feel certain emotions, such as grief.

In the case of infertility, it helps us recognize the legitimate grief experienced by those who are unable to have children. They grieve the life they never had the chance to know, and the value they never got to experience. This grief is rational, and stems from the aspirant’s predicament of not being able to acquire the value they sought.

Similarly, for those who must give up their aspirations (such as education) to raise a child, the aspirational approach acknowledges their grief as a rational response. These individuals feel the loss of their own self and the life they were trying to build. By recognizing aspiration and its role in these experiences, we can better understand and empathize with the emotions faced by those in situations of motherhood and infertility.

7.2. Callous attitudes towards infertile people often come from a failure to recognize proleptic reasons.

This may be seen from two examples of callousness towards infertile people. The first example was when Agnes Callard, in response to her friend’s infertility, suggested adoption prematurely, which came across as cruel and implied that it was self-indulgent for her friend to want biological children. The second example is this quote from E. May’s 1995 book Barren in the Promised Land, quoting a woman named Deirdre Kearny as “one among many who provided a list of frequently heard offensive remarks”:

I really would like to write a book entitled What NOT to Say to Infertile Couples! “Just forget it and go on.” “I don’t think it would have bothered me if I couldn’t have children.” (p. 13)

These examples of callousness are due to the difficulty of theorizing or rationalizing proleptic reasons, or reasons based on anticipation of future values. In the first example, Callard’s response was callous because she failed to recognize the proleptic character of her friend’s reasons for wanting biological children. She should have understood that her friend longed for experiences like feeling her unborn baby kick or giving birth. In the second example, the person making the offensive comment (Bill) denies that he had access to the value of parenthood in advance, which results in a denial of the loss experienced by those who have never been parents.

Both examples share a blindness to the way infertile people are antecedently invested in motherhood. The insensitivity in these responses is rooted in the failure to acknowledge the aspirational vulnerability and the proleptic reasons that drive people who want to become parents.

7.3. Proleptic rationality allows an understanding of the desire for parenthood as rational.

Proleptic reasons are anticipatory, meaning they are based on an individual’s limited understanding of a future value or perspective. In the case of aspiring parents, they may have an incomplete grasp of what parenthood entails and the value it holds.

It would be inappropriate to treat the decision to become a parent as a simple choice or a transaction, like buying a car. Rather, parenthood is a transformative experience, one that may shake one’s existing value system and require a reevaluation of priorities. Prospective parents may struggle to weigh the various factors involved in becoming a parent, as their understanding of the value of parenthood is not fully developed.

Insensitive responses to aspirants often stem from a failure to recognize the multiple evaluative perspectives that divide an individual’s deliberative faculties. This inability to provide a clear justification for one’s actions is a common feature of proleptic reasoning. Aspiring parents might not be able to articulate why they want to become parents, but once they experience parenthood, they can say, “This was why.”

The proleptic character of our reasons for wanting to become parents is, in fact, beneficial. As parents-to-be, we have an incomplete understanding of what parenthood entails, which allows us to be open to loving any child that comes into our lives. This openness is crucial for forming a genuine, loving bond with our future children, as they will ultimately shape and define what parenthood means for each of us.

Reasons and Persons

This post criticizes Reasons and Persons by Derek Parfit, which I just read.

I think I would have been impressed by this book if I had read it five years ago, as a naïve kid who didn’t know much about philosophy. But as things are, I think that everything it says is very confused and poorly thought out, and overall, it is the worst thing I’ve ever read. I’m not sure whether to even call it philosophy – it’s more like a kind of Buddhism built up from a bunch of vague undefined ideas and sci-fi thought experiments.

There’s a religious side to Plato and Aristotle too, but the difference to me is that for them, the religious stuff is really just a cute way to represent what are really some scientific theories. When Plato says that the forms are imperishable and perfect, this is (or can be) really just an exciting way to communicate the fact that in typical human experience, our concepts don’t change when our sensations do, and they don’t have the limitations that we observe. When Aristotle talks about souls, that’s really just the way in which we understand living things to move by themselves – Plato does seem to believe in immortality in a deeper way, but at least that’s a way for him to understand the origin of our ideas here on earth, since they can’t come totally from the senses, so there’s some sophistication there.

But when Parfit uses his obfuscations about identity to basically say that there’s no separation between our psychological experiences and those of other people, this doesn’t come from anything that otherwise helps you understand the world. He’s just making things up, and trying to make them sound plausible by making you imagine fictional scenarios.

A method followed throughout much of the book is the anti-rational method of making up principles for the reason that they support previously-preferred conclusions, and of arguing against opposing theories because they lead to a so-called “absurd” conclusion, not in the sense of self-contradictory or incomprehensible, but of disliked. This is done very clearly in §26, §50, and §52, and most egregiously throughout Part 4, where each chapter is about a specific disliked conclusion, which he makes up various theories to try to reject. I have spoken against this method here and here. In brief, if you already supported your conclusions before you chose your principles, then your conclusions were never rational – rationalization, despite what the word sounds like it means, cannot make conclusions become rational, but rather can only make them appear reasonable to the uneducated.

What follows is a series of some of the worst things Parfit says in the book. This covers only a small part of Reasons and Persons, mostly from its beginning; this is because the book was very long and very bad, and most of the wrong things it said were said too vaguely to be worth the interpretation work they would take to discuss.

Rational irrationality

Derek Parfit believed in such a self-contradictory thing as rational irrationality. The phrase is his own, although he does not use it in the following extended quotation.

Schelling’s Answer to Armed Robbery. A man breaks into my house. He hears me calling the police. But, since the nearest town is far away, the police cannot arrive in less then fifteen minutes. The man orders me to open the safe in which I hoard my gold. He threatens that, unless he gets the gold in the next five minutes, he will start shooting my children, one by one.

What is it rational for me to do? I need the answer fast. I realize that it would not be rational to give this man the gold. The man knows that, if he simply takes the gold, either I or my children could tell the police the make and number of the car in which he drives away. So there is a great risk that, if he gets the gold, he will kill me and my children before he drives away.

Since it would be irrational to give this man the gold, should I ignore his threat? This would also be irrational. There is a great risk that he will kill one of my children, to make me believe his threat that, unless he gets the gold, he will kill my other children.

What should I do? It is very likely that, whether or not I give this man the gold, he will kill us all. I am in a desperate position. Fortunately, I remember reading Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict. I also have a special drug, conveniently at hand. This drug causes one to be, for a brief period, very irrational. Before the man can stop me, I reach for the bottle and drink. Within a few seconds, it becomes apparent that I am crazy. Reeling about the room, I say to the man: ‘Go ahead. I love my children. So please kill them.’ The man tries to get the gold by torturing me. I cry out: ‘This is agony. So please go on.’

Given the state that I am in, the man is now powerless. He can do nothing that will induce me to open the safe. Threats and torture cannot force concessions from someone who is so irrational. The man can only flee, hoping to escape the police. And, since I am in this state, he is less likely to believe that I would record the number of his car. He therefore has less reason to kill me.

While I am in this state, I shall act in irrational ways. There is a risk that, before the police arrive, I may harm myself or my children. But, since I have no gun, this risk is small. And making myself irrational is the best way to reduce the great risk that this man will kill us all.

On any plausible theory about rationality, it would be rational for me, in this case, to cause myself to become for a period irrational. [...] (§5)

Obviously, it is always irrational to become irrational, so he is wrong. What the hell is wrong with him? And he thinks “any plausible theory about rationality” has to go along with this bullshit.

Self-effacing truth

Later, Parfit discusses the possibility that an ethical theory called “S” might lead us, in some circumstances, to conclude that we ought to stop believing the theory:

If S told us to believe some other theory, this would not support this other theory. But would it be an objection to S? Once again, S would not be failing in its own terms. S is a theory about practical not theoretical rationality. S may tell us to make ourselves have false beliefs. If it would be better for us to have false beliefs, having true beliefs, even about rationality, would not be part of the ultimate aim given to us by S. [...]

Suppose that S told everyone to cause himself to believe some other theory. S would then be self-effacing. If we all believed S, but could also change our beliefs, S would remove itself from the scene. It would become a theory that no one believed. But to be self-effacing is not to be self-defeating. It is not the aim of a theory to be believed. If we personify theories, and pretend that they have aims, the aim of a theory is not to be believed, but to be true, or to be the best theory. That a theory is self-effacing does not show that it is not the best theory. [...]

Though S would not be failing in its own terms, it might be claimed that an acceptable theory cannot be self-effacing. I deny this claim. It may seem plausible for what, when examined, is a bad reason. It would be natural to want the best theory about rationality not to be self-effacing. If the best theory was self-effacing, telling us to believe some other theory, the truth about rationality would be depressingly convoluted. It is natural to hope that the truth is simpler: that the best theory would tell us to believe itself. But can this be more than a hope? Can we assume that the truth must be simpler? We cannot. (§9)

Apparently he believes that “practical rationality” may possibly tell us to believe what is false, unlike “theoretical rationality”. But of course, nothing that tells us to have false beliefs deserves the name of rationality, since reason is, fundamentally, the faculty with which we seek knowledge. Parfit deceptively distorts language, and then pretends that someone could only protest against this if moved by wishful thinking.

For any theory about actual rationality, to conclude that it is rational to believe something is the same as to conclude that it is true, which is why no such theory can be self-effacing, never mind “the best” theory. A theory that claims to be about rationality, but does not conceive of reason as the faculty that seeks knowledge, is really a misleadingly-named theory about something other than rationality – in this case, a theory of Parfit’s wicked delusions.

Actions from passion more virtuous

The following is how Parfit says that a hedonistic utilitarian might try to defend his claim that acting morally is a mere means:

He might first appeal to the unattractiveness of what Williams calls moral self-indulgence. Compare two people who are trying to relieve the suffering of others. The first person acts because he sympathises with these people. He also believes that suffering is bad, and ought to be relieved. The second person acts because he wants to think of himself as someone who is morally good. Of these two people, the first seems to be better. But the first person has no thoughts about the goodness of acting morally, or the badness of wrongdoing. He is moved to act simply by his sympathy, and by his belief that, since suffering is bad, he ought to try to prevent it. This person seems to regard acting morally as a mere means. It is the second person who regards acting morally as a separate aim that is in itself good. Since the first person seems to be better, this supports the claim that acting morally is a mere means. (§19)

Of course, it makes no sense to believe that the first person, on any account, even seems to be better. This strange passage cannot be interpreted in any reasonable way, and is simply insane.